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AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LOOK AT
FEDERALISM IN TAXATIONt
Daniel Shaviro *
INTRODUCTION

Over the past thirty years, state and local tax receipts have more
than doubled in real terms, and have even increased relative to U.S.
government tax receipts and gross national product. 1 They now account for more than $400 billion annually, or in excess of thirty percent of the taxes collected in this country and ten percent of gross
national product.2 Over the next few years, state and local taxation
may continue to increase in importance, since government service expansion seems more likely to occur below the national leveP and since,
for political reasons, the taxing authority is often the same as the
spending authority.
As a result, the interaction between taxation and federalism is
more important than ever. What are the consequences of assigning to
limited geographical jurisdictions, subject to congressional and federal
judicial review, so much of the power to levy and collect taxes that
inevitably have national effects? Given the danger of protectionist or
burden-exporting local legislation, as well as the overlap with national
taxation - in tension with the maxim of federalism that generally
t © 1992 by Daniel Shaviro.

All rights reserved.
Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. A.B. 1978, Princeton; J.D. 1981,
Yale. - Ed. I am grateful to the American Enterprise Institute, which commissioned and provided financial support for this paper, and which will be publishing a slightly different version as
part of a larger study of federalism. I am also grateful to the Russell Baker Scholai:s Fund and
the Walter J. Blum Faculty Research Fund for financial support. Earlier versions of this paper
were presented at workshops held at the University of Chicago Law School, Columbia University
School of Law, New York University School of Law, the University of Pennsylvania Law School,
and the First Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association. I appreciate
the comments of the participants at those workshops and comments separately received from
Bernard Black, Walter Blum, Robert Ellickson, Thomas Griffith, Jonathan Macey, Geoffrey
Miller, Julie Roin, and Ferdinand Schoettle.
1. On the growth in state and local tax receipts, see JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER
HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LoCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 5, 9 (5th ed. 1988). On
their growth relative to U.S. government tax receipts and gross national product, see JOSEPH A.
PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 3 (5th ed. 1987).
2. See PECHMAN, supra note 1, at 2-3.
3. From 1980 through at least 1987, state and local governments' share of total government
expenditures in this country increased. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE,
PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 476 (5th ed. 1989).
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only one level of government should regulate any subject4 - one
might expect the existing practice of federalism in taxation to have
attracted widespread criticism. Yet the literature has proven surprisingly favorable to current practice. The conventional viewpoint,
rooted in deference to our historical traditions, 5 goes something as
follows:
While the state and local exercise of taxing power has costs given the
danger of discrimination against interstate commerce and the incentive
to export the burden of state and local taxation to outsiders, these costs
can be kept relatively modest. States gain from reciprocal forbearance,
market forces impede tax exporting, 6 and states face constitutional constraints under the commerce, due process, and equal protection clauses.
The remaining costs imposed plausibly are offset by the advantages of
local control, such as interstate tax competition, smaller government
units' increased responsiveness to voters, 7 and voters' ability to exercise
the "exit option." 8

I think this answer is too optimistic and in some respects wrong.
First, "discrimination" is too narrow a conception of how state and
local taxation can distort or impair national markets. Even if no jurisdiction targets interstate commerce for unfavorable treatment, disparities in state and local taxation have many of the same effects on
business and personal decisionmaking as an outright tariff at the jurisdictional boundary. The problem in both cases is one of locational
nonneutrality due to tax rules. Second, the attempt to limit discrimination (as distinct from requiring locational neutrality) is inherently
complicated and costly, especially if left to the courts. 9 Third, political forces such as reciprocal forbearance operating at the state and
local level cannot always be counted on to limit locational distortion,
even when no discrimination is deliberately intended. In particular,
even if political decisionmaking is no worse at the state and local level
4. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation and the American Common Market, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 9, 47 (A. Dan Tarlock ed., 1980).
5. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations:
Reflections on Mobil, Exxon, and H.R. 5076, 19 MICH. L. REV. 113, 160 (1980) ("[A]bsent some
pressing need for federal intervention .•. the states should be free to go their own way. Our
constitutional system contemplates concurrent state and federal taxation, with considerable latitude accorded to the states in this domain." (footnote omitted)).
6. See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., Tax Exporting and the Commerce Clause, in FISCAL
FEDERALISM AND THE TAXATION OF NATURAL REsouRCES 169 (Charles E. McLure, Jr. &
Peter Mieszkowski eds., 1983).
7. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493 (1987).
8. The seminal work on the exit option's relevance to local government is Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcoN. 416 (1956).
9. This is not to say that the logical endpoint of a locational neutrality standard, requiring all
states and localities to levy precisely the same taxes at the same rates, would be either good policy
or a constitutionally defensible position for a court. See infra section 111.C.
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than at the national level, the administrative and compliance costs imposed by even seemingly trivial variations between tax systems present
powerful grounds for desiring greater uniformity. Fourth, the belief
by state and local governments or voters that they can export tax burdens to outsiders need not be factually correct in order to have adverse
consequences. Fifth, in the tax area, the benefits of increasing governmental responsiveness by placing authority at the state and local level
seem overrated. These benefits tend to be especially less significant
when the issue is how to define a tax base, rather than how much
revenue to raise through taxes of one sort or another.
While constitutional and political constraints, along with the better
counterarguments in favor of state and local government taxing authority, defeat an unambiguous "right answer," we should move toward confining states' taxing authority to the determination of their
tax rates, not the precis,e contours of the tax bases to which they apply
these rates. Thus, I urge that Congress require the states to use partly
or wholly uniform tax bases for business and perhaps personal income
taxes, to make greater use of tax credits and uniform allocation rules
where taxpayers have a multijurisdictional presence, and, when levying taxes that seem directed principally at outsiders, such as excise and
severance taxes on oil and coal, to use rates no higher than those applying to comparable in-state levies. Such legislation would almost
surely be within Congress' broad Commerce Clause powers. However, given that for two hundred years Congress has almost never used
these powers to constrain state and local discretion in the tax area, 10
the enactment of such legislation may be unlikely. Absent congressional action, the courts should more consistently and coherently bar
discrimination against outsiders or interstate commerce and attempted
tax exportation, and should attach less weight to the countervailing
concern for state and local government autonomy.
My arguments might support stronger limitations than the above.
By keeping my proposals relatively modest, however, I aim to stay
unambiguously where the costs of decentralization continue significantly to exceed the benefits. Complete centralization of authority
over taxation, while having significant advantages, would on balance
be undesirable. My primary point is not that federalism in taxation is
wholly misconceived, or that state and local governments have no valuable role to play, but that the balance is askew.
10. Congress did not exercise its powers to restrict state and local taxation of interstate commerce until 1959. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 324. It has continued to
exercise such power only rarely. Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business: Perspectives on Two Centuries of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 TAX LAW. 37, 37 (1987).
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Part I of this article examines the reasons for preferring locationally neutral taxes and explains the basic tension between locational
neutrality and state and local autonomy in taxation. Part II examines
the federal judicial check on state and local taxation, which often relies
on a principle barring discrimination against outsiders or interstate
commerce. Part III explores the need for a broad federal judicial
check by examining state and local governments' reasons for imposing
(or avoiding) locationally distortive taxes, the countervailing benefits
of allowing such governments broad autonomy in taxation, and Congress' willingness to strike down locationally distortive taxes under its
Commerce Clause powers. Part IV, the conclusion, provides specific
recommendations for congressional and judicial action.

I.

TARIFFS, TAXES, AND LOCATIONAL NEUTRALITY

A.

The Harms To Be Avoided

The capacity of state and local taxation to burden national markets
has long been recognized. Indeed, the paradigmatic form of burden protectionist tariffs on the passage of goods across state boundaries provided one of the chief motives for the Constitutional Convention in
1787. 11 In explaining why protectionist tariffs were undesirable, the
Framers principally stressed the enmity resulting from states' competition to tax and disfavor each other. 12 Yet they also recognized, at
least roughly, a second type of harm tariffs cause: adverse wealth effects or inefficiency, which result from reducing aggregate social gains
from trade and on a locational basis distorting economic decisions and
substituting high-cost for low-cost production.13 These two types of
harm continue to be recognized today as the principal grounds for
aversion to state and local government tariffs, 14 as well as to taxes that
11. See THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 39-41 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961);
THE FEDERALIST, supra, No. 42 (James Madison), at 275-76; John B. Sholley, The Negative
Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. CHI. L. REv. 556, 559-60 (1936). Interstate commerce issues, despite their importance to the calling of the Constitutional Convention, mostly
dwelt in the background during drafting and ratification. See id.
12. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), at 39-41; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. 42 (James Madison), at 283-84.
13. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. 11 (Alexander Hamilton), at 69-70 (describing
the benefits of a flourishing and unrestricted commerce).
14. See, e.g., Philip M. Tatarowicz & Rebecca F. Mims-Velarde, An Analytical Approach to
State Tax Discrimination Under the Commerce Clause, 39 VAND. L. REV. 879, 882 (1986). Professor Donald Regan places great weight on a third objection to tariffs: that they are "inconsistent with the very idea of political union .•.• the economic equivalent of war , ••• hostile in
[their] essence." See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1113 (1986). I disregard this
objection on the consequentialist grounds that notional "wars" only matter to the extent that
they harm or anger people, and that it is unduly difficult to decide which actions, among a
variety that are consciously or implicitly self-serving, are impermissibly hostile.
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have similar effects even if they do not formally tax the act of crossing
a boundary. 15
As a matter of policy, I focus principally on locational distortion
on the ground that, at present, enmity between the states is far less
important, and locational distortion far more so, than was the case in
1787. Moreover, a conventional ground for emphasizing enmity the fear that one state's tariffs will provoke retaliatory tariffs by other
states, leading inexorably to trade wars 16 - contains a circularity.
Unless tariffs are for some independent reason undesirable, what could
be wrong with having more of them? The likelihood of retaliation
may be relevant to deciding when the federal government should intervene, but it fails to enlighten the question of what state and local taxes
are undesirable to begin with, and why.
The Framers, while concerned about retaliatory tariffs, also feared
that the enmity among the states arising from taxation would have far
broader consequences, including a possibility of actual armed conflict.17 This concern was understandable and, at the time, probably
realistic. The American Revolution had been prompted in large part
by disputes over taxing authority, 18 the classical and recent European
history that the Framers studied so carefully revealed that commercial
disputes could lead to war, 19 and government power and citizen loyalty were very differently distributed than they are today. The state
governments were truly sovereign entities that had a primary claim on
most people's loyalties and that even the Framers expected to remain
preeminent.20 This is hardly surprising in an age of relatively low mobility and trade, when travel and communication over geographical
expanses were vastly more difficult and expensive than they are now
-and when the country was new and the Civil War had not yet been
fought. Today, not only is actual war between the states a chimera
(the former Soviet Union's or Yugoslavia's problems notwithstand15. The Framers recognized that tariffs were only one means of causing geographical distortion. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), at 39-41 (noting that so
long as states can pursue commercial policies peculiar to themselves, there will be injurious regulations of trade designed to benefit in-state at the expense of out-of-state residents).
16. See, e.g., Tatarowicz & Mims-Velarde, supra note 14, at 883; Regan, supra note 14, at
1114.
17. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), at 28-29, 34-35; THE
FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), at 39-41; THE FEDERALIST, supra
note 11, No. 42 (James Madison), at 283-84.
18. See, e.g., LAWRENCE H. GIPSON, THE CoMING OF THE REVOLUTION 1763-1775, at 69100, 162-95 (1954); EDMUNDS. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC 1763-1789, at 14-27,
43-60 (1977).
19. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), at 31-35.
20. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison).
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ing), but even lesser degrees of interstate conflict or rivalry, while perhaps not irrelevant, are a greatly diminished concern.21
Even to the extent that enmity or rivalry between the states remains an important problem, it fails to suggest a clear generalizable
standard for identifying objectionable state and local taxes. 22 One's
enmity toward others is a product of one's perceptions about them,
not necessarily of what they are actually doing, and perceptions cannot easily be measured or predicted. Other than on an ad hoc basis, it
would be difficult to identify the class of state and local taxes that were
likely to create excessive enmity.
On the other side of the comparison, the principal argument for
attaching such great importance to locational neutrality is one of efficiency. As an economic matter, all else being equal - an important
qualification that I will later relax23 - it is optimal that the tax levied
on a given amount of profit or a given taxpayer be invariant with regard to where property or persons are located. 24 As I discuss in the
next subsection, taxes generally are transfer payments, rather than net
costs to society or compensation for the use or consumption of scarce
resources. Thus, stylized economic actors making cost-benefit calculations but selflessly seeking to maximize social rather than personal
utility would disregard their tax bills in making personal and business
decisions. Equally stylized but selfish actors will not disregard their
tax bills in making locational decisions, however, unless taxation is
constant across different locations. Accordingly, under standard economic assumptions, locational neutrality minimizes the real social
costs of production and ensures that low-cost producers will out-compete high-cost but otherwise equivalent producers. Even when per21. While regional loyalties (for example, as a Southerner or New Englander) remain culturally important today, state tax rivalries often involve neighbors from the same region. See, e.g.,
Speno v. Gallman, 319 N.E.2d 180 (1974) (concerning New York's attempt to tax New Jersey
residents who worked in New York).
22. A standard barring discrimination against interstate commerce, which might be thought
to address the enmity/perception problem, has difficulties that I discuss in Part II infra. Even if
this standard worked better, however, I doubt that an empirical study would reveal much effect
on popular perceptions regarding the behavior of other states. Ironically, perhaps the clearest
recent example of a tax that created interstate enmity, Montana's severance tax on coal, viewed
by many as an OPEC-style extraction of monopoly rents by "blue-eyed Arabs," was upheld by
the Supreme Court under the antidiscrimination standard. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981); Walter Hellerstein, Constitutional Limitations on State Tax Exportation, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1, 48-51, 75.
23. See infra section 111.C.
24. See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., The State Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in Wolves'
Clothing, in THE EcONOMICS OF TAXATION 327, 345 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskins
eds., 1980). McLure notes that this insight, while standard in discussions of international taxation, tends to be ignored in discussions of state taxation - a point that is as true now as when
McLure made it more than ten years ago. Id. at 344.
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sonal consumption rather than business decisionmaking is involved,
locational neutrality in taxation permits people to maximize their utility net of social costs.25
To put the point more precisely, while taxes inevitably have income effects - by reducing the taxpayer's wealth, they affect her behavior - they ought not, to the extent avoidable, to have substitution
effects. When they cause a taxpayer to substitute an activity for the
one she would otherwise prefer in order to reduce her tax liability,
they create a deadweight social loss in the amount of the reduced
pretax benefit to the taxpayer by reason of the substitution. Absent
externalities, the conclusion that the substitution is a loss follows logically from assuming that people generally know (better than the tax
authorities, if not absolutely) what is best for themselves.
I have thus far treated locational neutrality as important purely for
reasons of efficiency. This might suggest that its import depends upon
the relevant elasticities of taxpayer behavior. Disparities in taxation
have no efficiency consequences absent behavioral responses - that is,
if that which is differentially taxed is wholly inelastic. Inelasticity,
however, does not eliminate the problems caused by locational disparity, but merely changes their form from inefficiency to inequity. This
may follow, for example, if persons who are equivalent except for location ought to pay the same amount of tax. To illustrate the tradeoff
between inefficiency and inequity, a discriminatory tax on out-of-state
merchants that they cannot pass on to consumers seems mainly inefficient if the merchants substantially reduce their in-state business and
thereby largely avoid paying it, and mainly inequitable (at least in the
short run) if they continue to operate the same size in-state business
(for example, due to sunk costs) but at a tax price that substantially
reduces their profits below those available to in-state merchants.
While locational neutrality is desirable only because it serves the
more primary ends of efficiency and equity, I generally will, for reasons of convenience in exposition, refer to locational neutrality as if it
were an end in itself. This practice resembles the convention, in discussions of federal income tax policy, of treating conformity to the
Haig-Simons definition of economic income26 as a normative goal.
25. Locational neutrality may be desirable even if market outcomes are flawed by externalities. Problems with market outcomes merely make possible a second-best defense of locational
disparities as an offset to other distortions. Absent any good reason for expecting such offset,
however, it is common to assume that avoiding further distortions is desirable. See, e.g., E.J.
Mishan, Second Thoughts on Second Best, 14 OXFORD EcoN. PAPERS 205, 214 (1962). In addition, locational neutrality within the United States is desirable even if absent worldwide if only to
benefit the doing of business within the United States.
26. See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1189, 1190 (1989).

902

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 90:895

There too the more primary ends are efficiency and equity, 27 but the
reciprocal relationship between these two ends, ensuring that one or
the other generally will be implicated,28 permits use of the shorthand,
so long as one keeps the ultimate ends in mind when one must to
balance the advantages of conformity to the standard against competing objectives.29
Locational neutrality is far more important today than in 1787.
Today's far greater set of economic interrelationships among the
states, founded above all on drastic reductions in the costs of travel
and communication, suggest a far greater elasticity of response to locational tax disparities. Thus, the efficiency consequences of locational
disparities probably have grown immensely. 30 While this initially
might seem to suggest merely a shift from inequity to inefficiency,
rather than an increase in the sum total of the two problems, it seems
clear that the sum total has increased. First, the immense real growth
in state and local taxation since 1787 would make the problem a larger
one even absent any other changes. Second, as I will discuss shortly,
the notions of state and local tax equity and efficiency involve more
than merely comparing the tax burdens in different locations. They
are complicated by the question of whether the taxpayer has received
sufficient offsetting benefits, a condition that is particularly likely to be
met if the taxes are in some sense paid voluntarily (for example, she
has chosen them as a voter in order to finance higher spending). Taxes
that are borne by persons not residing or voting in the taxing jurisdiction thus are relatively likely to be inequitable and inefficient. Today's
more integrated national economy presents far greater opportunities
than existed in 1787 for states in effect to reach across their borders
and tax nonconsenting nonbeneficiaries.
The analysis thus far has depended upon incompletely explored
assumptions about taxation, going both to the efficiency reasons for
preferring that taxpayers base decisions on pretax rather than post-tax
outcomes, and to the meaning of tax equity. Before further discussing
27. See, e.g., id. at 1220-30.
28. Cf Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misal/ocations Drive
Out Inequities?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735 (1979) (describing the inequities and inefficiencies
attributed to departures from Haig-Simons income taxation as inversely related depending on the
relevant elasticities).
29. For similar reasons of convenience and convention, I ignore the existence of nontax barriers to locational neutrality (such as protectionist state and local regulation) that ultimately
might be more important to furthering the integration of the national economy, and which conceivably might support second-best arguments for locationally nonneutral taxes.
30. On the other hand, the efficiency consequences of a particular jurisdiction's undesirable
taxes and regulations have been reduced, since greater mobility permits disfavored activities to
move to other jurisdictions instead of being wholly suppressed.
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locational neutrality and comparing it to a standard barring discrimination against interstate commerce, I will explore more carefully the
definitions and assumptions about taxes that qualify the meaning and
importance of locational neutrality.
B.

The Definition of a Tax and Its Significance for Locational
Neutrality

In common usage, not all laws requiring value to be transferred to
governments are taxes. We speak of income, sales, and property taxes;
business, excise, and severance taxes; gift, estate, and inheritance
taxes; and the like. Yet items such as highway tolls, public transit
fares, tuition charged by state universities, and fines for criminal behavior commonly are not called taxes. More generally, transfers of
value to the government are not called taxes when they have either of
two characteristics. First, if paid dir~ctly in exchange for specific serv- .
ices (such as a subway ride or college education), they are called user
fees. Second, if levied principally to affect behavior rather than to
raise revenue, they are called regulation. 31
Both distinctions are imprecise. Consider a "car user fee," enacted
to replace a substantively identical personal property tax on cars, that
directly benefits the payer only in the sense that she avoids penalty for
nonpayment and is permitted to drive. 32 Or consider a tax on the
rental of hotel rooms - arguably a user fee if it merely defrays the
costs imposed on the taxing jurisdiction by visitors, but more of a tax
as it begins to swell general revenues. 33
As for the distinction between taxes and regulation, colonial
Americans encountered its vagaries when they took the position, in
connection with their claim that England could regulate but not tax
their trade, that a sixpence duty on foreign molasses was within the
power of Parliament because it would end the molasses trade, but that
cutting the duty in half to three pence, so that it was no longer prohib31. A tax could alternatively be defined as any regulatory provision that imposes costs on
private parties, even if the costs are deadweight social losses rather than transfers. I define taxes
more narrowly, and distinguish them from regulation, given this article's purpose of examining
the provisions that state and local governments use primarily to raise revenue.
32. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 3, at 212, define a user fee as a "voluntary" payment, but this begs the question of whether, for example, an income tax is voluntary because one
could avoid it by earning no taxable income.
33. The hotel example helps to clarify that even what looks like a market exchange involving
a government may belong in the tax realm if the government is using its coercive powers to
charge a monopoly price. Thus, imagine that the above government repealed its hotel tax but
used its eminent domain and police powers to take over all hotels in the jurisdiction and bar any
new hotels from entering the local market. Tlie example would be substantively identical to that
in the main text if the government then set room prices to equal the "normal" (i.e., previous
private) charge plus the earlier hotel tax.
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itive and therefore raised revenue, would infringe the fundamental liberties of English subjects. 34 Even when the substantive distinction
between raising revenue and seeking behavioral responses appears
clear, common usage is not always consistent with it. Consider a tariff
set high enough to keep out all foreign trade, thus raising no revenue.
While the provision meets my definition of regulation, it might be
called a tax given its form and the likely surreptitiousness of the regulatory motive. Similarly, an income tax rule permitting homeowners
to deduct lodging costs against taxable income, thereby understating
the consumption component of income for the regulatory purpose of
favoring home ownership, commonly is classified, in keeping with its
form, as part of the income tax.
While mindful of the murkiness of the distinctions, I define "taxes"
for purposes of this article as provisions that (unlike user fees) are
simple transfers to government rather than market-style exchanges of
value for specific goods or services, and that (unlike regulation) principally serve revenue-raising objectives. To the extent that a transfer is
part of a market-style exchange or serves regulatory objectives, my
analysis remains relevant but is incomplete. In particular, consider
the statement in the previous section that, from an efficiency standpoint, taxes are costs one would prefer the taxpayer to ignore. Plainly
it is not efficient for prospective payers to disregard user fees that reflect the cost of providing them with services. 35 Moreover, if we assume that a particular regulation is a good one, then presumably we
do want it to affect people's behavior. Thus, to the extent that a levy
imposed by a state or local government is a user fee or regulation,
rather than a tax, additional issues are presented - on the user fee
side, concerning whether it may reduce locational or other distortions
by making the payer internalize actual social costs of her presence; 36
and on the regulation side, concerning whether any distortions resulting from the levy might be either desirable in themselves or worth the
price of achieving the regulatory aim.
The provisions commonly called taxes, however, and on which all
34. See GIPSON, supra note 18, at 184.
35. The efficiency issue is more complicated where user fees pay for a service with high fixed
costs and low variable costs. In the case of subway fares, for example, if price discrimination
were feasible and permitted the recovery of fixed costs from high-valuing users, it would be
efficient for a low-valuing user to pay a fare that compensated the state only for the trivial variable costs imposed by her ride.
36. Even when a user fee recovers actual social costs attributable to a class of users, it may be
apportioned among them in a locationally distortive fashion. See, e.g., American Trucking
Assns. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987) (holding that fixed highway user charges imposed on
truckers unconstitutionally discriminated in favor of in-state truckers who paid the same amount
as out-of-staters despite averaging far more miles of use).
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governments in this country depend for most of their revenue, are in
their dominant features unlike either user fees or regulation. They
tend neither to recover specific governmental costs in the context of a
market-style transaction nor to be regulatory so much as revenue-raising devices. For example, consider an income tax on salary or a sales
tax on consumer purchases. A taxpayer probably does not impose significant costs on society by deciding to work for a salary rather than
enjoy leisure, or to purchase a consumer item rather than take a walk.
Nor is the taxing government likely to be attempting (other than very
marginally in its choice of tax base) to discourage work or consumer
purchases. The act of earning or purchasing merely serves as a convenient occasion for the government to demand payment.
Taxes emerge from the intersection of two of governments' principal characteristics. The first is that they provide public goods, such as
police protection, clean streets, and national defense, that cannot be
sold separately to individual users through standard market transactions. 37 This prevents governments from charging users directly for
many of the benefits provided. The second is that they possess coercive powers, enabling them to seize property or claim monopolies.
Thus, governments can successfully extract payments without regard
to the cost or value of any benefits provided.
The separation between benefits received and taxes imposed has
important implications even if all taxpayers receive an acceptably "fair
deal." In particular, it explains why taxpayers should, but are unlikely
to, disregard tax costs in making decisions. However much value one
receives from the government, one generally does not get more at the
margin by increasing one's own tax bill. Thus, tax payments are
purely a cost to the taxpayer, and one that bears no direct relationship
to either the social cost or the subjective value of the benefits one receives. For society, by contrast, the tax payment itself is a pure transfer (even if its existence and the act of payment have associated costs)
that leaves aggregate social monetary wealth unchanged. 38
37. Government also can serve the function of redistributing wealth. I do not separately
address redistribution here because, to the extent desirable, it can be defined as a public good.
For example, if one's goal is a significant transfer of wealth to the poor, one's own efforts may be
inadequate if others with money "shirk" their shares of the overall transfer. Governmental taxation to redistribute wealth thus can be seen as solving the collective action problem faced by
voters with money who favor redistribution. I later discuss redistribution, and conclude that it is
most effectively conducted at the national rather than the state or local level. See infra section
111.C.2.
38. Tax payments are pure transfers for society even if one believes that all government
spending is wasted, so long as the amount and kind of such spending is not affected at the margin
by short-term variations in the amount of tax collected. If this spending-invariance condition
holds, a taxpayer's avoidance of liability merely reallocates the cost of paying for government
expenditures, in some hard-to-determine way, from herself to other current or future members of
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In calling taxes revenue-raisers devoid of independent regulatory
purpose, I have ignored two issues. The first is the classification problem presented by a provision within a tax that reflects regulatory
rather than revenue-raising purposes. Such a provision can be a revenue-raising tax penalty, 39 but perhaps more commonly is a revenuelosing "tax expenditure" that departs from the ordinary course of the
tax to serve regulatory purposes, such as homeowners' income tax deductions. 40 Or a provision, while plausibly within the ordinary course
of the tax, may have been chosen over a comparably plausible alternative for regulatory reasons. 41 In general, for reasons to be explained
later,42 I will exalt formalism over substance, and treat provisions as
"taxes" so long as they are part of the structure of a tax (for example,
an income tax deduction or a sales tax exclusion). Second, any basic
choice of tax base by a government presumably reflects regulatory purposes regarding how liability ought to be apportioned or the expected
behavioral effects of different taxes. 43 These points do not so much
rebut the inefficiency of taxes that influence behavior as suggest offsetting benefit or justification, and I therefore will defer considering
them.
We have now seen the grounds for the claim that an efficient tax is
one taxpayers ignore. Because this article examines federalism in taxation, I will focus on locational efficiency to the exclusion of other sorts.
Conceptually, a locationally efficient tax is one that does not affect
people's decisions about where to live, travel, invest, and so forth. In
other words, such a tax replicates as closely as possible the state of
affairs that would prevail under a uniform national taxing scheme, dissociety. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative
Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 59 (1990).
39. Consider, for example, § 280E of the Internal Revenue Code, which denies dealers in
illegal drugs deductions for certain items that plainly are business expenses, such as rental or
salary costs incurred in the illegal business. I.R.C. § 280E (West Supp. 1991). Such provisions
mismeasure income in order to penalize drug-dealing relative to other business activity.
40. On the tax expenditure concept, see STANLEY s. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM
(1973). The concept rapidly became controversial and has remained so. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Accountingfor Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NATL. TAX J. 244 (1969);
Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343
(1989); Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155. While mo~t
commonly used in the income tax context, the term tax expenditure is equally applicable (or
inapplicable) to any other tax that is claimed to have a discernible "normal" structure.
41. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 309 (1972) (arguing that medical deductions may not be preferential departures from
"normal" income tax rules).
42. See infra section 111.C.3.
43. See, e.g., Joseph Isenbergh, The End of Income Taxation, 45 TAX L. REV. 283 (1990)
(arguing that a consumption tax should replace the current income tax in order to ameliorate the
tax system's bias against saving and in favor of current consumption).
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regarding any consequent changes either in the level of taxation or in
what is taxed. Similarly, a locationally equitable tax is one in which
real tax burdens do not vary with location, and therefore are the same
as under a uniform national taxing scheme. It may be objected, however, that the case for locational neutrality in taxation is less compelling than the case for other sorts of tax neutrality - for example,
neutrality in the taxation of different types of investment income under
an income tax. I therefore will consider the special issues raised by
locational neutrality before examining more comprehensively what it
means.
C.

The Comparative Value of Locational Neutrality and Tax
Neutrality in General

Even if one accepts the view that taxes should usually be neutral,
locational neutrality presents special complexities and difficulties. The
key difference between it and, say, neutral treatment of different types
of investment income under an income tax is that the cost and value of
the services people receive in different geographical areas from the operation of their state and local governments are likely to differ,
whereas there may be no reason to expect differences in the government services that holders of different types of investments receive.
Consider again my statement that a tax, as distinct from a user fee,
involves no relationship between the amount paid and the benefits received. While true at the margin as one's own tax bill increases, it is
not necessarily true over a broader range of variation in tax levels.
Governments that charge more taxes often may provide more value in
the form of services, and may be able to direct most of this value to
resident taxpayers. These residents, in their capacity as voters, rationally may take a different view of taxes than in their capacity as taxpayers. A voter is helping to determine everyone's tax burden, not just
her own, and therefore has less reason to be tax-averse. Voting for
higher taxes does not automatically create an externality problem: one
may receive significantly more services if everyone pays more. Moreover, even in one's capacity as a taxpayer there may be a relationship
between taxes paid and services received. If a government provides
insufficient value in exchange for the taxes it extracts, residents may be
able to "vote with their feet" by leaving. If exit costs are sufficiently
low, state and local taxes are user fees, voluntarily exchanged for the
state or local government's service package. 44
Thus, higher taxes in one jurisdiction are not locationally inequita44. See, e.g., Tiebout, supra note 8.
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ble to the extent that those paying the higher taxes also receive greater
value from government services,45 and are not locationally inefficient
to the extent that this value is effectively linked to the payment of tax.
Moreover, since voters have some control over taxing levels, we might
expect an equitable and efficient service offset in cases where voters
impose higher taxes on themselves. This point holds even more
powerfully if one "votes" in the notional sense of declining to exercise
a cheap exit option, since one can decide on one's own where to live
without needing to be part of a voting majority.
The significance of these points is diminished to the extent that
they ignore tax burden and service benefit disparities within the taxpaying class and expect too much both of the often costly exit option46 •
and of voting. 47 Thus, at the margin for any one taxpayer, taxes often
do function simultaneously as costs to the taxpayer and transfers from
society's perspective. Yet the voter or resident benefit and consent
points arguably are significant enough to suggest that one particular
form of locational disparity merits special attention: the problem of
tax exportation, which occurs when governments succeed in placing
tax burdens on outsiders.48 Tax exportation might seem merely a
standard case of locational distortion, inducing taxpayers to stay entirely inside the exporting jurisdictions or else avoid them altogether.
From the broader perspective, however, tax exportation may pose unusually serious equity and efficiency problems by placing tax burdens
on what may often be nonconsenting nonbeneficiaries.
So far, in exploring the limits to locational neutrality as an equity
and efficiency value, I have considered only differences in tax level that
result from people's different decisions regarding how much government service to pay for. Differences in tax level may arise, however,
even if people in all jurisdictions have identical preferences. The social
costs of what all deem to be essential services may vary, due to differences in geography, climate, population density, or any number of
other factors. Many of these differences would efficiently be reflected
in user fees varying with location if it were feasible to finance all government operations through user fees rather than taxes. How, then,
45. By focusing on the value received in return for paying truces, I do not argue that wealthredistributing truces are inequitable. I ignore wealth redistribution because it seems irrelevant to
locational equity, which presumably requires that the amount taken from one for redistributive
purposes not vary with location.
46. See, e.g., Brookes D. Billman, Jr. & Noel B. Cunningham, Nonbusiness State and Local
Taxes: The Case for Deductibility, 28 TAX NOTES 1107, 1113 (1985).
47. On imperfect information, the danger that one group of voters will exploit another, and
other standard voting paradoxes and problems, see IAIN McLEAN, PUBLIC CHOICE (1987).
48. See infra section III.C.
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can it be argued that locational neutrality, rather than a system of
highly nuanced variation in local tax levels, is optimally efficient?
The answer to this challenge, in part, is that locationally neutral
taxation concededly is not optimally efficient. No taxation can be,
given that it is an imperfect substitute for user fees, made necessary by
the public goods problem. The argument for locationally neutral taxation, as for tax neutrality in general, is a ceteris paribus argument: that
absent differences on the service side taxes should be neutral and minimize behavioral responses. The ceteris paribus argument is reasonable,
however, given the difficulty of measuring the cost or value of government services received by different persons or in different areas, unless
the actual variations are quite large.
In other words, despite such actual variations, one should not reject locational neutrality in favor of either a more nuanced standard
that incorporates all cost-of-government-service variations or abandonment of the notion of a standard altogether. The former, while
theoretically preferable, is too complex and indeterminate to be usable.
The latter is unnecessarily skeptical and despairing if it appears plausible that, in most cases, differences in government services received
either are not overly significant or will accentuate, rather than offset,
the distortive effects (considered in isolation) of locational disparity in
taxation. The leap of faith that support for locational neutrality involves - for such it is, however well founded and sensible - should
be familiar to people who are versed in the income tax policy literature
of the past fifty years. For similar reasons income tax policy often is
based on a neutrality norm that ignores both variations in services received by different taxpayers49 and the arguments for a more nuanced
(but too complex and indeterminate) optimal taxation norm under
which rates of taxation would vary with the elasticity of what is being
taxed. 50

D. Broader Ramifications of Locational Neutrality
1. Differences Between Tax Systems as Inherently Distortive
The previous three sections described the principle of locational
neutrality and the reasons for considering it desirable. We saw that
locational equity and efficiency generally require that taxes not vary
with location or affect business or personal decisions regarding loca,

49. On the problems with using a benefit standard, see WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY
35-39 (1953).
50. On optimal taxation, see, e.g., Walter Hettich & Stanley Winer, Blueprints and Pathways:
The Shifting Foundations of Tax Reform, 38 NATL. TAX J. 423, 428 (1985).
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tion. While benefits received and voters• or residents• consent also
may enter the picture and make taxes the equivalent of user fees that
ought to vary with location, it is plausible to begin the analysis by
assuming the general case where taxes are disjoined from benefits or
unconstrained consent. This section therefore explores the ramifications of locational neutrality in its general sense, leaving the benefit
and consent points to be addressed later. 51
In a locationally neutral system, the level, kinds, and geographical
distribution of all activity would be the same as if the country had a
uniform national taxing system, disregarding any effects that such a
reallocation of taxing authority would have on the types of taxes levied
or tax rates. Unfortunately, this notional touchstone for measuring
locational neutrality is not only abstract and counterfactual, but utterly unattainable other than by actually establishing a uniform national taxing system. Consider the administrative and compliance
effects of having federal rather than national taxation. The existence
of multiple taxing authorities - including, for example, several thousand different sales tax jurisdictions - inevitably creates burden, unevenly distributed among taxpayers, that changes outcomes. The
compliance costs alone of having multiple taxing jurisdictions are
great enough, according to one recent commentator, to constitute "a
drag on interstate trade almost as debilitating as the border restrictions our federal system was originally designed to prevent."52
Even disregarding compliance costs, locational neutrality is unattainable as virtually an immediate consequence of having separate taxing jurisdictions. As soon as there are any differences in the taxes
levied by such jurisdictions, locational neutrality disappears. For example, assume that North Dakota has a ten percent flat rate income
tax on residents and South Dakota has a five percent flat rate income
tax on residents. All else being equal, residing in South Dakota is taxfavored relative to residing in North Dakota. Or assume that North
Dakota taxes real property while South Dakota taxes sales. Now the
locational biases favor owning real property in South Dakota and
making sales in North Dakota. Finally, assume that both states have
identical income taxes except that South Dakota allows more
favorable depreciation. Even if the states' depreciation rules apply to
property owned in other states, the effects are the same as in the rate
51. See infra section 111.C.
52. Gordon D. Henderson, What We Can Do About What's Wrong With the Tax Law, 49
TAX NOTES 1349, 1352 (1990). See infra section I.E for a discussion of administrative and
compliance costs.
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difference example for taxpayers who own or anticipate owning depreciable property.
Tax base disparities present obvious planning opportunities for
both taxpayers and governments. The taxpayer side of maximizing
after-tax returns by minimizing tax liability is obvious. The government side is significant as well, however. States can choose tax bases
that seem likely to draw tax revenues from outsiders. Consider, for
example, severance taxes that Alaska, Montana, and Wyoming levy on
the extraction of oil or coal (principally for use out of state), or the
tendency of states with large tourist industries to charge higher general sales taxes than other states, 53 as well as higher hotel taxes than
their general sales taxes. 54 Taxes of this kind penalize interstate relative to intrastate commerce, since wholly in-state items and transactions tend to be more lightly taxed, but any attempt to strike them
down involves line-drawing problems if one assumes that states have
authority to decide what they want to tax. 55
Clearly, then, disparities in state and local taxation would defeat
locational neutrality even if no person was present in more than one
jurisdiction. When taxpayers straddle jurisdictions and thus become
directly subject to more than one tax system, the disparities grow
worse. The income tax-property tax example above suggested one
problem, arising when states have different types of tax bases: the possibility of being either double taxed (as when one has real property in
North Dakota and sales in South Dakota) or not taxed at all (if one
reverses the states). Yet problems arise even when all states have the
same type of tax base, and that base does not in any inherent way
target interstate commerce. For each of the major taxes widely employed at the state and local level, a set of coordination problems between jurisdictions, commonly lacking easy solution, has emerged over
the years. These problems involve determining which states have taxing authority, and to what degree, over a particular taxpayer or transaction, as well as how one state's exercise of authority should affect
another's. Imperfect coordination, which often is unavoidable, tends
to distort taxpayers' choices regarding entry into multiple jurisdic53. See JOHN F. DUE & JOHN L. MIKESELL, SALES TAXATION: STATE AND LocAL STRUCTURE AND ADMINISfRATION 12 (1983).
54. See, e.g., Betsy Wade, Tax Collectors Lean on the Out-of-Towners, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25,
1991, § 5, at 3.
55. In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), the Supreme Court
relied on this assumption to sustain Montana's coal severance tax against constitutional challenge. The Court rejected arguments that the tax unduly exported tax burdens to out-of-staters
and exceeded the value of any benefits provided to out-of-staters, largely on the ground that real
economic incidence and the value of benefits provided (such as police protection) are prohibitively difficult to measure. I address the merits of the Court's position at section 111.C.1 infra.
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tions. The following is a brief description of some of the major coordination problems in the principal existing state and local truces.
2. Multijurisdictional Coordination Problems

a. Personal income taxes. If income could be taxed only in the
state where it was earned and the identity of that state were always
clear, the personal income tax might present no coordination
problems. At the other extreme, if all states could and did tax all
income, regardless of whether the earner or earning activity had any
connection with the taxing state, coordination problems would not
arise. In that instance, multiple trucation would be a fact of life to
which all persons were subject without regard to their locational
decisions.
In legal and economic fact, however, neither alternative holds.
States can and do tax their residents on all income, and nonresidents
on income earned within the state. 56 The resulting threat of double
taxation when a trucpayer resides in one state and earns income in
other states is widely addressed by true credits for liability incurred
elsewhere, or by states' declining to exercise their full taxing powers.
However, these countermeasures are not constitutionally required, are
not universally employed, and provide incomplete protection due to
built-in limitations and disparities in their application. 57
Even when the states consistently apportion a person's income so
that each dollar is truced only once, one's overall tax liability may exceed what it would have been if any one of the states had been the only
taxing authority. This results from provisions that limit or prorate
personal exemptions, deductions, or credits for persons (such as nonresidents or part-year residents) associated with other states, or that
count income earned in other states to determine the applicable rate
bracket under a progressive rate structure, meaning that some never
benefit from the lower brackets. 58 Double trucation may result even
when the states ostensibly try to apportion a person's income, if the
location where it was earned (or where one resides) is sufficiently unclear for the states to take inconsistent positions.
A final personal income tax coordination problem involves the interaction between issues of tax timing and changes in the taxpayer's
56. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19 (1938); New York ex rel. Cohn v.
Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937); Walter Hellerstein, Some Reflections on the State Taxation of a
Nonresident's Personal Income, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1309, 1310 (1974).
57. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 968-71; Hellerstein, supra note 56,
at 1310.
58. See Wheeler v. State, 249 A.2d 887 (Vt.), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 4 (1969); Hellerstein,
supra note 56, at 1346-54.
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state of residence. When a state income tax rule permits the taxpayer
to defer recognizing otherwise taxable income and she moves to another state before recognition, then upon recognition both the current
and the former state of residence may make a claim, potentially leading to duplicative taxation. This problem has arisen under state income tax rules providing that salary invested in a retirement annuity,
along with the annuity fund's inside buildup, is taxable only upon
withdrawal. States allowing such deferral have attempted to reach
withdrawals by taxpayers who move out of state upon retirement,
leading to overlap with residency-based claims by the taxpayers' new
states. 59
b. Property taxes. Not all property taxes present coordination
problems. Since real property generally is immobile and has an unambiguous location, its taxation at the state and local level ordinarily
does not create coordination problems between different jurisdictions.
The main danger to interstate commerce is simply one of property
assessments that are biased against outsiders. Assessment tends to be
highly discretionary and is only subject to independent administrative
review in four states and the District of Columbia. 60
Mobile personal property presents a danger both of double taxation, if more than one jurisdiction makes a claim, and of tax avoidance, as when taxpayers temporarily move property out of the taxing
jurisdiction on tax day. 61 In addition, the taxation of intangible property (such as mortgages or corporate stock) can result in overlapping
taxation by different jurisdictions that penalizes taxpayers for multijurisdictional presence. The problem is not only that intangible property
may have no clear location, but that its value may result from the
rights that it conveys in tangible property already subject to property
tax. Consider, for example, a property tax on shares of corporate
stock held in North Dakota, where all of the corporation's tangible
property is located and taxed in South Dakota. 62
Property taxes can yield further coordination problems if the taxpayer's domicile or residency, in addition to the property's location, is
a ground for imposing liability. In illustration, Florida's intangible
property tax, recently upheld by an evenly divided Supreme Court,
applies to items that either have an in-state business situs or are owned
59. See, e.g., 137 CONG. R.Ec. Sll59, Sll89-90 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1991) (describing a bill
introduced by Senator Reid to bar states from taxing nonresidents' pension incomes).
60. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSfEIN, supra note l, at 192-93.
61. See id. at 198-203.
62. See id. at 204-07. There is no locational coordination problem (although still double
taxation) if North Dakota and South Dakota each tax both the tangible property and the stock if
both are located in-state.
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by Florida domiciliaries. 63 If other states similarly tax property on the
basis of both business situs and domicile, without granting credits for
other states' taxes on the same property, multijurisdictional presence is
penalized.
c. Retail sales and use taxes. Perhaps no coordination problem in
state and local taxation is better known than that arising under sales
taxation. When a buyer in one jurisdiction makes a purchase from a
seller in another jurisdiction, both jurisdictions may have a claim.
There may be no right answer as to where the sale occurred. Moreover, even if the place of sale is clear, residency provides an alternative
ground supporting the imposition of a tax. To prevent avoidance of
their sales taxes by residents, many jurisdictions impose use taxes on
goods purchased out-of-state but used in-state. 64
As most people who have ordered from out-of-state by telephone
or mail to avoid sales tax know, however, nontaxation, not double taxation, is the main problem. Pursuant to a Multistate Tax Compact, 65
most states accept consistent rules allocating exclusive tax jurisdiction
(such as deeming sales to occur in the state of destination) and grant
credits where necessary to avoid double taxation. The remaining
problems, such as holdouts from this pattern of agreement or the imposition of use taxes that are harsher than the analogous sales taxes
and thereby disfavor out-of-state sales, are relatively minor. 66
A significant coordination problem still remains, but it goes in the
opposite direction. While use taxes commonly require self-assessment
by the purchaser, collection often depends on the active cooperation of
the seller. Given the many thousands of sales tax jurisdictions in this
country, however, sellers with nationwide mail or phone order businesses might suffer from intolerable burden if, in keeping with usual
sales tax practice, they were required to remit all taxes due from purchasers on their sales to the purchasers' jurisdictions. Although, especially in an age of computers, such a result might not overly burden
interstate commerce, the Supreme Court has ruled otherwise. In National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 61 the Court held
that, at least absent congressional authorization, sellers cannot be re63. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 111 S. Ct. 2049 (1991); Divided
Court Affirms Florida Court's Ruling Upholding Tax on Intangibles, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No.
98, at G-4 (May 21, 1991).
64. See, e.g., HELLERSfEIN & HELLERSfEIN, supra note 1, at 770-71.
65. State Tax Guide (CCH) ~ 351, at 356 (1991) [hereinafter State Tax Guide].
66. See HELLERSrEIN & HELLERSfEIN, supra note l, at 781-85. Double taxation of an interstate sale may in any event lead to invalidation of one of the taxes under the Commerce
Clause. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1989).
67. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
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quired to remit the sales tax due from the purchaser to any state where
they have not established a sufficient presence to constitute nexus. 68
The rule of National Bellas Hess creates two distortions. First,
purchasers often find that they can avoid taxation by making out-ofstate purchases, including some that were more expensive before tax
than the in-state alternatives. Thus, interstate transactions are tax-favored based on the Supreme Court's concern that the only practical
alternative is to tax-penalize them. Second, sellers are deterred from
increasing their presence in a taxing jurisdiction at the margin where it
would establish nexus.
A further coordination problem under sales and use taxes arises
when states tax sales other than final retail sales. When one state taxes
an intermediate sale of raw materials or services to a manufacturer,
and another state taxes the final product without allowing a credit for
the prior sale, the effect is double taxation of the end product. This
problem can of course arise within a single state, but may be most
likely to occur where states are trying to reach sales that would otherwise escape their jurisdiction - as Florida recently attempted when it
abortively imposed a sales tax on services, including many rendered
out-of-state, without limiting the tax to final retail sales. 69
d. Business taxes. States levy a number of taxes on corporations
and other business entities. These taxes commonly resemble general
income, property, or sales taxes in that they are based on a measure of
the taxpayer's profits, value, or gross receipts. Thus, they present
many of the same coordination problems as these provisions, but in a
particularly significant setting, given that legal entities such as corporations do such a large share of the interstate business in this country.
Taxing companies that are involved in interstate business would
present no coordination problems if each company could neatly be divided, such that each piece belonged for tax purposes to one state.
Where the proper lines of division are unclear, however, some pieces
may be taxed more than once or not at all, leading to over- or undertaxation of interstate business relative to other business. Historically, the Supreme Court long feared overtaxation more than
undertaxation - or else simply interpreted the Constitution's "negative Commerce Clause" with numbing literalness70 - and therefore
68. The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a case in which it apparently intends to reconsider the holding of National Bellas Hess. See State v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d
203 (N.D.}, cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 49 (1991).
69. See George Mundstock, Florida Services: You Only Tax Twice?, 35 TAX NOTES 1137
(1987).
70. As a literal textual matter, of course, there is no negative Commerce Clause and thus no
possibility of its being interpreted with numbing literalness. The Commerce Clause of the Con-
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barred all direct state and local taxation of interstate commerce. The
result might be called chronic undertaxation mitigated by judicial myopia, since it allowed indirect taxes on interstate commerce that might
be identical to the direct kind in economic incidence and effect. 71 The
Court eventually decided, however, that the coordination problem deserved a facially neutral answer. It now holds that interstate business
may be taxed, whether directly or indirectly, but that the Commerce
Clause bars undue relative burdens on such commerce, such as duplicative "multiple taxation." 72 The states therefore collectively may
reach all of an interstate business' profits, value, or gross receipts, but
must apportion the resulting revenue base among themselves.
The differences between the tax bases of profits, value, and gross
receipts, along with the difficulty of defining each, guarantee that
states will not achieve the outcome of taxing everything exactly once.
States can opportunistically choose whatever base, within the permissible range, appears most favorable to themselves, and thereby collectively engage in effective multiple taxation. Businesses can
opportunistically exploit disparities in state tax bases in the effort to
avoid even single taxation. The Supreme Court, lacking the institutional competence or any plausible ground for picking any one tax
base as the right one, may be unable to go beyond crudely weighing
the equities case by case or else imposing new formal requirements to
replace the old "direct-indirect" line. 73
Coordination problems would remain even under a uniform tax
base, however, because for large interstate businesses there often is no
definite place where gross receipts or income are earned or value exstitution states only that "Congress shall have Power •.. To regulate Commerce •.. among the
Several States." U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This eventually was interpreted as implying what
is now called the "negative Commerce Clause": the proposition that Congress' jurisdiction over
interstate commerce is exclusive and that therefore, even in the absence of congressional action,
the federal courts can and should strike down improper state and local government infringements of this national power. See, e.g., Sholley, supra note 11, at 559-83.
71. See, e.g., Hellerstein, supra note 10, at 42-48 (1987); William B. Lockhart, A Revol11tion
in State Taxation of Commerce?, 65 MINN. L. REv. 1025, 1027-34 (1981). "Directness" depended, for example, in the case of taxes on commercial freight transportation by interstate railways, on whether the tax was computed with regard to the amount of freight transported (direct
and therefore impermissible) or the proceeds earned by the railway (indirect and therefore permissible). See Hellerstein, s11pra, at 43-44.
72. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 281 (1977).
73. An example of a new formal rule to address the multiple taxation problem is the requirement that a tax "have ... 'internal consistency - that is [it] must be such that, if applied by
every jurisdiction,' there would be no [multiple taxation]." Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S.
638, 644 (1984) (quoting Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169
(1983)). Internal consistency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for multiple taxation, but the Court looks to it because "[a]ny other rule would mean that the constitutionality of
[any one state's] tax laws would depend on the shifting complexities of the tax codes of 49 other
States." 467 U.S. at 644-45.
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ists. The problems go to substance, not just administration or recordkeeping. For example, consider a merger between two previously
separate businesses in different states, creating synergies, as of integration, centralized management, and scale, that increase profits and
value. Even if everything else remains unchanged, the increased value
and income resulting from the synergy do not inherently belong to
either state. In any instance where factors of production in more than
one state are deployed cooperatively, that which is being taxed may
have no "real" location - for example, where income is generated by
intangible assets (such as patents) that have no clear location, where
contracts are negotiated across state lines, or where property is constructed in one state, transported through a second, and sold in a
third.
The difficulty of determining where income, value, or gross receipts are located need not prevent the development of a set of consistent and plausible allocation rules. Such a set of rules may impose
social costs of its own as taxpayers plan to minimize tax liability and
in some cases enter interstate commerce solely to realize "tax synergies," but at least the rules might solve the basic coordination problem
of multiple or nontaxation of a portion of the tax base. While states
have in part cooperated and adopted similar rules, complete uniformity predictably has not emerged given opportunism and random variation by the states and the courts' lack of institutional competence (or
confidence) to impose a uniform rule when no particular rule is clearly
correct.
The federal courts require, therefore, only that the method of apportionment be reasonable. No tax can be levied .absent a sufficient
nexus, a not very demanding standard74 that nonetheless deters at the
margin establishment of an in-state presence. Moreover, at least in
principle, extraterritorial value cannot be taxed. 75 Where in-state and
out-of-state operations, even if conducted by separate corporations
that belong to the same control group, constitute a "unitary business,"
however - another not very demanding standard76 that affects incentives at the margin - the state can use any number of apportionment
methods in identifying the in-state component that is subject to tax.
74. Nexus may be found, for example, if the company maintains an office, employees or
agents to conduct its business, or property in the taxing state. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 362.
75. See, e.g., Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 164 (1983).
76. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980), for example, Vermont was held entitled to treat Mobil's entire international petroleum operations as a unitary
business because a Mobil subsidiary owned and operated a few in-state gas stations. 445 U.S. at
446-49.
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In practice, for income taxation of a unitary multistate business,

almost all states employ a three-factor formula based on property,
payroll, and sales, but the exact formula and the three factors' definitions vary. 77 For example, while some states weigh all three factors
equally, others give extra weight to the sales factor; 78 not surprisingly,
these tend to be market states, where the percentage of a national business' sales in-state is likely to exceed the in-state percentage of its
property and payroll. Standards other than a three-factor formula are
also allowable, 79 even if in practice they clearly favor local residents or
businesses, so long as they are not " 'out of all appropriate proportions
to the business transacted.' " 80
Controversy recently has arisen over some states' application of
unitary business rules, not just to companies that are active in more
than one state in this country, but on a worldwide basis. A multinational corporate group, if present in such a state, is taxable on the
apportionable share of its worldwide income. 81 Taxpayers subject to
worldwide unitary taxation have argued against it on a number of
grounds, including the following: (1) requiring foreign corporate affiliates to report their taxable income to the United States under U.S.
rules creates severe compliance difficulties; (2) since no foreign country engages in worldwide unitary taxation, its implementation here
creates effective double taxation of foreign income, along with competitive disadvantage for worldwide businesses relative to those operating
purely in-state; and (3) worldwide unitary taxation's departure from
prevailing domestic practice, both at the national level and in most
states, adds to its undesirability. 82 The Supreme Court has held states'
use of worldwide unitary taxation constitutionally allowable, however,
leaving only a political remedy for those who oppose it. 83
The basic choice of apportionment formula for unitary businesses,
while important, answers only a subset of the issues concerning the
location of business income that commonly arise. Whenever an activity's location is ambiguous or arguably crosses state lines, how to ap77. See HELLERSfEIN &. HELLERSfEIN, supra note 1, at 473-79.
78. See id. at 506-08.
79. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
80. 437 U.S. at 278 (quoting Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina ex rel Maxwell, 283 U.S.
123, 135 (1931)); see also Joel Michael, The Constitutionality ofMinnesota's Business Tax Credits
After Westinghouse Electric Corp., 4 J. ST. TAXN. 163, 166-67 (1985).
81. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
82. See CHARLES E. MCLURE, JR., EcONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON STATE TAXATION OF
MULTUURISDICTIONAL CORPORATIONS 204-08 (1986).
83. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983); see Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
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ply any formula becomes unclear, and a host of competing claims of
tax jurisdiction can be made. Consider, for example, a baseball team

that plays games in one state during spring training and a number of
other states during the season, and whose games are broadcast on
cable television across the country. Or consider a telephone company
that provides interstate calling services, thus arguably entering not
only the states in which the parties to phone calls are located but all
states through which the phone lines or electrical signals pass. In such
situations, states can easily and plausibly take inconsistent positions,
under which they may collectively claim more than one hundred percent of the income derived from the activities. 84
In summary, states can choose their apportionment standards opportunistically and make overlapping or inconsistent claims, although
this will not necessarily lead collectively to overtaxation of interstate
business relative to intrastate business. Businesses also can respond
opportunistically to coordination problems - for example, by tax
planning to minimize liability, 85 deploying superior resources to win
contested factual issues at audit, and applying in-state political pressure, backed by the threat of leaving, to obtain favorable rules in the
first place.

E. Administrative and Compliance Costs of Disparate State and
Local Taxation

While I have thus far emphasized the burdens that state and local
taxation deliberately places on interstate commerce, those that arise
incidentally may be even more important. The existence of multiple
separate tax systems, each with its own set of rules and enforcement
personnel, imposes a number of different costs on the national economy. It adds substantially to taxpayers' costs of tax planning and
compliance. It increases the costs of tax administration, as each state
hires its own bureaucracy and, in many cases, conducts its own audits
and imposes its own reporting requirements. 86 It leads to more litigation, in the state courts as well as from federal constitutional chal84. Other industries that arguably require special apportionment rules include public utilities, railroads, trucks, airlines, insurance companies, and savings and loan associations. See HELLERSrEJN & HELLERSfEJN, supra note 1, at 498-99.
85. In one recent case, a corporation apparently was able to exploit differences between
states' rules to report only 20% of its domestic source income for federal tax purposes as income
of any state. See Little Support Seen for Proposals to Harmonize State Taxation of Intangibles,
Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 197, at G-10 to G-11 (Oct. 10, 1991).
86. See Michael J. Graetz et al., United States, in ADMINISTRATIVE AND COMPLIANCE
COSTS OF TAXATION 329-26 (International Fiscal Assn. ed., 1989).
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lenges. It means that more legislative bodies consider tax law changes
and are lobbied by a host of different interests.
The aggregate social costs of all the tax planning, compliance, administration, litigation, and politicking attributable to state and local
taxation cannot readily be estimated, but plainly are enormous.
Although only the avoidable costs are fairly at issue here, state and
local tax receipts exceed $400 billion annually; for sales taxes (which
are the best documented), rough estimates suggest that the costs of
state government tax administration plus direct costs of taxpayer compliance equal almost five percent of the amount collected. 87 Even if
this impressive level of collection efficiency holds across the board, 88
annual administration and compliance costs for all state and local
taxes would approach $20 billion annually. This number, however, is
unrealistically low because it excludes such costs as tax planning, litigation, and politicking. 89
Unnecessarily high compliance costs are virtually an inevitable
consequence of state and local government autonomy in defining tax
bases even under optimistic assumptions about levels of interstate cooperation. Even assuming that everyone generally wants to cooperate,
the positive transaction costs of cooperation, along with the occasional
countervailing factors motivating legislators, suggest that there will remain at least residual differences between states' tax bases, as suggested by the substantial but incomplete degree of state
"piggybacking" onto the federal definition of taxable income. Even a
small residual degree of variation may impose substantial compliance
costs, however - for example, by requiring duplicative recordkeeping
regarding tax attributes such as loss carryovers and basis. Compliance
costs are not purely proportional to the quantum of divergence be87. DUE & MIKESELL, supra note 53, at 323-27, estimate state administrative costs at .73%,
and vendor compliance costs at 3.93%, of the revenue collected through sales taxation - totaling 4.66%. A more recent study by the State of Washington estimates administrative costs at
.93%. STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPT. OF REVENUE, PROGRAM ADMIN. SECTION, TAX ADMINISTRATION SURVEY 20 (1988) [hereinafter WASHINGTON TAX SURVEY].
88. The sales tax may be above average in collection efficiency. In particular, compared to
state income taxes, it concentrates compliance costs on a relatively small number of persons the retailers who are responsible for collecting it - thus potentially creating scale efficiencies,
and it is unlikely to elicit anything near the same level of tax planning. Moreover, while for
many taxpayers the state income tax presents relatively light marginal burdens due to federal
income tax "piggybacking," for multistate businesses - admittedly, a small group that substantially overlaps with retailers - the extra costs of state and local taxation are increased by income
allocation issues. Finally, Washington's tax administration survey estimates state collection costs
for the sales tax to be lower than those for business or income taxes. WASHINGTON TAX SURVEY, supra note 87, at 20.
89. While political activity may be viewed as valuable in itself, rather than as a social cost,
that view seems relatively inapplicable to the straightforward economic lobbying by interest
groups that undoubtedly accounts for a large portion of the political activity in the tax area.
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tween states' tax bases; a significant fixed cost results from the bare
fact of divergence.
In particular, divergence requires taxpayers (1) to know about a
host of different rules, (2) separately to exercise judgment about the
application of different jurisdictions' rules, (3) to engage in separate
numerical calculations (often the least of the problems in a computer
age), (4) to keep duplicative records, for example, of an asset's basis
under different income tax regimes, (5) to file multiple forms - not
only tax returns, but information reports, requests for extensions, reports of tax return adjustments required by other jurisdictions, and the
like, and (6) to engage in a host of parallel interactions with government officials, such as auditors and legislators.
These burdens, while not entirely avoidable given the existence of
multiple governmental units, need not be nearly so great as they are in
practice. The following is a brief description of the features of each of
the principal state and local taxes that create arguably unnecessary
burden.
1. Personal and Business Income Taxes
Despite substantial piggybacking by state and local governments
onto the federal income tax base, enough differences remain, along
with legal or factual issues and compliance requirements unique to the
state and local level, to create substantial added compliance costs.
Several companies that I contacted during my research indicated that
they devote as much manpower and other resources to state and local
income taxation as to federal income taxation. This suggests that, at
least for multistate businesses, compliance efficiency (compliance costs
in relation to taxes paid) is lower for state and local income taxes than
for federal income taxes, even treating all shared compliance requirements as attributable to the latter. While a company's state and local
income tax bills may occasionally exceed its federal income tax bill for example, if it has net taxable income in several states but not for its
overall operations - ordinarily federal income tax liability is higher
given the higher federal marginal rates and aggregate tax revenue.
The compliance burdens faced by multistate businesses - and at
times by individuals - arise at several different ".Onceptual stages.
First comes the problem of identifying the taxpaying unit. In particular, consolidated corporate groups must determine the set of affiliates
subject to tax in each state. Not only may the set of affiliates with
direct jurisdictional nexus vary from state to state, but so may the
legal standards for determining both nexus and which members of the
groups are engaged in a unitary business (obviating the need for direct
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nexus by each separate affiliate). Even if the legal issues are clear, tax
recordkeeping by the overall group may be complicated by the varying
sets of in-state taxpayers. Moreover, if some affiliates are deemed
outside the state's taxing jurisdiction, transactions between the inside
and outside affiliates may be reviewable under state provisions incorporating Internal Revenue Code section 482, 90 which empowers the
IRS Commissioner to reallocate income among affiliated taxpayers
across national boundaries. Section 482 is a notorious quagmire that
involves factual complexity and lacks a clear underlying standard.
The Commissioner often seeks to reconstruct the true arm's-length
terms of an intercorporate transaction, but such terms often do not
exist and would depend in large part on the outcome of bargaining
that never occurred. States nonetheless have begun to take an increasing interest in section 482-type issues.9 1
The possible application of worldwide unitary taxation creates additional costs for multinational companies. Where applicable, taxpayers must procure information from foreign affiliates that may be
reluctant to provide it and that may not keep records similar to those
required for federal income tax purposes. Even some states that follow, or permit as an election, 92 a "water's-edge rule," under which
foreign affiliates are excluded from the taxpaying group, require taxpayers to file comprehensive spreadsheets detailing their income and
operations on a worldwide basis. These spreadsheets generally are not
required annually, but the length of time between required filings varies from state to state. 93
An additional issue in identifying the taxpaying unit arises for
small closely held companies. For federal income tax purposes, such a
company may elect to be classified as an S corporation and have its
income taxed directly to its shareholders, essentially on the partnership model, instead of being taxed itself. 94 However, eight states decline to recognize S corporation status for their own income tax
purposes. 95
Once the precise taxpaying unit is known, taxpayers must deter90. I.RC. § 482 (1991). For an example of an analogous state provision, see CAL. REV. &
TAX. CoDB § 17551 (West Supp. 1992).
91. I learned while interviewing companies' tax staffs that Connecticut has been raising § 482
issues and that California recently sent tax personnel to § 482 training sessions.
92. Taxpayer elections tend to be socially undesirable even if politically popular, in that they
encourage taxpayers to substitute compliance costs that are deadweight social costs for tax payments that are transfers.
93. This information was derived from my interviews with companies' tax staffs.
94. See I.R.C. §§ 1361-63 (1988).
95. See State Tax Guide, supra note 65, 11 10-100, at 1033-37.
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mine the potential tax base that is within each state's reach. States
follow different income apportionment formulas - in some cases, for
example, giving extra weight to the sales factor in a variety of degrees. 96 Even where the formulas are ostensibly the same, their precise
meaning may differ. As an example, the includability~ and if includable the location, of intangible property and income ~der what appear to be·identical formulas may raise questions. Other potential taxbase issues that create burden include determining what municipal
bond interest is tax exempt (since most states, unlike the federal government, exempt only the interest on their own municipal bonds), and
identifying for deduction disallowance the expenses that are attributable to income that a given state does not tax. 97
A third stage in income tax compliance involves applying the rules
for determining taxable income once the potential tax base is known.
States' rules for computing taxable income vary from the federal rules
and from each other in a number of different respects. For example,
California and New York have their own depreciation systems for
business property. All property subject to these systems therefore has
a different basis, and potentially a different amount of gain or loss
upon taxable transfer, for state than for federal tax purposes. 98 Other
states, while generally following the federal depreciation rules, require
that a portion offederal depreciation deductions be added back to taxable income. Five states reject federal depletion rules and five others
have modified them in varying degrees. 99 Net operating losses and
capital loss carryovers are allowed everywhere, but with a range of
different carryover periods. Foreign income taxes are alternatively
creditable (with an election to deduct them instead) as under the federal income tax, deductible only, or disregarded altogether (the predominant state rule for corporate taxpayers). Foreign or out-of-state
dividends received by a corporation may be taxable in-state under a
variety of different rules. States provide a variety of different investment incentives - for example, rewarding investment in designated
enterprise zones. Eight states levy an alternative minimum tax, payable to the extent that it exceeds the amount due under the regular tax,
96. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 506-08. For example, New York
double-weights the sales factor for regular tax (although not minimum tax) purposes; Illinois,
Connecticut, Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Ohio simply double-weight the sales factor; and
Minnesota's three-factor formula is weighted 70-15-15 in favor of sales. Id.
97. I.R.C. § 265 (West Supp. 1991) is a federal example of such a rule. ·
98. An item of property also may have different bases for state and federal income tax purposes owing to differences in the allowance of tax credits that give rise to basis adjustments.
99. See State Tax Guide, supra note 65,

1f 10-060, at 1027.
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in order to reduce the value of tax preferences. too
A fourth stage in income tax compliance is reporting to state tax
commissions. The tax return is only one of many documents that
must be filed separately for each jurisdiction on its own forms. In
addition, thirty-one states require separate applications for an extension of time to file the tax return, instead of granting extensions automatically when granted by the federal government. 101 States typically
require that all adjustments to federal income tax returns be reported
to them, but both the form and the deadline for making such reports
differ.
A fifth and final stage in income tax compliance is the audit process. States generally conduct their own audits of major corporate taxpayers. These audits typically take from several days to several weeks,
tend to be influenced more by political and budgetary considerations
than are federal income tax audits, often take the form of nonspecific
denials that particular deductions or other tax benefits are allowable
- requiring voluminous documentation in response - and are conducted very much in light of the taxpayer's expected unwillingness to
litigate unless large amounts or broadly important principles are at
issue.
2. Property Taxes
The compliance costs resulting from property taxes differ in kind
from those resulting from income taxes in two respects. First, property taxation is predominantly used by local governments, while income taxation is predominantly used by state govemments. 102
Second, the difficult or unclear issues that need to be resolved in determining one's liability for property taxation are to a greater extent factual rather than legal.
The first of these differences makes property tax compliance more
of a "retail," rather than a "wholesale," operation than state and local
income tax compliance. Property tax compliance involves more separate jurisdictions, and, for a given amount of revenue, more individual
100. See id. 1[ 10-104, at 1051. The alternative minimum tax, in comparison to the regular
tax, is computed by applying a lower rate to a larger base (due to the denial of specified tax
preferences). Pennsylvania, while not levying an alternative minimum tax, treats certain tax preferences as modification addbacks to taxable income. Id.
101. See id. 11 10-115, at 1075-76. This counts both states that do not honor the federal
extension and those that honor it upon application.
102. See, e.g., HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 7, 10 (stating that in the mid1980s, state governments derived 37.6% of their revenue from income taxes and 1.9% from
property taxes, whereas local governments derived 37. 7% of their revenue from property taxes
and 3% from income taxes).
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officials than income tax compliance. This tends to make the computation of property tax liability more subjective, political, and dependent on the intervention of persons (such as local attorneys) having
working relationships with tax administrators.
The greater emphasis of property tax compliance on factual rather
than legal issues further adds to the subjectivity of property tax assessment. The difference from income taxation is relative, not absolute.
Income taxes frequently pose case-specific issues of fact, such as what
was the section 482 arm's-length transfer price for an item transferred
by one corporate affiliate to another, or which of a company's expenses
related to tax-exempt income. Property tax liability often turns on
questions oflaw, such as what categories of property are taxed at what
rates, and exactly how these categories are defined. Different jurisdictions not only recognize different categories of property for rate purposes - for example, real property, personal property, equipment,
inventory, intangible property, and the like -but define what is ostensibly the same category in a variety of different ways.
Nonetheless, for property taxes case-specific factual issues have relative prominence due to the centrality of the issue of valuation. The
amount of property tax due typically depends on the property's value,
rather than, say, its historical cost. Although some jurisdictions apply
formulas to known data, determining a property's value frequently requires the exercise of judgment, often culminating in an administrator's subjective assessment of conflicting expert testimony.
The differences in kind between income tax and property tax compliance costs do not make either tax inherently better or worse than
the other. They are relevant chiefly to questions such as which tax's
compliance costs could more easily be reduced, and which tax involves
a greater risk of discriminatory application at the administrative level.
The differences suggest that, barring significant changes (such as a
shift from value to a formula based on historical cost), compliance
costs are less easily reduced, and discrimination against interstate
commerce less easily eliminated, for property taxation than state and
local income taxation.103
3. Retail Sales and Use Taxes
From a compliance standpoint, retail sales and use taxes resemble
income taxes in one sense and property taxes in another. Like income
taxes, they often tum simply on the numbers, such as the gross revenues derived from sales transactions, rather than routinely requiring
103. See infra Part IV.
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the exercise of judgment about indefinite facts. As with property tax
compliance, however, retail sales and use tax compliance is itself a
"retail" rather than a "wholesale" operation for multistate businesses.
This country has about 7000 separate sales tax jurisdictions. 104 Often,
even neighboring jurisdictions within the same state impose different
classifications and rates, collect their own taxes separately, impose separate documentation requirements (such as the use of their own certificates attesting to tax exemption or that taxes have been paid), and
conduct their own audits. Local jurisdictions' incentive to cut their
own costs by either cooperating or delegating administrative duties to
state governments may be outweighed at times by the political desire
to impose diverse rules (with the effect of impeding cooperation or
delegation), or by the interest of local bureaucracies in maintaining
their own power and function.
The compliance costs incurred by sellers pursuant to their legal
obligation to remit sales taxes due from purchasers are significantly
increased by the need to comply with so many separate jurisdictions.
The burden results not only from parallel or duplicative papenvork
but from the need to know and understand each jurisdiction's rules.
As with property taxes, not only the rates but the categories (and precise meanings of these categories) to which rates and exemptions apply
often vary between jurisdictions. Moreover, burden results from the
need under use tax provisions, pursuant to National Bellas Hess or
state and local law, to determine nexus for a large number of separate
jurisdictions, and before that to engage in tax planning regarding
nexus.
4.

Other Taxes

State and local governments impose a vast array of other taxes,
along with licenses, user fees, and other charges that may serve in part
to raise general revenue and thus are conceptually indistinct from
taxes. For example, a recent growth area is environmental taxes,
which often may serve both environmental and revenue-raising objectives. The sheer number and variety of such charges (whether or not
"taxes" under my definition) can create massive compliance costs for
nationwide businesses, particularly if state and local laws change
rapidly.
104. See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1 SIGNIFICANT FEATURES
OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 58-59, Table 27, (1989) [hereinafter Advisory Commission]; ABA
SALES & USE TAX HANDBOOK (D. Michael Young & John T. Piper eds., 1988). When National
Bellas Hess was decided, the number of such jurisdictions was about 2300. National Bellas Hess,
Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759 n.12 (1967).
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In some cases, the structure of these taxes seems to suggest a lack
of concern by state and local governments about taxpayers' compliance costs. One example is severance and excise taxes on mineral extraction, which often take the form either of a "netback" based on
mineral value (so called because it requires "netting back" from the
contract price to the value of the mineral deposit by ·subtracting production costs) or of a "volumetric" tax based only on the quantity
extracted. Netback taxes impose significantly greater burden than volumetric taxes, due not only to the additional records and computations that they require but to the fact-specific judgmental issue of what
costs are appropriately subtracted from the contract price. Netback
taxes nonetheless continue to be widely used. 105

F. Responding to the Problems Caused by Locational Disparity
This Part has attempted to suggest the magnitude and intractability of the locational disparities resulting from federali!!m in taxation.
Merely having different tax rates or bases defeats locational neutrality,
and thus is economically similar to having tariffs imposed at state borders. Differences between state and local tax systems also give rise to
serious coordination problems, potentially inducing taxpayers to seek
or avoid a multijurisdictional presence purely for tax reasons, and
presenting strategic opportunities, as for tax exportation or protectionism, to state and local governments. Such differences also impose
massive costs of compliance, administration, tax planning, politicking,
and litigation.
One might take some satisfaction from the fact that taxpayers and
state and local governments both have strategic opportunities, since
this suggests that a rough balance may emerge between the taxation of
interstate and intrastate activity, except for two sobering considerations. First, the opposing forces do not offset in all cases; instead,
there are "pockets" where one side has the decisive advantage, resulting in significant over- or undertaxation. As an example, Alaska's and
Wyoming's capacity to tax natural resources that are mainly ·consumed by outsiders gives them a special opportunity to engage in significant tax exportation - or at least to persuade themselves that they
are doing so, although the actual economic incidence of their severance taxes is unclear. 106 There is evidence that this perception of
105. The principal advantage of the netback method - since rates can be adjusted to yield
the same revenue under either method - is that it automatically, without requiring the legislature to amend the rates, adjusts for changes in the minerals' value, which might be thought
somehow to correlate with the appropriate, or revenue-maximizing, level of tax.
106. See, e.g., McLure, supra note 6, at 186-87; Hellerstein, supra note 22, at 29-35.
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spending other people's money not only encourages the two states to
burden interstate commerce - an effect of their taxes regardless of
incidence - but also removes the political discipline, from voter aversion to visible high taxes, that ordinarily constrains waste in government spending. Alaska and Wyoming are the two leading states in the
country in per capita government expenditure - with Alaska spending five times, and Wyoming two times, the national average - and
anecdotal evidence indicates that they waste much of the excess,
rather than spend it productively. 107 Even if they spend the excess
relatively productively, the difference in spending might be undesirable
if based on the special opportunity to tax resources consumed by outsiders, rather than on a voter preference for more government services.
Second, even if the tax burdens on intrastate and interstate activity
are roughly equivalent overall, the result may still be allocatively inefficient. Opposing inefficiencies of over- and undertaxation of interstate
commerce in different sectors of the economy may compound each
other as distortions, rather than cancel each other out. Moreover,
shifts between interstate and intrastate commerce are only one category of allocative inefficiency resulting from federalism in taxation.
Other examples include the shifting of investment to low-tax jurisdictions, to activities whose proper apportionment between jurisdictions
is unclear and manipulable, and to more mobile forms of capital,
which can flee when jurisdictions raise their taxes.1os
Costly departures from locational neutrality are inevitable under a
federal system. If we accept the Framers' starting point of wanting
both a federal system and some sort of antitariff principle that constrains departures from locational neutrality (without being limited to
what are tariffs on their face), we encounter an intellectual quandary.
How are we to define and identify impermissible departures from locational neutrality, given that many departures will be permitted? Particularly if courts are in charge of applying the antitariff principle,
some sort of general legal standard is needed; courts presumably cannot be quite so ad hoc as legislatures in weighing each case on its individual merits.
The legal standard most widely accepted in this area is one barring
discrimination against outsiders or interstate commerce. The leading
Supreme Court authority concerning state taxation of interstate busi107. See, e.g., Dwight R. Lee, A Bigger Oil Spill That No Alaskan Seems to Notice, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 20, 1989, at A24. An alternative explanation for Alaska and Wyoming's high per capita
spending is that their low population densities deny them economies of scale in providing government services.
108. See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of
Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 108 (1987).
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ness, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 109 lists four requirements
for upholding such taxes, the most stringent and important of which is
the absence of discrimination against interstate commerce. 110 Among
commentators, the antidiscrimination standard even more clearly
stands out as a dominant, if not quite exclusive, legal norm. 111
What constitutes discrimination against outsiders or interstate
commerce is far from clear. 112 Yet a bedrock illustration is both simple and intuitive. For North Dakota to impose a ten percent income
tax while South Dakota imposes a five percent income tax would create locational distortion but not discrimination, because North Dakota's tax applies alike to all taxpayers both in-state and out-of-state.
By contrast, for North Dakota to tax out-of-state businesses at ten
percent and local businesses at five percent would be discriminatory.113 The following Part explores more thoroughly both the meaning of a federal judicial standard barring discrimination against
outsiders or interstate commerce, and whether this standard provides
a workable and attractive fallback from requiring complete locational
neutrality.

II.

THE EXERCISE OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL REVIEW To BAR
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST OUTSIDERS OR INTERSTATE
COMMERCE

While the notion of discrimination against outsiders or interstate
commerce seems easy to grasp intuitively, it has proven slippery in
109. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
110. 430 U.S. at 279. The other three factors are the existence of a nexus with the taxing
state, fair apportionment where there is interstate activity, and a fair relationship to the services
provided by the taxing state. 430 U.S. at 279, 287. On the greater stringency and importance of
the antidiscrimination requirement, see Hellerstein, supra note 10, at 60; Tatarowicz & MimsVelarde, supra note 14, at 883-84.
111. See, e.g., PAUL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LoCAL TAXATION§ 2:19 (1981 & Supp. 1990); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 6-17 (2d ed. 1988); James F. Blumstein, Some Intersections of the Negative Commerce Clause
and the New Federalism: The Case of Discriminatory State Income Tax Treatment of Out-ofState Tax-Exempt Bonds, 31 VAND. L. REv. 473, 497-518 (1978); Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme Court: Toward a More Unified Approach to Constitutional Adjudication?,
75 MICH. L. REv. 1426, 1446 (1977); Lockhart, supra note 71, at 1034-38; Regan, supra note 14,
at 1115-18 (articulating an "antiprotectionism" standard that resembles barring discrimination);
Michael E. Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1203,
1213 (1986); Tatarowicz & Mims-Velarde, supra note 14; Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125, 130-31.
112. See, e.g., Ernest J. Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the Position of
the Judiciary, 67 YALE L.J. 219, 228 (1957); HARTMAN, supra note 111, § 2-19; Hellerstein,
supra note 10, at 60.
113. See, e.g., West Point Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Opelika, 354 U.S. 390 (1957) (striking
down a tax that applied solely to merchants outside the taxing jurisdiction).
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practice. Some dismiss it as a "shibboleth," 114 while even the more
hopeful concede that it is "not ... self-defining" and can appear "delusively simple." 115 Essentially, discrimination is a subset of locational
nonneutrality, founded on comparing two groups - the persons inside
and outside the taxing jurisdiction or, alternatively, the commerce
originating inside and outside. Since the groups being compared are
taken as given, the antidiscrimination standard reflects an assumption
either that taxes have no effect at the margin on where one resides or
locates one's business or that any such effect is irrelevant. After all,
low taxes as an inducement to move in (such as South Dakota's five
percent rate in the earlier example) are permissible, and a claim of
discrimination cannot be rebutted by arguing that if only the victim
moved into the taxing jurisdiction she would no longer be discriminated against. Instead, outsiders are compared to insiders as they
stand, and deemed victims of discrimination if, in cases where members of the two groups are alike in some relevant sense, the tax system
treats the outsiders worse, either by directly taxing them more, or by
otherwise imposing a burden that places them at a competitive
disadvantage. 116
Below, I examine why the antidiscrimination standard often is
thought appealing - specifically, why discrimination is considered
worse than other types of locational disparity, what it should be construed to mean, and how workable a standard it provides. I then tum
to the problems in defining and applying the standard.
A. Discrimination Compared to Other Locational Disparity

The antidiscrimination standard is highly selective in addressing
locational distortion. In addition to placing taxpayers in two fixed
groups, insiders and outsiders, and ignoring marginal effects on which
group one chooses to join, it treats one of the two groups, the outsiders, as uniquely needing protection. It does not bar discrimination
114. Brown, supra note 112, at 228.
115. HARTMAN, supra note 111, § 2:19, at 122; Tatarowicz & Mims-Velarde, supra note 14,
at 885.
116. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1987) (stating that to violate the
Commerce Clause it is not necessary that the tax facially discriminate against outsiders or apportion a larger share of the tax burden to interstate commerce); HARTMAN, supra note 111, § 2:19,
at 127 ("A tax is ... discriminatory .•. when [it] ... provides a commercial advantage to local
business at the expense of out-of-state business."); Hellerstein, supra note 22, at 22 ("[A] tax
which ... imposes greater burdens on out-of-state goods or activities than on competing in·state
goods or activities will be struck down."); Regan, supra note 14, at 1126 ("The classical tariff or
embargo .... improves the competitive position of local economic actors, just because they are
local, vis-a-vis their foreign competitors."); Smith, supra note 111, at 1213 ("A regulation is
discriminatory if it imposes greater economic burdens on those outside the state, to the economic
advantage of those within.").
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against insiders, for example, to attract outside investment. Moreover,
given the requirement of nexus that outsiders potentially subject to tax
must have entered the taxing jurisdiction at least to a limited extent
(for example, by offering to sell goods there), the antidiscrimination
standard reflects an assumption that marginal effects on such limited
entry are important, in contrast to marginal effects on where one primarily resides or locates one's business.
The reasons for the antidiscrimination standard's selective focus
are easily deduced. Presumably, the decision to focus on marginal effects on limited entry into a jurisdiction, while ignoring marginal effects on primary residence or business location, reflects a judgment
that the former is more elastic, and thus more substantially disrupted
by disparate taxation, or else more likely in practice to draw state and
local governmental hostility (since once one fully joins a community
one may have a greater chance of being treated as well as the other
members). The decision to intervene only when outsiders are disadvantaged, not when they are advantaged, reflects the judgment that
insiders' exclusive political representation as voters leaves the outsiders uniquely vulnerable.111
As Professor Mark Tushnet has noted, however, this political explanation for the antidiscrimination standard, while superficially appealing, misses an important point. 118 Outside merchants (or
consumers) ordinarily have grounds for hoping that in-state political
processes will reflect their interests, even aside from the possibility that
their campaign contributions will be accepted like any other. When
they are taxed discriminatorily, they rarely suffer alone. Their actual
or prospective in-state customers (or merchants) typically suffer with
them, bearing some portion of the tax burden or losing the opportunity to buy (or sell) desired goods. Indeed, it is plausible that, in most
cases where a state discriminates against interstate commerce, it
reduces its own well being on balance. 119 Discriminatory taxes thus
are not purely products of a lack of political representation after all.
Rather, they result from a combination of that problem and a wellknown public choice problem of intrajurisdictional politics: widely
dispersed groups with low individual stakes (such as consumers) suffer
117. See, e.g., South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85
n.2 (1938); see also TRIBE, supra note 111, § 6-5.
118. Tushnet, supra note 111, at 132-33. Professor Tribe makes the same point as Tushnet,
but dismisses it without further analysis for the sin of "turning traditional commerce clause
analysis on its head." TRIBE, supra note 111, § 6-5, at 413.
119. In the paradigmatic case of tariffs on both imports and exports, this has been well
known at least since Adam Smith. See I ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 450-69
(R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1776).
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from collective action and information cost problems relative to concentrated groups with high individual stakes (such as producers in
particular industries).120
The argument for barring discrimination against outsiders or interstate commerce therefore has less to do with political representation
than one might have thought. Accordingly, one might question the
antidiscrimination standard for using federal judicial powers to address intrastate distributional issues or, alternatively, for reaching only
a part of what Mancur Olson called the "systematic tendency for 'exploitation' of the great [in number] by the small." 121 One might also
want to complicate the standard by applying it with an eye to just how
deficient in-state political processes seemed in the particular case. 122
For example, one might be more tolerant of questionable statutes in
cases where, at the time of enactment, the issue of effects on consumers was widely discussed, in-state consumer groups were well organized, or some of the adversely affected narrow interest groups were
from in-state.
While the Supreme Court has occasionally articulated the political
representation argument for barring discrimination against outsiders
or interstate commerce, 123 it has only sporadically examined whether
significant in-state political forces were on the losing side. 124 It may
not understand the underlying public choice problem well enough to
consider in any consistent fashion the significance of adversely affected
but politically unorganized in-staters. This would explain the recent
case of Goldberg v. Sweet, 125 where the Court stated that a tax paid by
in-state consumers on their out-of-state telephone calls was constitutionally innocuous because the consumers could complain as political
insiders, and "[i]t is not a purpose of the Commerce Clause to protect
state residents from their own state taxes." 126 To follow this principle
consistently - which the Court has not done 127 - would either elimi120. See MANCUR OLSON, THE Lome OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 16-36 (1971); Tushnet,
supra note 111, at 133.
121. OLSON, supra note 120, at 29 (footnote and emphasis omitted).
122. Tushnet seems to suggest this. See Tushnet, supra note 111, at 133.
123. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767-68 n.2 (1945); South Carolina
Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938); Cooley v. Board of Port War·
dens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 315 (1851); see also TRIBE, supra note 111, § 6-5.
124. But see South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938)
(upholding questionable statute that directly affected in-staters in large numbers); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (invalidating statute that barred large tractortrailers from state highways but provided exemptions that applied to many in-staters); Kassel v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (same).
125. 488 U.S. 252 (1989).
126. 488 U.S. at 266.
127. As Justices Stevens and O'Connor noted in concurrence, numerous Supreme Court
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nate most negative Commerce Clause scrutiny by making adverse impact on in-staters a defense (probably beyond the Court's intention), or
else revive the old formalist distinction between "direct" and "indirect" taxes, with the issue now being whether local consumers (rather
than interstate commerce as previously) were taxed directly or only
indirectly. 12s
Other than a relative lack of political representation, the antidiscrimination principle could rest on one of three alternative bases.
Each shares with the representational view a potential to influence
how one would define discrimination. First, the "enmity between
states" ground for objecting to tariffs, which I rejected earlier as less
important than locational neutrality, 129 could be revived here now that
we are considering distinctions within the category of nonneutral
taxes. This ground would presumably suggest striking down state and
local taxes that visibly and obviously harmed outsiders, while paying
less heed to taxes with uncertain or well-disguised effects.
Second, one could object morally or aesthetically to states' subjective intentions to harm outsiders, on the ground that such intentions
are - in the words of Professor Donald Regan - "inconsistent with
the very idea of [a] political union." 130 Under this view, it need not
matter whether a particular tax has actual distortive effects or is perceived by outsiders as hostile, although one might expect strong positive correlation on both points. This ground suggests focusing on a
subjectively defined discriminatory intent, and striking down statutes
that upon analysis exhibit such intent even if the harm to outsiders or
interstate commerce is uncertain or well disguised.
Finally, one could object equally to all locational distortion but
single out discriminatory taxes for opportunistic reasons. For example, such taxes may be the easiest to oppose politically since the term
"discrimination" is so pejorative, or the Constitution may afford
grounds for judicial intervention in these but not other cases. 131 Opprecedents have recognized that interstate commerce is impermissibly burdened when in·staters
are penalized for engaging in it. 488 U.S. at 268, 270. For example, in Boston Stock Exchange v.
State Tax Commission, 429 U.S. 318 (1977), the Court invalidated a securities transfer tax on
state residents that discriminated against out-of-state sales.
128. The Court in Goldberg purported to rely on the economic burden of the challenged tax,
which it assumed was the same as the direct incidence. 488 U.S. at 266.
129. See supra section I.A.
130. Regan, supra note 14, at 1113.
131. I ignore the nonopportunistic argument that we should simply do what the Constitution
says for its own sake, because I am here discussing policy, not constitutional interpretation. As
discussed infra in section 11.D, however, it is far from clear that the Framers intended or ex·
pected courts to discern and vigorously enforce a negative Commerce Clause.
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portunism's only apparent implication for the meaning of discrimination is that it be made as broad as possible.
For better or worse, we have largely been spared overt reliance by
the Supreme Court on any of these grounds for distinguishing discrimination against outsiders or interstate commerce from other locational
distortion. The perception standard perhaps could not be openly followed in any case, as it appears unprincipled and may be difficult to
apply. Any suggestion that it secretly motivates the Court was contradicted by Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 132 upholding a
state's transparent and politically controversial attempt to shift tax
burdens to outsiders by simultaneously reducing various in-state taxes
and increasing a coal severance tax that out-of-state consumers principally paid, at least in the short run. 133 The discriminatory intent standard is conceded by its principal scholarly advocate not to explain
state and local tax cases, 134 and its lack of influence is suggested by
Commonwealth Edison and other recent cases where the state's intention was fairly clear. 135 Opportunism, in the sense of striking down
taxes that create locational disparity whenever a case for "discrimination" can be made, even more plainly has not guided the Supreme
Court's lurching course, which instead has largely been tempered by
what Professor Laurence Tribe calls "an extra dose of judicial sympathy for state taxing power." 13 6
In sum, the Supreme Court has largely ignored the relevant but
potentially highly complicating question of whether the reasons for
focusing on discrimination against outsiders or interstate commerce
should shape the definition of discrimination. Nonetheless, as we will
132. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
133. On the political controversiality of Montana's severance tax, see, e.g., Hellerstein, supra
note 22, at 75-76.
134. See Regan, supra note 14, at 1186.
135. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978). Moorman upheld Iowa's use
of a single-factor test {based only on sales) for apportioning the interstate income of a unitary
business. The test, in contrast to the three-factor test 44 other states used (based on property,
payroll, and sales), sufficiently obviously benefited Iowa, predominantly a market state, to suggest to a recent commentator that "[i]t takes no great feat of imagination to conjure up the
legislative purpose underlying the Iowa statute." Walter Hellerstein, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation: Purposeful Economic Protectionism and Beyond, 85 MICH. L. REV.
758, 765 (1987).
136. TRIBE, supra note 111, at 442. Consistent leaning either in favor of or against state
taxing power is particularly unlikely given the lack of clear ideological guideposts. A harsh line
against state and local governments' exercise of their taxing powers is judicial activism protecting
persons against the government on the one hand, and support for business against government on
the other. Perhaps reflecting this lack of clear guideposts, the conservative Justice Scalia consistently takes the state governments' side, while the conservative Professor Richard Epstein generally takes the taxpayer's side. See Richard Epstein, Taxation, Regulation, and Confiscation, 20
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 433, 445-49 (1982). The liberal Justice Marshall took the business taxpayer's side in Commonwealth Edison and the taxing government's side in Moorman.
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see below, the antidiscrimination standard has an almost excruciating
unclarity and inconsistency in practice, due partly to the Court's mistakes and erratic behavior in interpreting it, but more fundamentally
to the standard's built-in difficulties.
B.

Theoretical and Historical Difficulties in Defining Discrimination
Against Outsiders or Interstate Commerce

The question now arises whether, given antidiscrimination's limited focus, it is reconcilable with state and local taxing power, as locational neutrality is not. The answer, unfortunately, is no. Only one
type of locational neutrality problem is eliminated by narrowing one's
gaze as antidiscrimination dictates: that resulting when jurisdictions
impose different tax rates, as when North Dakota taxes all in-state
income at ten percent, and South Dakota at five percent: but each
state's rate applies to insiders and outsiders alike. Problems resulting
from the use of different tax bases remain. The very existence of inconsistent tax bases creates the possibility that outsiders alone will in
effect be taxed more than once (or not at all), and states may opportunistically choose tax bases designed to shift tax burdens to outsiders
or interstate commerce. Yet it may seem plausible to regard the power
to choose one's own tax base as central to state and local governments'
sovereignty.
Coordination problems further impede identifying instances of discrimination. The lack of clear answers regarding how even consistently defined tax bases should be allocated among the states creates the
possibility that what looks like the reasonable exercise of discretion in
providing allocation methods may lead to relative overtaxation of interstate commerce, whether resulting from states' opportunism or simply from their making different decisions.
Short of imposing uniform tax bases and coordination rules, we
cannot expect state and local taxation never to harm any outsiders
relative to any insiders. Concern for state and local autonomy may
seem to require allowing some flexibility, and perhaps even some disparate impact on outsiders, so long as it remains within reason. Moreover, we may not want to err too much on the side of protecting
outsiders, given their strategic opportunities to minimize their tax burdens and the equity and efficiency reasons for wanting to tax them
neutrally, not preferentially.
Consequently, an antidiscrimination standard, like a broader locational neutrality standard, is fundamentally in tension with state and
local government autonomy. Once autonomy is given countervailing
weight, the standard's capacity to yield consistent and predictable de-
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cisions evaporates. One must weigh the facts case by case, even if
guided by general principles such as that discriminatory intent mandates application of a stricter rule of invalidity. 137 Realism must flourish, if at all, at the expense of predictability, and judges' idiosyncratic
responses to particular sets of facts become prominent.
At the same time, formalism is hard to banish altogether. Realistic
considerations too complicated for a court to consider systematically
- such as whether a particular tax rate is too high, 138 whether an
interstate business is overtaxed given all fifty states' constantly changing laws (and if so which states' laws should change), 139 and whether
the apparent discrimination in one part of a state's tax code is cured by
some offsetting feature elsewhere in the code140 - may be thought
necessary to ignore even if their import is clear in a particular case.
Moreover, if one believes (as many do) as a premise of federalism that
states must have the right to set their own tax bases, one way of
achieving discriminatory effect - indirectly, through a tax base
designed primarily to reach outsiders but that does not on its face treat
them differently - inevitably does better than other methods from
which it may differ only in form. 141 Thus, the antidiscrimination standard can lead to the worst of both worlds: all the unpredictability of
attempted realism and all the arbitrariness and circumventability of
formalism. 142
This unfortunate potential has been all too richly realized in practice. Even the Supreme Court, while bravely forging ahead, repeatedly
confesses that its decisions form a "quagmire" 143 that "leaves much
room for controversy and confusion and little in the way of precise
guides to the States in the exercise of their indispensable power of taxation."144 This harsh judgment has become enough of a truism 145 that
137. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984).
138. See Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 628.
139. See Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45 (1984).
140. See American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 288·89 (1987).
141. See Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 624-25; Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S.
267, 280 (1978).
142. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (disparaging the
earlier constitutional era's formal rule distinguishing direct from indirect burdens for "stand[ing]
only as a trap for the unwary draftsman").
143. See, e.g., American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 280 (1987); Boston Stock
Exch. v. State Tax Commn., 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977); Northwestern States Portland Cement Co.
v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959).
144. Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U.S. at 329; Northwestern States, 358 U.S. at 457; see also
Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 269 ("[T)he uneven course of decisions in this field reflects the difficulties of
reconciling unrestricted access to the national market with each State's authority to collect its
fair share of revenues from interstate commercial activity.").
145. See, e.g., HARTMAN, supra note 111, § 2:9, at 53; TRIBE, supra note 111, § 6-14, at 439;
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it need not be proven anew here. Nonetheless, to show the magnitude
of the problem and its relationship to the antidiscrimination standard's
underlying dilemmas, it is worth briefly exploring the Court's tendency in this area repeatedly to contradict itself or narrowly hem in a
line of reasoning, even when it is not, as happens frequently, consciously overruling a precedent146 or announcing a new test. 147 The
following sample of inconsistencies and odd juxtapositions in recent
cases concerning state taxes should help bring to life the difficulties,
both inherent and self-inflicted, with which the Supreme Court has
been struggling.
(1) Are courts institutionally capable of examining the rate or level
of a state tax in order to decide whether it is reasonable? Commonwealth Edison says no in the context of a coal severance tax, 14 s while
American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner says yes in the context of a fiat
tax on truckers' use of in-state highways. 149
(2) Commonwealth Edison and Scheiner are similarly at odds on
the question of how to determine whether a tax imposed on outsiders
is justified by the benefits they derive from the state government. 150
According to Commonwealth Edison, the question requires no detailed
factual inquiry, but is automatically satisfied where the state exercises
its police powers, and thus provides the "benefits which it has conferred by the fact of being an orderly, civilized society," to all who
pass through. 151 The case rejects the taxpayer's argument that only
costs and services directly related to coal extraction were relevant to
Hellerstein, supra note 10, at 81; see also GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 332-33
(11th ed. 1985) (declining even to discuss, in an otherwise comprehensive constitutional law
treatise, the constitutional issues raised by state and local taxation because the "intricacies ...
would require more time and space than the undertaking warrants"); Julian N. Eule, Laying the
Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 426 n.2 (1982) (declining to synthesize
Dormant Commerce Clause tax cases because they are so confusing and complex).
146. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288-89 (1977) (overruling
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)); Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467
U.S. 638, 642 (1984) (citing with approval Justice Goldberg's dissent in General Motors Corp. v.
Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 459 (1964)); Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 298 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Court expressly overruled the holdings of three cases directly on point that it had
cited with approval only nine years previously, and after issuing Brady to overrule Spector).
147. See, e.g., Brady, 430 U.S. at 277-78 (describing four-part test for taxes on interstate
business); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1983) (announcing new "internal consistency" and "external consistency" tests for the allocation of multijurisdictional business income).
148. 453 U.S. at 628.
149. 483 U.S. at 289-90 (deeming tax "excessive" and distinguishing from reasonable fiat fees
that were significantly lower).
150. Brady, 430 U.S. at 287, describes this as a requirement apart from discrimination for
upholding a tax on interstate commerce, but notionally it appears related, since charging the
same tax for fewer services arguably is a kind of discrimination.
151. 453 U.S. at 625, 624-29.
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the comparison of tax and benefit. In Scheiner, however, the tax had
to "approximate fairly the cost or value of the use of Pennsylvania's
roads." 152
(3) Anticipating Scheiner's can-do approach to problems of measurement, the Court in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair 153 is willing to draw lines between extreme and moderate disparities in the tax
burdens imposed on interstate business. Moorman therefore permits
the use of a single-factor income allocation formula that overattributes
income from interstate commerce to the taxing jurisdiction, thus creating relative burden, so long as the disparity is not too great. 154 Moorman distinguishes Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel
Maxwell, 155 in which a state's single-factor allocation formula was
struck down, because there the disparity between the scope of interstate operations and the in-state allocation of income was greater. 156
Apparently, then, line-drawing is not a problem (unlike in Commonwealth Edison), and some burden on interstate commerce is allowable,
but not too much. In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 157 however, we
learn in the context of a tax exemption for local business that no discrimination against interstate commerce is allowable. 158 The state
cannot argue that the burden is only slight. In short, where it is difficult to measure burden precisely, the answer may be to allow no burden (as in Bacchus), some burden (as in Moorman), or any and all
burden (as in Commonwealth Edison).
(4) Perhaps Bacchus is special because it concerned a tax that, by
exempting local businesses, facially discriminated against interstate
commerce. 159 The meaning of facial discrimination is by no means
clear, however. In Tyler Pipe Industries v. Washington State Department of Revenue, 160 a tax was described as "facially discriminatory"
where it required both local and outside manufacturers to pay a
wholesale tax on sales in-state, and locals alone to pay a manufacturers' tax in lieu of the wholesale tax (but calculated at the same rate) on
their sales out-of-state. 161 In short, facial discrimination was found
even though the statute explicitly treated in-staters and outsiders alike
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

483
437
437
283

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

at 290.
267 (1978).
at 274.
123 (1931).
Moonnan, 437 U.S. at 274.
468 U.S. 263 (1984).
468 U.S. at 269.
See 468 U.S. at 268-71.
483 U.S. 232 (1987).
483 U.S. at 244.
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except where it only taxed the former. 162 By contrast, in Boston Stock
Exchange v. State Tax Commission, 163 the Court apparently regarded
as neutral a state tax that, analogous to the Washington wholesale tax,
applied exclusively to sales in-state, here of securities that were transferred or delivered in-state by either in-state or outside stock
exchanges. 164
(5) The problem in Tyler was that other states might charge a
wholesale tax on Washington exports or a manufacturers' tax on
Washington imports, thus leading to double taxation of interstate
commerce. (This danger was equally presented by the statute the
Court called "neutral" in Boston Stock Exchange.) Yet in Moorman,
where Iowa used an allocation formula almost certain to create multiple taxation of interstate commerce, there was no facial discrimination. The only apparent difference is that in Moorman the threat of
multiple taxation was deducible only if one knew certain clear and
undisputed facts about other states' income allocation rules and Iowa's
status as a market rather than a producer state, 165 whereas in Tyler the
threat was abstractly deducible if one assumes knowledge of basic
Supreme Court nexus doctrine. Accordingly, whether a tax is facially
discriminatory when it creates a danger of multiple taxation depends
not just on the face of the statute, but on what types of facts (among
the broader set available to the relevant state actors) need be known to
demonstrate a significant danger. This distinction apparently is so important that in Moorman the Court dismissed a strong showing of actual multiple taxation as overly "speculative," whereas in Tyler it
stated that actual multiple taxation need not be shown in order for the
statute to be invalidated.166
(6) The Court desires, to the extent possible, to rely on the "practical consequences" and " 'actual effect' " of state taxation, not on
"metaphysic[s]" or" 'legal terminology.' " 167 Yet cases such as Tyler,
by applying an "internal consistency" test to strike down state taxes
that would burden interstate commerce if enacted by more than one
jurisdiction, create a peculiar formal distinction, given the states' basic
discretion to decide what they want to tax. Whereas the hypothetical
162. 483 U.S. at 256-57 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
163. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
164. See 429 U.S. at 330 (approving in dicta of a tax that was the precursor to the one being
litigated). Justice Scalia noted the contradiction in his Tyler opinion. 483 U.S. at 255 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. See Hellerstein, supra note 135, at 765.
166. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978); Tyler, 483 U.S. at 247-48.
167. American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 294-95 (1987) (quoting Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 281 (1977)).
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double taxation that would arise if two states enacted similar taxes is
constitutionally intolerable, the actual double taxation that results
from existing dissimilar taxes is permissible. 168 For example, if State A
taxes in-state manufacturing only and State B taxes in-state sales only,
taxpayers may have no constitutional complaint, even though companies exporting from A to B face multiple taxation, and even though the
states may be able to predict what tax bases will tend to favor in-state
businesses or taxpayers.169
(7) As far as the Supreme Court has openly said, internal consistency remains a substantive requirement in the state and local tax area.
Yet in a recent case, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Florida Department of
Revenue, 170 an evenly divided Court (with Justi.ce O'Connor not participating) upheld without opinion a tax that plainly violated the requirement. The tax at issue in this case applied to intangible property
that either had an in-state situs or was owned by a Florida domiciliary.
Its unambiguous effect, therefore, if adopted by all jurisdictions, would
be to double tax all intangible property that was located in one state
and owned by a domiciliary of another state.
(8) According to Bacchus and Westinghouse Electric Corp. v.
Tully, 171 striking down a New York State investment tax credit that
applied only to in-state investment, states may not "'foreclose[] taxneutral [investment] decisions' .... in an attempt to induce 'business
operations to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere.' " 172 Yet other decisions explain that
states may "structur[e] their tax systems to encourage the growth and
development of intrastate commerce and industry," and to "compete
with other States for a share of interstate commerce." 173 Westinghouse regards as particularly significant that the credit, since computed by determining the New York State percentage of the taxpayer's
total investment, "not only ... 'provide[s] a positive incentive for increased business activity in New York State,' ... but also it penalizes
increases in ... activities in other States.''174 Bacchus, by contrast,
rejects the distinction between a "benefit" and a "burden," and between the motives of helping in-state producers and harming
168. See Tyler, 483 U.S. at 258-59 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
169. See Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 645 (1984).
170. 111 s. Ct. 2049 (1991).
171. 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
172. Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 406 (quoting Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Commn., 429
U.S. 318, 331, 336 (1977)).
173. Armco, 467 U.S. at 645-46 (quoting Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 336-37).
174. 466 U.S. at 400-01.
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outsiders. 175
(9) Despite the ostensible lack of a distinction between benefits and
burdens, states may in some situations discriminate in favor of local
businesses relative to outsiders if the mechanism is a direct spending
program rather than the tax system. The only definite limitation on
favoring in-state businesses through direct subsidies is that the state
act as a "market participant," or buyer of goods, rather than as a regulator.176 The underlying notion is that states, as sovereign entities,
must be permitted to buy the goods of their choice and, if they so
prefer, to deal solely with their own citizens. 177 Yet this rule has been
held to apply even where the state is not in any real sense using the
goods it purchases - for example, where it pays private parties to
destroy inoperable cars. 178 Moreover, there apparently is no bar on
overpaying local sellers or bidding up the market price to their
advantage. 179
(10) As noted earlier, Goldberg v. Sweet denies that the Commerce
Clause protects in-state residents against discriminatory taxation. 180
Numerous earlier cases, however, explicitly hold to the contrary where
in-staters were subjected to a higher tax rate on interstate than intrastate transactions.181

***

As the above instances show, legal doctrine in the state and local
tax area is shot through with uneasy juxtapositions and outright contradictions. Some of the disparities may be explainable in a principled
and convincing fashion. For example, the internal consistency test
may eliminate a category of taxes burdening interstate commerce that
courts can easily identify and states cannot easily replace with other
discriminatory taxes. Other disparities may be isolated mistakes, such
as the dictum from Goldberg v. Sweet, 182 or unannounced changes in
legal standard, such as Ford Motor Credit. 183 Yet the Supreme Court's
175. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984).
176. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983);
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794
(1976); Michael, supra note 80, at 184-87. Additionally, states may not be allowed to favor local
businesses through overly pervasive and open-ended discriminatory spending programs. See id.
at 187.
177. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436, 441.
178. See Hughes, 426 U.S. at 805-06.
179. See, e.g., Hughes, 426 U.S. at 806.
180. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
182. 488 U.S. 252, 266 (1989).
183. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 111 S. Ct. 2049 (1991).
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lurching course clearly reflects underlying conceptual problems.
Surely its performance, from a technical and consistency standpoint, is
not always this bad.184
In part, the Supreme Court's error has been to look for the middle,
implicitly balancing aversion to discrimination against concern for
state and local autonomy. Strangely, the Court apparently regards the
tax area as justifying greater deference to state and local government
autonomy than Commerce Clause cases involving regulation. 185 This
seems exactly backwards. To the extent that state and local taxes
serve only revenue-raising, not regulatory, purposes, the taxing government may have little stake in their particular form, and they should
be relatively substitutable.. Thus, compare the severance tax upheld in
Commonwealth Edison to a famous example of regulation with interstate effects: a Wisconsin city's rule, struck down in Dean Milk Co. v.
City ofMadison, 186 that milk had to be pasteurized within five miles of
the city center, ostensibly to facilitate plant inspection by city officials.
While Montana's need for revenue plainly could have been met by
other taxes, the lack of need for the Dean Milk rule at issue cannot be
assumed until one examines the facts. Dean Milk was an easy case
solely because the sham nature of the city's health concerns and the
underlying protectionist motive were so obvious. If the health justifications had been plausible, however, the case would have been difficult, given the importance of allowing Madison to protect its residents
against unsafe milk and the presumably limited ways of doing this
conveniently.
The Supreme Court may treat tax cases as meriting greater deference to state and local governments than regulation cases because it
regards the power to tax as at the heart of a government's sovereignty.
Another explanation is that the Court simply lacks confidence in its
ability to understand tax cases and resolve them intelligently, and thus
prefers to let most challenged taxes stand. 187 While both explanations
may be persuasive descriptively, neither provides much support for the
normative proposition that the Supreme Court should defer. As to the
first, while effective sovereignty requires an ability to raise revenue, it
does not depend so strongly on the power to choose a particular means
of revenue raising. Indeed, the relative substitutability of one revenue184. Negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence has long been an area of relative weakness for
the Court. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 234 (1985).
185. See TRIBE, supra note 111, at 442; Kitch, supra note 4, at 31.
186. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
187. These two explanations were suggested to me by Richard Briffault and Henry
Monaghan, respectively.
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raising device for another suggests that state and local government
sovereignty may be less threatened by judicial review of taxation than
of regulation. As to the second explanation, a better course than relaxing judicial review of tax cases would be to achieve greater competence in deciding them, and I ultimately suggest legal standards that
should make adequate performance by the courts more feasible. 188
Some might argue that, even if the Supreme Court's heightened
deference to state and local taxation is not always justified, in today's
political and economic environment it makes sense. Over the past few
years state and local governments have borne an increasing share of
the responsibility for providing government services, and this, along
with transfer payments obligations, has strained their fiscal capacity.
Increased revenue need, however, cannot justify greater judicial deference when it principally derives from voters' unwillingness - reflected
as well in budget deficits at the national level - to pay through taxes
for the services that they wish their governments to provide. If anything, the current fiscal situation at the state and local level, by creating greater incentives for tax exportation, calls for more careful
judicial scrutiny. 189
Thus, the Supreme Court should reverse its current practice and
defer less to state and local government autonomy in tax cases than in
regulatory cases. Despite the inherent problems with the discrimination concept, this would enable the Court to perform in the area far
more coherently and predictably. Alternatively, if the Court viewed
the discrimination standard as overly vague even with this improvement, it might move in the opposite direction and replace its current
balancing with a general refusal to strike down state and local tax provisions. Both directions of doctrinal movement have their advocates,
and I consider prominent examples of both in the next section.
C. Attempts To Improve the Discrimination Standard by
Broadening or Narrowing Its Application
The previous section showed that an antidiscrimination standard is
inherently flawed. Yet improvement may conceivably be possible, es188. See infra section IV.B.
189. Surely every state in this country has sufficient wealth within its borders to finance
government services and transfer payments at less than confiscatory rates. To the extent that
states cannot raise additional revenue because increased taxation would prompt exit, the answer
(where the affected government spending is desirable) is to shift financing to the national level.
There might, in some instances, be a second-best argument for tax exportation as correcting the
misallocation of properly national spending functions to the state and local level, but it seems
plausible that the dominant marginal effect of tax exportation generally will be to increase spending for the benefit of state and local residents, which generally should be financed by them rather
than nationally.
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pecially if the countervailing notion of state and local autonomy is
given either far less or far more weight, pushing balancing problems to
the margin. Thus, two recent proposals are worth examining. The
first is Professor Ferdinand Schoettle's proposal that ideas from public
finance economics, and in particular comparing the marginal tax costs
of in-state and outside businesses, be employed more openly and consistently.190 The second is Justice Scalia's view that the courts should
bar only facial discrimination, defined narrowly to mean that which
appears clearly on the face of the taxing statute. 191 This subsection
explores these proposals in tum.
1. Schoettle's Comparative Marginal Cost Standard
Professor Schoettle argues that the Supreme Court has done far
worse than necessary in its treatment of state and local taxation,
largely due to its taste for simple catchphrases at the expense of casespecific economic analysis. He urges the Court to replace its everchanging bevy of tests with detailed factual examination of the single
question: "Does the challenged tax have effects that place interstate
commerce at a disadvantage?" 192 He insists this question can be addressed intelligently by persons who lack formal economic training, so
long as they keep in mind a basic principle of price theory: that firms
decide whether to sell at a given price by comparing that price to the
marginal cost of a sale, not to any measure or fraction of their total
costs. He deduces from this principle that marginal, not total, tax
costs need to be equalized between in-state and outside businesses, and
that courts should therefore require such equality from state and local
taxes.193
Two of Schoettle's illustrations help to explain his point. First, a
source rule for income taxation, under which states can tax only the
income earned in-state, preserves equality of marginal cost between
residents and nonresidents who are considering limited entry. If the
state could tax the outside income of an outsider who earned any income in-state, that outsider's tax cost of initial entry would exceed an
insider's tax cost of increasing his in-state business by the same
amount (since his preexisting in-state business would already be subject to the state's income tax). 194 Schoettle admits that income often
190. Ferdinand P. Schoettle, Facts, Law, and Economics in Commerce Clause Challenges to
State Taxes, 50 TAX NOTES 1149 (1991).
191. See especially Justice Scalia's opinion in Tyler Pipe Industries v. Washington State Tax
Department of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 254 (1987).
192. Schoettle, supra note 190, at 1150.
193. Id. at 1151.
194. Id. at 1153-54. Similar problems presumably arise when one's state of residence taxes
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has no clear geographical source, 195 and he does not address, presumably as beyond the scope of a plausible constitutional analysis, the point
that all differences between state or local taxes distort market decisions
even under a perfectly applied source rule.
Second, Schoettle argues that double taxation of interstate commerce is not distortive where taxpayers face equal marginal costs. He
posits a case akin to my example where North Dakota had a property
tax and South Dakota a sales tax. While a company is double taxed if
it uses property in North Dakota to make widgets for sale in South
Dakota, its entry into South Dakota is not thereby competitively
handicapped. Since the property tax is a preexisting fixed cost, only
the sales tax is a marginal cost of entry, and therefore the North Dakota business can compete with South Dakota businesses for sales in
South Dakota without competitive disadvantage. 196
This example might be criticized as insufficiently dynamic in its
assessment of the effects of state and local taxes. What if a North
Dakota firm considers building an improvement to its in-state property, thus increasing its North Dakota tax bill, in order to produce
additional widgets for sale in South Dakota? Now the added North
Dakota property tax is a marginal cost. More generally, one might
expect firms that were deciding where to locate widget plants to
choose South Dakota, all else being equal, thereby disadvantaging
business in North Dakota at the margin.197
Or consider Tyler, where the Supreme Court struck down Washington's application of a wholesale tax on in-state sales, whether by
local or foreign firms, and a manufacturing tax on goods exported by
local firms. The Supreme Court struck down the tax under the internal consistency test that Schoettle criticizes as overly ad hoc. 198 His
test would seem to have several different plausible applications here,
however. If the manufacturing tax is treated as a given, in-state firms
are tax-favored at the margin since they avoid it by manufacturing for
income earned in other jurisdictions, because then, absent tax credits or other adjustments, one
pays the other state's income tax (if any) plus one's own.
195. Id. at 1153.
196. Id. at 1154. Professor Schoettle follows this example with one where a state, if it had
both a property tax and a sales tax but gave a tax credit for the former against the latter in order
to avoid double taxation of its own businesses, would thereby discriminate against interstate
commerce, because in-state businesses, even if paying about the same overall tax as outsiders,
would have lower marginal costs of making additional sales. Id.
197. To be sure, the differences in the two states' taxes would also favor interstate commerce
by encouraging companies to locate in South Dakota and sell in North Dakota, but Schoettle
correctly notes that advantaging interstate commerce is as inefficient as disadvantaging it. Id. at
1151-52.
198. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1947);
see Schoettle, supra note 190, at 1150.
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the home market. If the manufacturing test is regarded as wholly separate, however, then within the Washington market all firms are taxed
alike. Yet if other states also have manufacturing taxes, then at the
margin the outside firms are taxed more heavily. But this is only due
to the combination of two jurisdictions' decisions - the very point
made by application of the internal consistency test - and it is unclear
to what extent, if any, each jurisdiction should have to give way.
In order to be administratively workable, Schoettle's test might require a relatively narrow view of what tax costs are marginal in particular cases. This would reduce its power to address locational
distortion without completely eliminating the line-drawing problem of
deciding whether a particular tax cost is marginal or fixed. Three further conceptual and line-drawing issues are also worth noting. First,
given the difficulty of sourcing income from a multistate business,
what should be done about a case like Moorman, where Iowa used an
aggressively self-serving sourcing rule but there is no "correct" rule?
Given the fortuity that almost every other state used some variant of a
single, more sophisticated rule, the case may be easy for Schoettle:
Iowa loses. If the dominant sourcing rule grew less clear over time,
one would encounter line-drawing problems in deciding when only
Congress could prescribe a uniform rule. Moreover, should Iowa lose
under Schoettle's standard after all? He has no objection to double
taxation per se, and any imperfect sourcing rule will have the distortive effects that he describes, by causing a mismatch between the actual increase in income that results from one's entering a new
jurisdiction and the amount of income attributed to that jurisdiction,
and by causing tax planning that is motivated by the sourcing rule
itself - for example, inefficiently keeping employees out of a high-tax
state that uses payroll in its allocation formula.
Second, Schoettle's standard does not address tax exportation.
The coal severance tax in Commonwealth Edison, for example, does
not disadvantage interstate commerce if one compares in-state with
outside users of coal (who are taxed alike). It is disadvantageous only
if one compares coal to products that are not exported to nearly the
same extent. This is a standard problem for questions of discrimination throughout the law: what is the appropriate comparison? 199 Assuming that the severance tax is discriminatory due to the obvious
199. Cf. LoUIS EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 147-77 (1961) (describing attempts to introduce principles of equity into the tax system); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory
Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935, 940-46 (1989) (outlining different
approaches to the concept of unconstitutional discrimination).
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singling out of an item that is predominantly exported, one again has a
line-drawing problem regarding less clear-cut cases.
Third, Schoettle treats the receipt of benefits from state spending
as irrelevant to the tax issue.200 While for most purposes I make the
same assumption, 201 it is worth recalling that tax payments and benefits received may correlate to some extent. Even aside from the marginal costs imposed on Montana by coal mining, which presumably
should be recovered through a levy (whether termed a tax or a user
fee), what about the Supreme Court's suggestion that almost any level
of tax was appropriate given the benefits fl.owing to outsiders from
Montana's exercise of police powers to maintain a basic level of civilization? This analysis may have been laughable2°2 - indeed, the Court
seems to have feared as much, self-consciously denying that the reference to maintaining civilization was "a disingenuous incantation" 203
- but it was laughable only for a special reason. Maintaining civilization is a public good, and public goods may be undersupplied by voters
if only they, not nonvoting beneficiaries, are taxed to pay for such
goods. Thus, one might think it efficient to require outsiders to make
some contribution toward Montana's exercise of police powers.
These various problems reflect less on Professor Schoettle's ingenious contribution to Commerce Clause thinking than on the basic
intractability of the underlying issues. Very likely his standard, applied with a more consistent judicial solicitude for interstate commerce
in cases (such as Moorman and Commonwealth Edison) where the
standard's implications are unclear, would significantly improve the
law, making it more coherent, predictable, and better focused on a real
set of economic distortions than the prevailing "quagmire." 204 Yet the
inherent problems with an antidiscrimination standard that his proposal cannot eliminate should be kept in mind as we ask whether we
want courts to be active in the first place in the state and local tax area.
This is the very question that underlies Justice Scalia's position.
2. Justice Scalia's Facial Discrimination Standard

Justice Scalia, in a series of recent concurring and dissenting opinions in state tax cases, denounces what he views as systematic judicial
200. Schoettle, supra note 190, at 1160.
201. But see supra section I.C where I discuss the problems with ignoring the benefit side.
202. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 136, at 447.
203. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 628 (1981).
204. Thus, I recommend at infra section IV.B that Schoettle's standard be used as one part of
the Supreme Court's negative Commerce Clause analysis.
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overreaching. 205 Rather than "expanding our beachhead in this impoverished territory," Scalia suggests at most "being satisfied with
what we have already acquired by a sort of intellectual adverse possession. "206 To this end, although on a clean slate he might virtually
eliminate federal judicial review of state and local taxes, 207 he advocates barring only facial discrimination, which he finds when a provision by its own terms taxes outsiders more heavily than insiders. 208
Justice Scalia relies principally on the lack of textual support for
the negative Commerce Clause, as the text mentions only Congress'
positive power to regulate interstate commerce, and on his belief that
no such provision was intended by the Framers. 209 Yet he also finds
policy reasons for his position, arguing that the Court has produced a
"quagmire" that "[makes] no sense"210 for reasons rooted in the underlying enterprise. State tax cases cast courts in the "essentially legislative role of weighing the imponderable - balancing the importance
of the State's interest in this or that ... against the degree of impairment of commerce."211 Courts are institutionally incapable of performing this role well. Moreover, even if they look exclusively at
discrimination rather than balancing it against state interests, they will
struggle with the fact that state taxation "spans a spectrum, ranging
from the obviously discriminatory to the manipulative to the ambiguous to the wholly innocent."212 Arbitrariness is unavoidable, but at
least the facial discrimination standard minimizes uncertainty by
reaching only a well-defined class of cases on the discriminatory side
of the spectrum. While the standard admittedly relies on purely formal distinctions and often fails to prevent intentional discrimination,
he regards this as less damaging than the Court's plunge into legislative imponderables.213 Justice Scalia therefore would leave to Con205. See American Trucking Assns. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2343 (1990); Goldberg v.
Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 271 (1989); American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 304
(1987); Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 254 (1987).
206. Tyler, 483 U.S. at 265 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207. Justice Scalia would still bar "rank" state tax discrimination against outsiders under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution. Tyler, 483 U.S. at 265 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Whether this differs from facial discrimination is unclear.
208. Tyler, 483 U.S. at 257-59 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Scalia would confine his inquiry to the contested provision itself, not to the state's entire tax code.
Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 305 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209. Tyler, 483 U.S. at 260-63 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Smith,
110 S. Ct. at 2344 (Scalia, J., concurring).
210.
211.
212.
213.

Tyler, 483 U.S. at 259-60 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2344 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 305 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 305-06.
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gress the task of policing the more subtly discriminatory state taxes. 214
Although Justice Scalia detests balancing, he implicitly does so at
the level of framing general rules of decision. To make his textual
interpretation of the Constitution more palatable, he argues that the
cost of his rule's lesser reach in barring undesirable state taxes is less
than the benefit of its greater coherence and predictability. Professor
Schoettle presumably would argue to the contrary. One important
variable in choosing between these positions is what Congress would
do absent active judicial oversight. If judicial review has discouraged
it from handling the same range of problems more skillfully, there is
all the more reason to agree with Justice Scalia; if Congress would not
act, then only the courts can fill an arguable need. I turn to this and
related questions of the politics of federalism in taxation in Part III,
but first, given the constitutional issues Justice Scalia raises, I consider
whether the federal courts must as a matter of constitutional interpretation follow one course or the other.

D.

The Significance of the Constitutional Grounds for Federal
Judicial Review of State and Local Taxation

Judicial review of state and local taxes that affect outsiders or interstate commerce usually, though not exclusively, rests on the negative Commerce Clause - that ostensible though unstated corollary to
the Constitution's explicit grant to Congress, through the "positive"
Commerce Clause, of regulatory authority over interstate commerce.
As Justice Scalia, echoing earlier commentators, has noted, the historical case for the negative Commerce Clause is unpersuasive. The text
of the Constitution fails to mention it - contrary to what one might
expect given its importance, and in contradiction to drafting practices
elsewhere followed in the Constitution. 215 Debate concerning enactment of the Constitution seems to have rested on the assumption that
no negative Commerce Clause exists.216 Arguably the Framers would
not have adopted the Constitution had they understood the negative
Commerce Clause to exist. 217 Finally, the original theoretical basis for
the negative Commerce Clause - that the positive grant of authority
214. Tyler, 483 U.S. at 259. Justice Scalia ignores the possibility that if the Supreme Court
announced the abolition of the negative Commerce Clause, Congress would immediately pass a
statute barring discrimination against interstate commerce and instructing the Court to resume
its prior role, now under the aegis of the positive Commerce Clause.
215. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 184, at 173.
216. See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 264
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WAITE 12 (1937).
217. See, e.g., FRANKFURTER, supra note 216, at 19.
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over interstate commerce to Congress was meant to be exclusive, with
the consequence that all state legislation in the area is in effect ultra
vires - is historically and textually weak, has never been consistently
followed by the courts, and could not be followed today without virtually eliminating states' power to legislate, given the breadth of the currently prevailing definition of "interstate commerce."21s
This may counsel following Justice Scalia's lead and largely eliminating judicial review of state and local taxation (absent congressional
authorization). Yet counterarguments exist, on historical and other
grounds. It may be significant, either for its own sake or as evidence of
original intent, that the existence of a negative Commerce Clause was
suggested as early as the 1820s, by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v.
Ogden, 219 and has been with us ever since. Moreover, the clause, even
if a judicially created fiction, may perform the originally intended
function of the Import-Export Clause, which bars states from
"lay[ing] any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports,"220 if, as some
have asserted, that clause was meant to apply to the interstate, not just
international, movement of goods. 221 In addition, most Commerce
Clause jurisprudence probably could continue to stand under plausible
interpretations of the Privileges and Immunities, Due Process, or
Equal Protection Clauses. 222
From a broader standpoint, we must consider how strictly we
should feel bound by textualism and original intent. If doctrinal
evolution to meet changing policy needs is methodologically permissible, this might be a particularly good place for it. An expansive negative Commerce Clause, if not quite uncontroversial, at least does not
systematically favor some broad social groups against others; 223
rather, it favors the whole against the partsj to collective long-term
benefit. It also is not identified with any particular point on the political spectrum. Thus, the rhetoric that portrays constitutional innova218. See, e.g., Tyler, 483 U.S. at 261 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
219. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824); see also Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat,) 419,
448-49 (1827).
220. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
221. See 1 WILLIAM w. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION JN THE HISTORY OP
THE UNITED STATES 295-323 (1953); Hellerstein, supra note 10, at 39. The Supreme Court first
held that the Import-Export Clause applies only to international commerce in Woodruff v.
Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1868).
222. See Hellerstein, supra note 10, at 50-54 (discussing overlap between negative Commerce
Clause and other constitutional provisions).
223. An expansive negative Commerce Clause may favor consumers and out-of-state producers over in-state producers, but everyone is a consumer, and many in-state producers are also
out-of-state producers elsewhere.
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tion as offensively political and countermajoritarian224 seems less
applicable here.
One also could powerfully argue unforeseen circumstances, if they
are relevant under one's theory of constitutional interpretation.225
The Framers very likely failed to foresee the future growth either of
interstate commerce or of state and local taxation. They may also
have substantially overestimated the readiness of Congress to strike
down state legislation that is hostile to interstate commerce.226 That
Congress never so acted during its first 180 years227 arguably suggests
this.
I conclude that the constitutional issue is sufficiently open to be
decided on grounds of policy. From this perspective, the choice of
federal judicial standard involves a tradeoff between (1) the benefit of
enhancing locational neutrality, which turns not only on an activist
judicial standard's effectiveness but on the burdens to interstate commerce that otherwise would be imposed by state and local governments and survive congressional oversight, against (2) the costs of
broad judicial enforcement, which potentially include not only rampant litigation and legal uncertainty but reduced benefit from the desirable exercise of state and local government authority. The·
following Part examines the aspects of this tradeoff that tum on an
understanding of national or state and local politics.

III.

POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE PRACTICE OF
FEDERALISM IN TAXATION

The tradeoff described at the end of the previous Part turns in
large part on questions about expected political behavior. Absent a
federal judicial role, to what extent is Congress likely to overturn state
provisions that burden interstate commerce or overtax nonresidents?
Is the locational neutrality problem all that serious to begin with,
224. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 1-11 (1988).
225. Aside from the question of whether the Framers anticipated a "living Constitution" that
would evolve to meet changing circumstances, there is the question of whether it makes sense to
cling to their intent piecemeal when in so many complementary respects - relating, for example,
to the scope of government activity - we have jettisoned their intent entirely.
226. Political naivete by the Framers regarding Congress' willingness to strike down state
laws burdening interstate commerce hardly seems implausible if one recalls, for example, their
miscalculations relating to the electoral college (including the belief that the college would perform an independent role and the failure to separate its vote for President from its vote for Vice
President), and their apparent belief, refuted within five years of the Constitution's adoption, that
permanent political parties would not arise. On the latter, see RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE
IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES,
1780-1840, at 53, 80 (1969).
227. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 324.
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given states' incentives to cooperate by promoting efficiency to their
mutual advantage? Are there benefits to locating significant taxing authority at the state and local level that appear likely to outweigh the
harm to locational neutrality? This section examines these questions
in order.
A.

Congress and the Political Efficacy of the ''Positive" Commerce
Clause

The Framers counted on Congress, acting under the positive Commerce Clause, to restrain states' predilection to burden interstate commerce or export tax burdens to nonresidents. 228 The reliance seems a
standard application of Madison's famous formula: "extend the
sphere" of political action from the state to the national level to include more interests and thereby cure the vices of faction. 229 As it has
turned out, however, Congress has almost never barred or restrained
state and local taxes that created burden - even though judicial review of state and local taxation under the negative Commerce Clause
does not make its role wholly redundant. In Moorman and Commonwealth Edison, for example, the Supreme Court not only upheld taxes
with adverse effects on interstate commerce, but explicitly described
these effects as properly considered by Congress, rather than the
courts. 230
It is therefore important to understand the reasons for Congress'
pattern of inaction. If it likely would be taking a far more active role
but for the federal courts' claim of jurisdiction, little might be lost by
dispensing with the negative Commerce Clause. And it appears plausible that the courts' role at least marginally deters congressional action, even where a suspect tax is upheld. Once the Supreme Court
becomes the primary filter for objectionable state and local taxes, its
decision to let one stand may be (mis)interpreted politically as an affirmative endorsement or "clean bill of health." Moreover, absent a
regular congressional practice of reviewing such taxes, the inertial barriers to reviewing the provisions that survive judicial scrutiny may be
harder to overcome.
Despite this likely effect at the margin, there are powerful reasons
228. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. 42 (James Madison), at 283-84 (noting
the "necessity of a superintending authority over the reciprocal trade of confederated States").
229. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. IO (James Madison), at 64.
230. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978) ("It is to [Congress], and not
this Court, that the Constitution has committed ... policy decisions [regarding income allocation
rules]."); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 627 (1981) ("The simple fact is
that the appropriate level or rate of taxation is essentially a matter for legislative, and not judi·
cial, resolution.").
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for concluding that Congress would engage in little serious review of
state and local taxes even absent a negative Commerce Clause. Consider the basic fl.aw in Madison's "extend the sphere" solution to the
problem of faction: the tendency of concentrated interests to be better
organized and more aware of issues that affect them than diffuse interests, leading to systematic transfers from the "many" to the "few."231
This tendency inherently discourages an active congressional role in
the state and local tax area, where a socially harmful provision often
yields concentrated benefit (to the enacting state government and perhaps in-state businesses) and diffuses harm (across the other forty-nine
states and perhaps to in-state consumers).
To the extent that those harmed by a tax are sufficiently concentrated to be organized and aware of their interests, state-level political
processes may already provide some protection. Concentrated interests need not include residents or voters in order to exert political influence. The same financial and lobbying power that one generally
needs to be effective before Congress may also apply at the state level.
The ability to make campaign contributions, for example, may yield
power everywhere. Thus, the congressional filter is somewhat duplicative, rather than independent or complementary, of the state-level
political filters constraining enactment.
Even when a harmed outside interest group has greater influence
in Congress than in the taxing stat~'s legislature, the "extend the
sphere" model is unlikely to work well in the state and local tax area.
Madison counted on interest groups' inability in a large and diverse
polity to assemble majorities that would act together to invade others'
rights or interests. Virtue, inertia, and what we would call the transaction costs of forming broad alliances offered a measure of protection. 232 In the state and local tax area, however, it is not enough for
Congress to decline to erect trade barriers between the states. Rather,
it must act affirmatively to bar the states from erecting barriers. Thus,
the whole Madisonian structure of checks and balances impeding legislative action has the wrong effect here, where we need action, not
inaction, to restrain the vices of faction. 233
231. See OLSON, supra note 120, at 29.
232. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. 10 (James Madison), at 64.
233. While the Framers may simply have missed this point or concluded that it had no good
solution, some language in The Federalist could be read as supporting the view (under which the
problem would not exist) that states lack the power to burden interstate commerce, perhaps due
to the Import-Export Clause rather than the negative Commerce Clause. See THE FEDERALIST,
supra note 11, No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), at 41-43 (noting that states would pursue conflicting
and mutually injurious trade policies under a confederation but impliedly cannot under the Con·
stitution); THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. 42 (James Madison), at 275-76 (stating that
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Recent scholarship in political science and law provides grounds
for predicting congressional reluctance to strike down burdensome
state and local taxes even when the forces demanding such action are
quite strong. Assuming significant organized support for such taxes,
Congress typically will face what Michael Hayes terms conflictual demand patterns. Hayes finds that Congress is reluctant to legislate
when demand patterns are conflictual (even if the side demanding legislation is stronger), due to the existence of an "ungrateful electorate''
that punishes legislation opposed to its preferences to a greater extent
than it rewards legislation in favor. 234 Action is more visible than inaction, and enemies have longer memories than friends, with the result
that Congress usually tries to avoid conflictual issues altogether or defer their resolution to agencies and courts. 235 Professor Jonathan Macey has shown that similar considerations often lead Congress to defer
to state governments, ostensibly on grounds of principled federalism,
instead of addressing issues that from a public interest standpoint
might call for resolution at the national level. 2 36
All this suggests that, in the absence of a negative Commerce
Clause, Congress would be unwilling or unable to engage in much
case-by-case review of questionable state and local taxes. 237 While the
enactment of broad general rules to cover future disputes appears less
unlikely, it has not happened so far, in large part due to the organized
opposition of state and local govemments.238 Thus, ifthere is to be an
effective check, it probably must be the courts - although one still
could argue that such a check is worse than none at all.

absent the Constitution, states would be at liberty to regulate interstate commerce and burden it
with taxes on the import and export of goods).
234. MICHAEL T. HAYES, LoBBYISl'S AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL MAR·
KETS 93-9S (1981).
23S. Id.; see also Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice ofRegulatory Forms: Legal Process or
Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, SS-S7 (1982); Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Strategy of
Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition, 66 AM. POL. Sci. REV. SSS (1972); Peter H.
Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 33 (1983).
236. Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 26S (1990).
237. Under the Hayes-Macey analysis, Congress might, instead of doing nothing, reempower
the federal courts to act under its positive Commerce Clause authority, or establish an administrative agency (assuming this is constitutional) to perform the review function. Yet this would
have largely the same effect as retaining the negative Commerce Clause, except insofar as (1) the
empowering statute provided different (or at least clearer) directions to decisionmakers, or (2) an
agency acted differently than the courts, for example, by reason of its having independent investigative powers or being run by "experts."
238. See, e.g., HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 32S (describing an instance of
interstate cooperation as designed to "stave off further Federal intervention").
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B. State and Local Governments and the Degree of Need for a
Commerce Clause
Despite congressional inability to monitor state and local taxation,
there would be little need for a negative Commerce Clause if the states
were not likely to impose significant relative burdens on each others'
citizens or businesses or on the act of crossing state boundaries. One
might think that the states would refrain from imposing such burdens,
given the general social gains from locational neutrality, the self-defeating nature of competition to impose greater burdens on others than
others impose on oneself, and the capacity of threats of retaliation to
enforce cooperation.239 Unfortunately, however, while these considerations powerfully constrain state and local tax behavior and have created significant areas of cooperation, their force is incomplete.
While the leading tax compacts and uniform allocation statutes receive far from universal adherence,240 and while such adherence is motivated in part by the desire to forestall congressional intervention,241
interstate cooperation is in some respects impressive. To give two examples, all states with broad-based personal income taxes grant credits
for income taxes paid to other states with similar crediting provisions,242 and only Iowa fails to use a three-factor allocation formula
for business income - although other states opportunistically vary the
formula, for example, by giving greater weight to the sales factor in
what are predominantly market states.
Yet the history of Supreme Court Commerce Clause litigation
richly testifies to the incompleteness of interstate cooperation. The important question is not whether existing cooperation is impressive and
substantial, but whether it is sufficient. The practical evidence of noncooperation from litigated cases - which evidence presumably would
be even greater if states did not anticipate Commerce Clause challenges - accords with powerful theoretical reasons for expecting cooperation to fall well short of the optimum.
The sheer number of states and tax provisions creates significant
monitoring and collective action problems. One state may be likely to
benefit from enacting burden-exporting taxes even if some other states
239. See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 4, at 14.
240. The Multistate Tax Compact, developed in 1967, currently is subscribed to in full by
only 18 states, plus 10 associate members. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 653.
Likewise, only 25 states and the District of Columbia have substantially enacted the Uniform
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA). See id. at 505.
241. Discussion, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE, supra note
4, at 124 (comment by Walter Hellerstein).
242. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 968-69.
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(but not all) are watching its behavior and retaliating. States have differential opportunities to attempt to burden each other. For example,
states possessing scarce natural resources (like Montana in Commonwealth Edison), or a strategic location amid national transportation
networks (like Pennsylvania in Scheiner) may be able to export more
tax burdens to outsiders than outsiders can export back to them.
Moreover, the state-level role of concentrated interest groups is extremely significant. A group in StateX that can secure a tax benefiting
itself at the expense of State Y need not be concerned about retaliation
unless (1) the affected groups in State Y are sufficiently concentrated to
act, and (2) their retaliation against State X would hurt this very group
(or other groups that are politically effective), rather than residents of
State X generally. At the national level, it is well known that interest
groups active in taxation tend to practice what Emil Schattschneider
called "reciprocal noninterference," or agreeing to each other's favored tax concessions so long as each gets its own. 243 One would expect this to hold even more powerfully at the state level, where
opposing each others' special interest provisions generally might be
more difficult and costly given the multiplicity of jurisdictions.
A further problem with state-level tax politics goes to tax exportation, which may benefit state political actors even if it is practiced sufficiently reciprocally to be, in fact, zero sum for all taxpayers and
businesses. To understand why, it is useful to digress briefly to a related question: why states would attempt to engage in tax exportation
when they may not, as an economic matter, actually be accomplishing
it. Consider the coal severance tax in Commonwealth Edison. While
directly borne by consumers (predominantly from out of state), its real
incidence, even in the short term, cannot be determined without examining such factors as
the degree of geographic concentration, the mobility of various factors or
industry, cartelization by trucing states, international competition or
price-umbrella effects, natural substitutability, government regulation,
the prevalence of long-term contracts, the importance of transportation
costs and the way in which such costs are determined, unionization, and
market structure as well as the more mundane attributes of long- and
short-run elasticities of supply and demand. 244

In-state producers or landowners might bear most or all of the real tax
burden. While Montana's willingness to levy the tax arguably suggests otherwise, on the theory that the enacting legislators or in-state
243. See Shaviro, supra note 38, at 55-56 & n.254; ELMER E. SCHATfSCHNEIDER, POLITICS,
PRESSURES, AND THE TARIFF: A STUDY OF FREE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN PRESSURE PouTICS, AS SHOWN IN 1929-1930 REVISION OF THE TARIFF 135-36 (1935).
244. McLure, supra note 6, at 171 (footnote omitted).

March 1992]

Federalism in Taxation

957

interest groups must know better, one should not ascribe too much
weight to their apparent judgment given the inherent difficulty of determining tax incidence. 24s
Imagine, however, that one is a Montana legislator considering
voting to increase dramatically the coal severance tax and simultaneously to reduce dramatically the income and property taxes on local
residents. (These offsetting changes were in fact made simultaneously. 246) In order to be confident of gaining politically from this vote,
must one resolve the tax incidence question? While in-state interest
group opposition, if any, may be significant, a yes vote brings an obvious political benefit regardless of the proposal's real effects on incidence - and even if it has no effects. The advantage is that, instead of
being taxed visibly and directly, voters are now bearing tax burdens
invisibly and indirectly. For politicians interested in popularity or reelection, perceived tax exportation is better than the real thing.
Perceived tax exportation is a particularly potent form of what Susan Hansen calls "fiscal illusion": the use of camouflage to pay for
government without incurring voter wrath. 247 It is well documented
that fiscal illusions can be quite resilient and that voter support for
spending programs often depends on how well the costs of paying for
the programs are disguised. 248 It follows that perceived tax exportation is a valuable political tool for state legislators, permitting them to
claim that they provide government services for free, whether or not
tax burdens are actually exported and whether or not other states respond by returning the favor.
There is at least one more reason that state and local taxation tends
to burden outsiders and interstate commerce notwithstanding the incentives to cooperate. As noted earlier, one of the principal costs of
federalism in taxation goes to administration and compliance - arguably constituting "a drag on interstate trade almost as debilitating
as the border restrictions our federal system was originally designed to
prevent.''249 All jurisdictions seemingly would have an incentive to
reduce these burdens, and surely to some extent they do. At the mar245. The determination of tax incidence often baffies the most talented microeconomists who
have studied it seriously. See id. at 186. In other contexts, state legislatures also frequently get it
wrong. See McLure, supra note 24, at 341-42 (suggesting that state corporate income taxes
typically reflect progressive redistributional motives but are regressive in their actual incidence).
246. See Epstein, supra note 136, at 448.
247. See SUSAN B. HANSEN, THE PoLmcs OF TAXATION: REVENUE WITHOUT REPRESENTATION 22-23, 35-36 (1983).
248. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: FISCAL
INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL CHOICE 11-21 (1967); HANSEN, supra note 247, at 109-11.
249. Henderson, supra note 52, at 1352.
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gin, however, no jurisdiction is likely to feel this incentive very
strongly, given each jurisdiction's limited effect on nationwide costs of
compliance and administration.
Moreover, while businesses would benefit from state (or federal)
legislation reducing their compliance burdens, they are unlikely to
lobby intensively for it. Collective action and free rider problems inhibit such lobbying, not only absolutely but relative to other lobbying.
Here, the benefits of uniformity would be shared across a broad spectrum of multistate businesses. More targeted legislation - for example, creating industry-specific tax benefits - tends to induce greater
cooperation and easier monitoring among affected businesses, and to
permit each such business to capture a greater share of the overall
benefit. Cooperation also is less likely because in many cases businesses do not want uniformity. Their goal presumably is to reduce the
sum of their tax payments and compliance costs, whereas from an
overall social standpoint, to the extent that taxes are neutral transfers,
the goal should be to reduce their compliance costs alone. Businesses
may prefer socially costly locational disparity that permits them to
reduce their tax bills - for example, through the exploitation of differences between states' income allocation rules, or by inducing state tax
competition to provide investment incentives.
While the costs of imposing disparate tax systems are likely to be
undervalued by the various relevant actors, the real benefits to each
jurisdiction of imposing the system it prefers are likely to be overestimated. It seems fair enough for legislatures that take different views of
desirable tax policy to enact different types of taxes. Unfortunately,
however, as I have discussed elsewhere in the context of the national
legislature:
In many cases, Congress legislates because its members and others who
influence it value and benefit from the activity oflegislating. The reasons
for such behavior can be divided into two categories. First, proposing
and enacting legislation is a means of symbolic communication with
[poorly informed] members of the general public, of causing them to like
a politician without the inconvenience (and possible political inconsequence) of actually having to benefit them tangibly. Thus, without regard to its actual effects, legislation can promote reelection. Second,
succeeding legislatively is a means of exercising and demonstrating one's
power. It is inherently gratifying (as when an emperor enjoys seeing
statues of himself), and it increases one's prestige and status in political
circles. Thus, without regard to its actual effects, legislation can promote self-interested goals apart from reelection. 2 so
250. Shaviro, supra note 38, at 8-9 (footnotes omitted). Cf Discussion, in REGULATION,
supra note 4, at 124 (comment by Walter Heller-

FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE,
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As a consequence of these incentives, the more separate actors
have the opportunity to legislate, the more legislation there will be
even absent seriously held policy differences. In a federal system, for
example, state as well as federal legislators may want to be able to say
to voters, each other, or themselves that they have done something for
the average taxpayer, the homeowner, the economy, education, or any
other cause that momentarily seems salient and worthwhile. Legislatures thus may end up enacting differing rules, that on balance impose
tariff-like compliance and administrative burdens, simply because the
members of each legislature value the opportunity to exercise their
own discretion more than the overall outcome (net of everyone's efforts) or nationwide uniformity.251
This can be generalized into a point about the Madisonian system
of separation of powers (of which federalism is one application). 252
Instead of less legislation or even less costly legislation, the system
may simply tend to produce less consistent and coherent legislation
than a more unified and centralized system. Nonetheless the system
may be defended as a kind of "insurance" against the worst-case costs
of centralized legislation that is consistent and coherent but thoroughly bad.253 Does this defense, or any other, suggest that significant
state-level autonomy in taxation, accompanied by limited or no review
under the negative Commerce Clause, is a good idea despite the resulting harm to locational neutrality? The following section considers the
principal forms that such an argument could take.
C.

Possible Benefits of Preserving Broad State and Local
Government Autonomy in Taxation

So far, I have emphasized the benefits of large-scale rather than
small-scale units of political decisionmaking. Yet small political units,
however ill-suited to advance locational neutrality, may have offsetting
advantages of their own. Indeed, if this were not the case, large units
would be so obviously and unambiguously superior that the debate
over optimal size would never have become such a durable and popustein) (arguing that state legislators move toward uniformity in state income taxes so as to discourage federal intervention, thereby protecting their own power and patronage).
251. Consistent with this observation, in relatively nonpolitically salient areas, such as rules
of evidence and commercial law, states tend to subscribe to uniform codes far more than in the
area of taxation. Even in tax, there are some uniformities, such as widespread piggybacking,
often with particular modifications, to the federal income tax code for state and local income tax
purposes.
252. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11 (James Madison), No. 51, at 346.
253. See Shaviro, supra note 38, at 106.
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lar genre in American political theory.254
The principal arguments are as follows. First, in the tax context,
state and local government autonomy helps to ensure that public
goods, many of which are local rather than national in scope, will be
provided and financed at the most efficient scale. Second, such autonomy promotes desirable tax competition between separate jurisdictions
for residents and business investment, founded on the ease of exit by
those dissatisfied with the tradeoff between taxes paid and government
services received. Third, even disregarding exit, small-scale government is more responsive to voters' preferences than large-scale government. Fourth, unfettered taxing powers permit state and local
governments more readily to exploit and develop the resources that
they possess, thus benefiting their residents and arguably promoting
efficiency for much the same reason that private ownership of property
commonly is thought efficient. Fifth, state and local autonomy has the
Madisonian advantage of dividing political authority and thus reducing its capacity to do great harm. Sixth, such autonomy promotes
experimentation by governments with different kinds of tax rules.
This section considers these arguments in turn and concludes that,
in the tax area, they have some validity but relatively limited consequences. In particular, they suggest an important distinction. State
and local discretion regarding the amount of revenue raised through
taxes seems valuable and important despite its creating locational disparity. State and local discretion regarding exactly how revenue is
raised seems generally less beneficial, and thus more clearly ought to
be minimized. Moreover, the narrower and less publicly salient the
tax issue, the weaker the case for preserving discretion.
1. Benefits of Fiscal Federalism in Supplying and Financing Public
Goods

While the United States' multi-unit federal structure is to some
extent a historical accident reflecting its formation from separate colonies, good economic arguments support such a structure. The public
goods that government provides often vary in their spatial incidence or
in the scale at which they are most efficiently provided. 255 Assuming
that a public good has no externalities outside of its benefit region,
concerns of efficiency suggest that the people in that region be exclusively responsible both for deciding whether to provide the good and
254. See DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON 296-97 (1988)
(noting the "optimal size" genre's longstanding popularity).
255. See, e.g., MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 3, at 445-46; Gordon Tullock, Federalism: Problems of Scale, 6 PUB. CHOICE 19 (1969).
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for financing it. A larger scale pplitical unit may reduce government's
responsiveness, by giving influence over the decision to people unaffected by it, or may make government too responsive, by creating an
incentive to seek public goods that are worth less to the beneficiaries
than the amount society as a whole pays for the goods. 25 6
These principles do not provide a perfect rationale for the existing
practice of federalism in this country, given the extreme divergences
between units of government and scales of benefit from public goods.
Jurisdictional lines are in many cases the arbitrary products of geography or history. Any attempt to draw the lines more rationally would
be hampered by each public goad's potentially having a unique scale of
efficient provision or incidence of benefit. Thus, even if otherwise feasible, perfect fiscal federalism would require, in Gordon Tullock's
words, "a genuinely Rube Goldberg arrangement in which the individual citizen would be a member of a vast collection of governmental
units, each ... dealing with a separate activity."251
In practice, state and local governmental units are in some cases
too small and in others too large to be optimally efficient in providing
public goods. Moreover, positive and negative externalities surely
abound from the provision of public goods within limited geographical
units, reducing the validity of the entire model. Yet it nonetheless is
plausible that dividing government into national, state, and local components brings us closer to the optimum than would a purely national
system. A strong rationale therefore exists for having state and local
governments decide what public goods to provide to their residents
and take the responsibility for financing those public goods. Where
different jurisdictions separately exercise discretion about what level of
public goods to finance, it becomes almost inevitable that they will
levy taxes that differ in level or amount. This creates locational disparity in taxation that gives rise to some social costs, but the advantages of fiscal federalism may outweigh the costs.
All this suggests that, on balance, it may be efficient for state and
local jurisdictions to decide for themselves how much to raise in tax
revenues. While it might also seem reasonable, absent countervailing
considerations, to let them decide what types of taxes to use, that does
256. Congressional pork barrel legislation provides an instructive example. Such legislation,
while formally provided at the national scale, may in fact be decided on locally - for example,
by the House member who seeks a particular appropriation. Local decisions in the aggregate are
then simply ratified at the national level through logrolling and are financed nationally, often
leading to projects that are worth less to the beneficiaries than their cost to society. See, e.g.,
Shaviro, supra note 38, at 38.
257. Tullock, supra note 255, at 25. Tullock notes that in a world with positive information
costs this arrangement would be "very, very far from optimum" in practice. Id. at 26.
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not follow as clearly from the fiscal federalism model, which presumably would suggest, if this were feasible, that each resident pay for her
precise share of the benefit from the public goods provided. And
countervailing considerations plainly exist, since state or local discretion regarding the type of taxes levied increases the locational distortions already resulting from disparate levels of taxation, and has the
added drawback of encouraging tax exportation.
Absent positive externalities from a jurisdiction's providing public
goods, tax exportation clearly is inconsistent with fiscal federalism.
Given that positive externalities frequently exist, however, one could
argue that tax exportation is not objectionable after all. 258 This essentially was the Supreme Court's position in Commonwealth Edison,
where it viewed Montana's exercise of police powers, thus maintaining
local civilization to the benefit of all who passed through, as justifying
any degree of tax exportation, limited only by the requirement of
nexus. 259
The Court's argument - its failure to suggest any limit to tax exporting aside - may not be quite as preposterous as it initially appears. When not all beneficiaries from a public good must pay for it,
there is a risk that it will be inefficiently undersupplied. However, our
confidence that Montana will remain a civilized society with roads and
police even absent tax exportation minimizes this danger. At least up
to a point, maintaining civilization is a public good likely to involve
enormous consumer surplus. Many Montanans presumably would
pay significantly higher taxes if necessary to fend off the collapse of
their society (although some might choose instead to leave the state).
Thus, the efficiency reason for affirmatively wanting to charge outsiders seems relatively unimportant, and standard economic notions of
optimal taxation260 suggest charging the least elastic revenue source perhaps something pertaining to Montanans, if, as the principle condemning discrimination against interstate commerce implicitly posits,
residency is less elastic than limited entry into a jurisdiction for commercial purposes.261
It seems clear that, when public goods are predominantly local in
incidence, tax exportation tends to be undesirable even if there are
258. Of course, if positive externalities are critical even for public goods whose principal
incidence is local, the entire fiscal federalism model is called into question, but it is plausible that
local decisionmakers are best suited to decide on and provide such goods.
259. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 628-29 (1981).
260. See, e.g., Hettich & Winer, supra note SO, at 428 (describing the optimal taxation norm
that "[a]ctivities or commodities for which substitution effects are the smallest ought to be taxed
more heavily").
261. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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some positive externalities. While stronger substantive cases than
Montana's for allowing tax exportation are easily imaginable, state
and local governments have an incentive to engage in too much of it,
not too little. Instances of significant benefit spillover can be addressed through action at the national level, cooperation between
neighboring jurisdictions, and the charging of user fees for separable
benefits provided to outsiders - for example, on roads that facilitate
coal mining in Montana, establishing tolls that are reasonably commensurate with the roads' cost. When one adds together the costs of
actual and perceived tax exportation and the other locational distortions (including administrative and compliance costs) that result when
jurisdictions even "innocently" adopt different tax bases, it becomes
clear that the case for state and local discretion regarding the types of
taxes used is weaker than the case for such discretion regarding the
amount of revenue raised through taxes.
2. Facilitating Exit Under the Tiebout and Tax Competition Models
In public finance theory, even advocates of a relatively large government role commonly acknowledge the difficulty of calibrating taxes
and expenditures to people's preferences as efficiently as well-functioning private markets make possible.262 This difficulty persists even
under optimal fiscal federalism. Governments have local power monopolies, public goods cannot be sold separately just to people who
want them, and voting is too crude to disaggregate particular preferences or register their intensity. Charles Tiebout, however, argued in a
celebrated article that localizing the scale of government where feasible makes possible a market-style solution to the problem of satisfying
voters' preferences in the public sector. If numerous small-scale jurisdictions offer distinctive tax and service packages, people are sufficiently aware of the different packages available, and exit from one
jurisdiction to another is sufficiently cheap (among other necessary
preconditions), then the various jurisdictions will in effect compete for
residents in much the same way that private businesses compete for
customers.263 Small scale is critical to Tiebout's analysis because it
tends to make exit cheaper and permits the existence of a greater
number of choices.
Tiebout's analysis parallels the traditional wisdom that federalism
promotes tax competition among the states, since overtaxation induces
262. See, e.g., Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory ofPublic Expenditure, 36 REv. OF EcoN.
& STAT. 387, 388-89 (1954).
263. Tiebout, supra note 8. Tiebout's jurisdictions are not trying to maximize the number of
residents, but to achieve the optimal scale.
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exit or reluctance to enter. 264 Under this view, taxation is seen purely
as a cost to businesses or individuals of locating or remaining in a
particular jurisdiction, devoid of offsetting benefits at the margin from
added spending. Taxpayers' ability to flee accordingly encourages a
desirable "race to the bottom" in levels of taxation or at least inhibits
an undesirable "race to the top."
The two related models can be challenged in a number of respects,
however. First, they may expect too much from the exit option. Exit
often is costly. For individuals, even beyond the direct costs of a move
(including information and search costs), the decision to "vote with
one's feet" may be discouraged by personal attachments to particular
areas and by geographically limited job or housing opportunities.
Businesses not only must consider a wide range of nontax factors in
deciding where to invest, but once located may be unable to move
without sacrificing fixed investments (ranging from physical plant to
goodwill). 265 To the extent that exit is prohibitively costly, the benefits
of the Tiebout and tax competition models are lost. To the extent that
exit is costly but still done, the costs incurred yield a social loss, reducing or even eliminating the net social benefit predicted by the models.
Put differently, locational disparity still has costs even if it also has
benefits.
A second problem with the Tiebout and tax competition models is
that the information needed for their effective functioning may not be
available. Recent studies suggest that, even in urban areas containing
a multiplicity of local governments - seemingly ideal settings for the
Tiebout model - voters typically lack sufficient information about alternative tax and service packages to make the kinds of decisions that
Tiebout posits. 266 The vast diversity existing today between jurisdictions' tax systems surely contributes to this problem. Voters would
find it easier to compare more similarly structured types of tax packages. The existing diversity leads (perhaps deliberately) to information
overload.
264. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 236, at 291 (noting the "traditional defense of a strong
federalist system as a device for achieving a more efficient legal system by encouraging competition among the states").
265. A business may also incur the cost of preserving its future mobility by keeping its capital
in mobile form where, exit considerations aside, creating immobile capital would be more
profitable. ·
266. See David Lowery & William E. Lyons, The Impact of Jurisdictional Boundaries: An
Individual-Level Test of the Tiebout Model, 51 J. POL. 73 (1989). Businesses, due to advantages
of scale, may be more likely to have relevant information about tax levels, but even they may be
unable to predict the future levels of taxation that will apply to fixed investments. See Schoettle,
supra note 190, at 1152 (arguing that taxes significantly affect business decisions in the long run
even though skeptics and some evidence from surveys may suggest otherwise).
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In addition, the diversity that creates this information overload
yields few offsetting advantages. One of the most attractive features of
the Tiebout model - its promise of diversity in the packages that are
offered to suit diversity in people's tastes - has also been questioned
empirically. The greatest differences in jurisdictions' spending patterns apparently result, not from whether local voters prefer, say, art
museums or swimming pools, but instead from differences in fiscal capacity.267 Spending on education, for example, as between jurisdictions with similar proportions of children, varies principally based on
wealth rather than voters' taste for spending on education. 268
Reliance on diversity in preferences appears even less appropriate
for issues of taxation. Given people's varying preferences, diversity
may be valuable with regard to a jurisdiction's choice to be high-tax
and high-service or low-tax and low-service. Yet the same may not be
as true with regard to the choice of how to raise a particular amount of
revenue. Services are provided in kind, and therefore may vary
sharply in subjective value depending on one's taste, but taxes are paid
in the invariant form of cash. Thus, to the extent that people care
principally about their own taxes, it seems doubtful that they often
will be much concerned about what types of taxes they are paying
(other than in preferring low compliance costs), holding the amount
that they pay constant. 269
Moreover, to the extent that people care about the allocation of tax
burdens within the jurisdiction as a whole, 270 the Tiebout and tax
competition models suggest an inherent problem with attempting to
provide diversity at the local level. Assume that voters differ in their
267. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 422-25 (1990).
268. Some jurisdictions may specialize either in providing good public schools or in having
low taxes, thus encouraging geographical sorting between parents of school-age children and
others. Yet this example of Tiebout-style behavior is in large part an artifact of the federal
income tax system, which denies deductions for the costs of sending one's children to private
schools but allows deductions for real property taxes that are used to finance public education. It
also may respond opportunistically to the exit costs that prevent some nonparents from leaving
high-tax, good-school jurisdictions, thereby making such persons subsidize a benefit that, even if
partly a public good, primarily benefits its direct recipients.
269. Even where people manifest strong aversion to one particular type of tax - as in Connecticut currently, where Governor Weicker's push for an income tax has aroused strong opposition - popular sentiment may rest in large part on the belief that enacting the unpopular tax
would cause overall taxes to increase, at least over the long term. See Maria Newman, Anger
Against Governors Reflected in 3-State Poll, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1991, at Al. Note that, just as
creating a new income tax in addition to the sales tax is unpopular in Connecticut, so at the
national level is enacting a sales (or value-added) tax in addition to the income tax unpopular.
Many attribute Ways and Means Chairman Albert Ullman's electoral defeat in 1980 to his advocacy of a national value-added tax. See Jeff Gerth, Treasury's Objections to a Sales Tax, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1984, at A31.
270. People may also care about the policy arguments aside from incidence for different
taxes, an issue that I discuss at infra section 111.C.3.
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attitudes toward progressive taxes that redistribute wealth. Even if the
voters who favor such taxes concentrate in particular jurisdictions,
they cannot realize their preference unless suitable targets of redistributive taxation consent to live in those jurisdictions.271 Wealthy taxpayers and holders of capital - the most likely and plausible targets
of redistributive taxation - are precisely the ones most likely to enjoy
high mobility. 272
This reveals a normatively controversial aspect of the Tiebout and
tax competition models. Assume that "conservatives" favor a small
government sector, little or no wealth redistribution, and favorable tax
treatment for capital, while "liberals" favor a large government sector,
significant wealth redistribution, and high taxes on capital. Under
these assumptions, conservatives but not liberals will like the consequences for progressivity of cheap exit.213
Yet each side has its own countervailing considerations. First,
both may be dismayed by the inefficiency of departures from locational
neutrality. Moreover, in a country where support at the national level
for tax progressivity and redistribution is at most "weak and ambivalent,"274 highly liberal policies may be most likely to prevail politically
at smaller-scale jurisdictions that diverge from the mainstream
(although highly progressive taxation may be ineffective at the local
level given the ease of exit).275 This may in some instances make liberals friends, and conservatives foes, of state and local discretion in the
tax area. 276 Another consideration is that the exportation of perceived
or actual tax burdens to nonvoters may be most feasible at the state
and local level, where only one state's voters are represented. This
may favor the liberal objective of promoting high levels of taxation
and spending, but liberals may disapprove of the lack of taxpayer consent or the taxes' incidence.
Finally and most importantly, the question presented is not
271. Ifl want to redistribute my own wealth, I can make voluntary contributions to suitable
persons or causes and do not need the tax system's assistance.
272. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 267, at 420.
273. See, e.g., PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (1981); KAREN ORREN, CORPORATE
POWER AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1974) (discussing the distributive consequences of cheap exit).
274. JOHN F. WITrE, THE PoLmcs AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
352 (1985).
275. The same may be true of highly conservative policies that diverge from the mainstream,
but the point is that, in the area of tax progressivity, the mainstream tilts to the conservative side.
The reverse may be true in other areas, such as abortion policy, where tight restrictions (typically
a "conservative" position), if constitutionally permitted, might be most likely to prevail in se·
lected states and localities.
276. See STONE, supra note 254, at 304 (arguing that support for making decisions at a particular level in the federal system typically reflects "a belief that some particular interest is
stronger in a particular arena").

March 1992]

Federalism in Taxation

967

whether taxation should be exclusively national or exclusively state
and loca1. Continuing nationa1 taxation is a given. Moreover, since
the argument for state and local discretion regarding the amount of
tax levied is relatively strong, consider focusing on discretion regarding the types of taxes used. Arguably, given the potential for perceived tax exportation and the greater mobility of the wealthy and
capital, the dominant effect of such discretion is to increase the net
amount of state and local taxation (and thus the size of government),
but to make such taxation less progressive. The result could be the
worst of both worlds: the inefficiency many conservatives abhor277
without the redistribution many liberals favor. 278
3.

Greater Responsiveness of Small Government Units to Voter
Preferences

A further possible advantage of smaller government units is that
they may be more responsive to the policy preferences of local voters. 279 In smaller units, each individual's vote counts for relatively
more, there may be greater internal homogeneity and thus agreement,
a sense of community participation may be easier to foster, 280 and, as
even James Madison (while generally preferring the larger scale) admitted, government officials may be more familiar with loca1 sentiments and conditions. 281 These considerations plainly strengthen the
case for state and local control over taxation. Once again, however,
they apply more forcefully to the amount of fax levied than to the
types of taxes used.
Given fisca1 illusion, popular understanding of the amount of taxation imposed by a jurisdiction and its relationship to the value of government services provided can be disappointingly limited. 282 Yet it
277. Liberals, of course, should and often do oppose inefficiency, but it often is less prominent in their rhetoric.
278. This suggests that at least certain liberals and conservatives (those who disagree mainly
about the merits of what is often called the "equity versus efficiency" tradeoff posed by an increase in the size of government) should agree that state-level discretion in the tax area should be
reduced. Yet American politics, or, for that matter, the Supreme Court, reaches no such consensus. If anything, a consensus to preserve such discretion prevails. I suspect that liberals and
conservatives alike tend to cherish the existence of multiple levels of political discretion because
it increases the chance that they will enjoy the satisfaction of prevailing somewhere, albeit that
the real effects of prevailing anywhere are reduced.
279. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 7, at 1493.
280. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); Gerald E. Frug, Empowering Cities in a Federal System, 19 URBAN LAW. 553 (1987).
281. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. 10 (James Madison), at 63.
282. Thus, the demand for public goods often depends on how visibly they are financed
rather than on their cost, and many people apparently believe that government services can be
provided for free. See, e.g., BUCHANAN, supra note 248, at 11-21; HANSEN, supra note 247, at
39, 262.
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often functions as a powerful constraint - for example, causing the
defeat of politicians who enact or threaten unwanted tax increases. 283
Thus, for amount-of-tax issues, the argument that people will get more
of what they want if more control remains at the state and local levels
has some force. For type-of-tax issues, however, it appears considerably less persuasive.
Voters may care about what types of taxes their jurisdictions use
for reasons of incidence or of effect. We have already seen, however,
that issues of tax incidence are poorly understood by voters (and even
economists), with the result that support for particular taxes often depends on questionable or downright erroneous factual premises. Consider, for example, state-level corporate income taxes, which probably
gain much of their political support from the apparently erroneous
belief that they are borne by shareholders, rather than by employees
and consumers. 284 We have also seen that control over incidence is
impeded at the state and local level by the relative ease of exit by
targets of redistribution, and that control can be misused to export tax
burdens to persons neither participating as voters nor benefiting significantly from the jurisdiction's spending. The social gain from maximizing state and local-level voter control over tax incidence therefore
appears relatively weak.
Issues of tax effect go to the fact that taxes not only raise revenue
but function as regulation. For example, the choice between a sales
tax and an income tax may affect levels of saving, and the decision to
grant homeowners a tax preference may affect home ownership. 285
Voters in different jurisdictions may want different regulatory effects
for themselves, and while in some cases their efforts may simply offset
each other, in others the resulting differentiation might increase aggregate satisfaction.
The problem with supporting broad state and local discretion on
this ground is that, while taxes are only one type of regulation, they
are a type that voters poorly understand. For a variety of reasons,
including the simple dislike of taxation, people tend to assess regulatory uses of the tax system less rigorously than regulation by many
283. Recent examples include the defeat of Walter Mondale in the 1984 presidential election
after he promised a tax increase, see Howell Raines, The One Thing Democrats Agree On: They
Must Change, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1985, at E2, the defeat of Senator Dole in the 1988 New
Hampshire Republican presidential primary after he failed to "take the pledge" not to raise
taxes, see Bush v. Dole: Behind the Turnaround, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1988, at Al, and the 1991
state legislative elections in New Jersey, where the Democrats were overwhelmingly defeated
after Governor Florio increased taxes, see Jerry Gray, Democrats Fail to Kill the Tax Rise that
Doomed Them, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1992, at D6.
284. See McLure, supra note 24, at 341-42.
285. See supra section I.B.
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other means. 286 Thus, to limit state and local discretion in the tax area
would not be sufficiently broad to prevent regulation where desired,
because alternative means to regulatory ends will usually exist; nor
would it be so formalistic and easily evaded as to serve no purpose, in
that the alternative means might be more likely than tax provisions to
receive meaningful political scrutiny.287 Accordingly, the responsiveness argument for preserving state and local control over the types of
taxes levied, while not completely without force, plausibly is outweighed by the arguments for greater uniformity and centralized control over state and local tax bases.
One could argue that tax issues in general - the amount of tax
levied aside - are too poorly understood for increasing our political
system's aggregate responsiveness to voter preferences to have much
value. Certainly many observers of the federal income tax political
process have concluded that responsiveness commonly fails to yield
not only a fair or efficient tax system, but even one satisfying to the
voters whose preferences it ostensibly reflects. 288 Without pushing this
argument too far, it seems clear that for some types of tax issues - in
particular, those too narrow or esoteric to attract widespread attention
and concern - political responsiveness has relatively little value.
Compare, for example, the issue of choosing income tax depreciation schedules to the issue of whether to use an income tax or a sales
tax for the bulk of a state's revenue. The former issue is far less salient
than the latter, and thus the power to control it locally seems unlikely
to affect directly, to any significant extent, real levels of public satisfaction. By contrast, voters across the country frequently express interest
in the choice between an income tax and a sales tax (as Connecticut's
Governor Weicker has recently leamed289). However skeptical one is
of the underlying level of public understanding of each tax's incidence
and effects, it is difficult to argue that when voters express a preference
for one type of tax over another they are mistaken about what they
truly prefer. Even if their preference is based on erroneous factual
286. See Shaviro, supra note 38, at 62-63. This is not to deny that some other forms of
regulation - such as keeping social programs off-budget by requiring businesses to provide specified services - may be judged with a similar Jack of rigor.
287. Similarly, a well-known argument in the context of the federal income tax system holds
that the extensive use of "tax expenditures" is undesirable for structural political reasons. See,
e.g., SURREY, supra note 40.
288. See, e.g., Wrrrn, supra note 274; Shaviro, supra note 38, at 63-64; Stanley S. Surrey,
The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist - How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 1145 (1957).
289. See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Budget Is Passed for Connecticut with Income Tax, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 1991 at Al; Kirk Johnson, Effort to Repeal New Tax on Income Fails in Hartford, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 1991, at Al.
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premises - meaning that they are asking to live in a fool's paradise acceding to the preference might still yield the highest attainable level
of public satisfaction (assuming that their ignorance cannot be remedied). After all, a sense of satisfaction is no less subjectively real for
being founded on illusion.290
Again, however, the fool's paradise argument for state and local
autonomy in taxation reaches only those issues that are sufficiently
salient to evoke strongly held opinions on a broad scale. For the narrow and esoteric types of issues that are most common in the tax area
-generally, those of tax base design as opposed to the choice between
well known types of tax base - the case for greater uniformity and
centralized control remains strong.
4. Statewide Control over Resources and the Efficiency Gains from

Monopoly
One of the consequences of broad state and local government autonomy in taxation is that it affords particular jurisdictions the opportunity to exploit their natural or other resources. Montana, for
example, can use the coal severance tax to extract a higher price for its
coal (assuming that its market power is in fact sufficient to raise the
after-tax price paid by out-of-state customers). Similarly, Pennsylvania can attempt to exploit its highly strategic geographical location if it permits levies such as the one in Scheiner, 291 and New York
City and Florida can use hotel taxes to exploit their attractiveness as
tourist destinations. 292 The presumably intended effect in each case is
not so much to tax in-state resource owners as to raise the after-tax
prices paid by outsiders. In effect, states organize cartels that individual owners of coal mines, hotels, and the like would be unable to organize, given collective action problems and the antitrust laws, and the
states then appropriate the monopoly profits to themselves.
290. In endorsing the "fool's paradise," I argue, for the moment, against the pro-centralization theme of this article. The reader who disagrees with me about the fool's paradise should
conclude that the case for increased centralization is even stronger than I recognize, and thus
should be moved in the direction of greater rather than lesser agreement with my overall
conclusions.
291. Recently, while traveling through Pennsylvania after having been warned that the state
rigorously enforces its 55-mile-per-hour speed limit, I conjectured that this was one more example of an attempt to export taxes and burden interstate commerce. A large proportion of the
speeding fines levied in Pennsylvania no doubt are paid by outsiders, who may tend to be less
familiar with the state's policy and to have long distances to travel (increasing the urge to travel
fast). As is often the case with public choice explanations, however, this one proved difficult to
verify. I observed that Pennsylvania also seemed to make greater-than-normal use of speed
bumps and signs warning motorists to reduce their speed, perhaps evidencing a culture of traffic
safety independent of tax exportation.
292. See Wade, supra note 54.
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If this does not sound like an argument in favor of state and local
government autonomy in taxation, it can be converted into one by adding the assertion that the residents of the taxing states ought to be
able to exploit their resources to their profit. This assertion can be
defended either as a matter of entitlement or on efficiency grounds.
The entitlement argument - for example, that Montanans ought
to reap maximum benefit from Montana's coal - is relatively easy to
answer. While "Montana for the Montanans" may sound, as a baseline matter of justice, no less plausible than "Montana for the benefit
of all Americans" or "Montana for the benefit of all humanity,'' in
practice it has disadvantages. When all states attempt to exploit their
particular advantages at the expense of those in other. states by organizing in-state monopolies, society as a whole is left worse off, due to
the well-known deadweight welfare triangle loss that monopoly
causes.293 Thus, behind a veil of ignorance all states presumably
would agree, and arguably by adopting the Constitution they did
agree, mutually to forgo the advantages of being able to use taxation to
extract monopoly profits from their resources.
Monopoly power, however, has the advantage of eliminating, not
only the collective action problem that we are glad inhibits seekers of
monopoly profit, but also the regrettable collective action problem that
inhibits those who would like more fully to develop a state's resources.
Assume, for example, that the infrastructure needed by New York to
host a thriving tourist industry will not be built or maintained unless
its costs can be charged to tourists, and that public good and collective
action problems prevent anyone other than the government, through
taxes, from collecting the amounts that are needed.
The argument is a standard one about the welfare advantages of
monopoly2 94 (as well as collective or public ownership of property), It
also is identical in form to the standard argument for allowing private
property by granting the owner monopoly rights over a particular asset - namely, that by internalizing to the owner the social benefits
from the property, we can induce her to use and develop the property
to maximum social advantage. 295 For both monopoly and private
293. See, e.g., RYAN c. AMACHER & HOLLEY H. ULBRICH, PRINCIPLES OF EcoNOMICS 519
(4th ed. 1989).
294. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81-82 (2d ed.
1946), and JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM 86-87 (2d ed. 1956), argue
that monopoly increases business innovation by ensuring that none of the gains from innovation
will be captured by imitative competitors. The available empirical evidence about innovation
essentially refutes that argument, however. See AMACHER & ULBRICH, supra note 293, at 563.
295. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, AM. EcoN. REV. 347
(1967); CASS SUNSfEIN, ON PROPERTY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 6 (Chicago Law and Economics Working Paper No. 3, 2d Series, 1991).
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property rights, the assessment requires comparing benefits of internalization with harms, such as the welfare triangle loss, across a broad
spectrum. While such an assessment is beyond the scope of this article, the standard wisdom over the years has been that for private property the benefits tend to outweigh the harms, while for monopoly the
harms tend to be greater. This assessment certainly seems plausible in
the state and local tax context, where only rarely does it seem likely
that the tax revenues extracted from outsiders both are needed and
would be used for infrastructure that is desirable yet would not otherwise exist due to collective action problems.
5.

Reducing Worst-Case Harm by Decentralizing Authority
over Taxation

A further argument for broad state and local government discretion in matters of taxation is the standard Madisonian separation of
powers view, under which the creation of multiple independent authorities reduces the harms feared from vigorous government. Here
again the argument is not completely without force, but seems of relatively minor import. In particular, state and local governments cannot
directly constrain the exercise of federal taxing authority and thereby
prevent "tyranny." Thus, their only separation of powers benefit is to
make national tax policy as a whole less consistent and coherent which, while conceivably desirable if one is sufficiently pessimistic
about such policy, has significant costs.
The fact that control over taxes at the state and local level is in
addition to, not a potential substitute for, control over taxes at the
national level is important for more than the standard Madisonian reasons. It largely eliminates the relevance of any claim that tax base
standardization is a mistake because national authorities are unlikely
to make better decisions than local authorities. Whether that claim is
factually correct is debatable, given the greater number of represented
interests and the reduction of incentives for interstate tax exportation
at the national level. The claim nonetheless is not clearly wrong: a
simple glance at the Internal Revenue Code shows that it is rife with
special interest provisions, often (as with oil and gas tax preferences)
betraying a regional bias. Yet the relative merits of localized and national decisionmaking are not decisive when the question presented is
to what extent we should have "one of the most undesirable outcomes
in a federal system - dual state and federal regulation of the same
subject matter," 296 leading at a minimum to higher costs of tax com296. Kitch, supra note 4, at 47.

March 1992]

Federalism in Taxation

973

pliance and administration.
6. Promoting Experimentation by Governments in the Tax Area

A final argument for broad state and local autonomy in the tax
area is that it facilitates governmental experimentation. When there
are more separate units controlling their own tax systems, not only
can a greater number of different ideas be tried, but each experiment
involves less aggregate social risk than if it were attempted nationwide.
Therefore, a decentralized federal system ostensibly promotes a pace
of intellectual progress in matters of tax policy that would not otherwise be possible. 291
This argument is powerful to the extent that tax politics is an orderly, rational process in which the principal (or a major) impediment
to developing good law is simply the lack of hard empirical knowledge. Under the skeptical view of tax politics that I and many others
have taken, however, 298 the case for promoting experimentation loses
most of its force. Given the inherent difficulty of establishing causal
relationships between provisions that are enacted and subsequent social effects, "experiments" often have surprisingly little evidentiary
value. 299 Moreover, what value there is tends not to be examined very
cogently. Consider the national-level experiment of the early 1980s
with greatly expanded tax incentives to promote saving and investment, which was followed by a sharp decline in national saving and
investment (although arguably for unrelated reasons), but which has
failed to dismay or even compel much explanation from those who
advocate restoring these incentives. 300 Given both interest group politics and politicians' incentives to seek salient and dramatic legislation
as an end in itself, 301 the experiments simply are not being conducted
by a reliable set of "scientists." Even the lessons that are learned may
be the wrong ones, such as what types of provisions are effective in
297. Cf. McConnell, supra note 7, at 1498 (arguing that federalism gives state and local
governments greater opportunity to experiment with different policies and pursue innovations).
298. See, e.g.. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD E. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT:
THE PoLmCAL LEGACY OF LoRD KEYNES 129-34 (1977); HANSEN, supra note 247;
SCHATI'SCHNEIDER, supra note 243; WITI'E, supra note 274; Shaviro, supra note 38; Surrey,
supra note 288.
299. Cf. Daniel N. Shaviro, Exchange on Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 834 (1990)
(arguing that the political market contains the same types of misinformation and transaction
costs as are found in the private market).
300. While the tax incentives of the early 1980s have not, for the most part, been restored as
yet, this may be due more to budgetary considerations than to the evidence suggesting that the
incentives were ineffective. See Shaviro, supra note 38, at 52-53.
301. See id. at 8-9.
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disadvantaging outside businesses or creating perceived tax
exportation.
The rhetorically appealing metaphor of a national "laboratory"
where state and local governments conduct valuable experiments that,
when successful, can be emulated elsewhere, surely is not entirely
without foundation. Yet as one surveys the area that this metaphor
describes - for example, the 7000 separate sales tax jurisdictions and
the forty-odd state personal and business income taxes, each with its
own array of provisions - and reflects on the real but often invisible
consequences, both substantive and administrative, of so much diversity, it is hard to remain confident that the "laboratory" is yielding an
acceptable ratio of benefit to cost. The case for moving at least some
distance in the direction of nationally imposed uniformity remains
compelling.

***

In summary, while state and local governments serve a number of
important purposes, the case for preserving their discretion in deciding
what to tax (as opposed to how much to tax) seems weak. Even if
problems such as administrative complexity and breakdowns in interstate cooperation are no more serious in the tax area than elsewhere,
the offsetting benefits of localized control seem inadequate. This
seems particularly true for relatively narrow and esoteric tax issues,
such as the design details for a particular tax base.
In principle, one might even want to establish a uniform tax base
that all state and local jurisdictions were required to use when levying
taxes, and allow them discretion only regarding the rate. Yet such a
course would not only be politically implausible and constitutionally
suspect - even Congress' modem Commerce Clause powers may not
reach that far 302 - but would have significant disadvantages. Reliance on a single uniform tax base would tend to make state and local
tax revenues overly subject to fluctuation. Using a variety of bases
serves as a kind of insurance, reducing the likely revenue effects of any
particular kind of economic change; moreover, it permits marginal
rates to be lower across the spectrum, thus reducing the distortive effects of any one base. The following Part incorporates this constraint,
along with the stronger arguments for preserving state and local autonomy, into the development of specific recommendations for changing the current practice of federalism in taxation.
302. Depriving the states of all authority over taxation, other than concerning the rate applied to a single uniform base, might be too far removed from the Framers' expectations regarding state-federal relations to survive constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 32,
33 (Alexander Hamilton).
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

So far, this article has reached the following main conclusions:
(1) A principle opposing tariffs within the United States' borders
seems not only substantively correct but politically, historically, and
constitutionally uncontroversial. The best argument for this principle
is that tariffs impair locational neutrality. Tariffs are not unique in
this regard, however, and locational neutrality almost inevitably suffers if state and local governments have authority over taxation.
(2) Since complete locational neutrality is unattainable in a federal
system (and not even unambiguously desirable given'considerations of
fiscal federalism), some narrower principle must be used by courts that
are charged with determining which state and local taxes are impermissible. In this context, the case for a principle barring discrimination against outsiders and interstate commerce is plausible, although
not overwhelming. While such a principle may not reach all of the
cases in which one would like to intervene, it serves a valuable function to the extent that it facilitates line-drawing and filters out the very
worst state and local taxes. Yet in these respects the antidiscrimination principle has worked extremely poorly in practice, due to its theoretical limitations and the courts' implicit balancing of it against the
positive value ascribed to state and local government autonomy.
(3) Neither at the national level nor at the state and local level are
ordinary political processes likely to keep the harm to locational neutrality within acceptable bounds. Arguments that the state and local
political process serves important purposes, outweighing the harm
done to locational neutrality, are fairly persuasive with regard to levels
of taxation but not with regard to tax base design, particularly in light
of the resulting administrative costs and the incentives for actual or
perceived tax exportation. Therefore, we may want to limit state and
local governments' discretion to specify tax bases, while permitting
them to set the tax rates that apply to acceptable bases.
These conclusions have strong positive implications for both Congress and the federal courts. At least some congressional action seems
desirable because it can take the form of coherent rules, based on contextual policy considerations, that no one need pretend the Constitution mandates. Even if judges are intellectually capable of prescribing
better rules than legislators - despite the handicaps of addressing
only the cases that arise, and hearing principally from adversaries with
narrow litigating interests - they may conclude with some justification that their role does not extend to specifying precise rules that may
look arbitrary and political. Moreover, while there is little reason to
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expect congressional intervention in specific disputes as they arise, it is
less implausible that Congress will enact general rules to govern future
disputes that are as yet unknown. I therefore consider what Congress
should do before turning to the federal courts.
An important countervailing consideration, however, is the possible danger of involving Congress on an ongoing basis in specifying
state and local tax bases. Regular involvement might activate the incentive for Congress to respond to interest group pressures by repeatedly giving away potential revenue at the state and local level,
unconstrained by the budgetary concerns that may arise when it considers the effect of tax rules on its own budget at the national level.
Accordingly, even when Congress can specify detailed rules that
would improve state and local taxation, it should exercise caution unless it can explain such rules as one-time legislation predicated on creating uniformity for its own sake. 303
A.

Congress

The steps that Congress ought to consider taking can be arrayed in
three groups. I will discuss each, in order of increasing ambitiousness,
and then consider whether any exceed the constitutional limits to Congress' power over the states.
1. Addressing Coordination Problems Between Comparable State

and Local Tax Bases
Perhaps the least controversial proposal is to require the states to
use uniform apportionment rules in dividing among themselves tax bases of potentially national scope, such as income or sales. In particular, a uniform apportionment rule should be prescribed for the area
that is most problematic: business income taxes. Given that no apportionment rule is truly correct, since income often has no specific
location, the exact content of the rule is unimportant so far as the tax
merits are concerned. One particular rule, however - a three-factor
formula based on profits, payroll, and sales that counts all three factors equally to connote simplicity and objectivity - might be the most
consistent with both current practice and the message that Congress is
303. The preferred model for congressional action would be that of policy entrepreneurship,
overcoming political inertia by selling an attractive and simple idea to the general public, or at
least the Washington political community, over the heads of the most narrowly interested par·
ties. Similar dynamics have led in the past to federal income tax reform, deregulation of such
industries as trucking and the airlines, and regulatory legislation addressing air and water pollution, automobile safety, consumer product safety, and racial discrimination. See Shaviro, supra
note 38, at 94. Legislation too detailed and political in appearance to fit this model may be
undesirable because it would invite continual tinkering by Congress.
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simply providing a fair and uniform rule, not making a nuanced political or policy judgment. Whatever rule Congress chooses should apply not only to corporate income taxes, but also to the income of
business entities such as partnerships that are included in the taxable
income of individuals. 304
Such a rule would not end all controversy over the location of taxable income. Recall, for example, issues such as where baseball teams
or phone companies have their profits, payrolls, and sales. A host of
industry-specific rules might be warranted, and on these one might
expect lobbying and political disagreement. To limit the ongoing
political input, Congress could direct that industry-specific elaborations of the general rule be developed administratively, as by the
Treasury Department, pursuant to the general directive that in all
cases one hundred percent of a taxpayer's U.S. income, neither more
nor less, should be apportioned to all the states together.
For personal income taxes, questions of business entity income
aside, the allocation problems tend to be less serious in practice.
When one works and resides in a single state, only that state can impose an income tax under the judicial requirement of nexus. While
disparate multiple taxation may arise when a taxpayer resides in one
state and works in another, the states generally, although not universally, coordinate their exercise of taxing powers under the Multistate
Tax Compact, particularly by providing credits to residents for liability incurred elsewhere. 305 The existing degree of interstate cooperation here - presumably founded on residents' capacity to perceive the
double taxation and complain effectively about it - reduces the need
for a national-level solution, but one might still want to require that
the Compact be followed in all cases.
For sales and use taxes, the relatively high level of interstate cooperation once again ameliorates coordination problems. Congressional
action could again take the form of requiring adherence to the Multistate Tax Compact, thus making universal the "destination" rule for
place of sale and the requirement that states provide tax credits for
sales or use taxes previously paid to other states. 306 Congress also
could require greater uniformity between a state's sale and use taxes so
that out-of-state sales could not be disfavored. 307 Perhaps more im304. A statutory answer to many income allocation issues already exists at the state level, in
the form of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), currently subscribed to by 25 states and the District of Columbia. See HELLERSrEIN & HELLERSrEIN, supra
note 1, at 500-05.
305. See id. at 968-69.
306. See id. at 781-82.
307. See id. at 783.
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portantly, to eliminate what is in effect a tax preference favoring outof-state purchases, Congress could overturn National Bellas Hess and
require all out-of-state vendors to collect use taxes and remit them to
the taxing jurisdictions. 308
A further coordination problem that is worth addressing arises
under sales taxes other than those on final retail sales of property for example, taxes on the sale of services that are used to produce
property for sale, or on transfers during the production and marketing
process. Here, multiple taxation occurs unless the sales taxes imposed
at earlier stages are credited against those imposed later. 309 The general requirement that retail vendors collect sales and use taxes from
purchasers (the National Bellas Hess exception aside) should make a
mandatory crediting process feasible.
Property taxes present a similar danger of penalizing multijurisdictional presence under at least two scenarios: when they apply to intangible property in one state that is valuable due to the rights it conveys
in tangible property in other states, and when jurisdiction over the
same property is asserted by one state based on the taxpayer's residence or domicile and by another state based on the property's location. Once again, mandatory tax credits would be appropriate, 3•0
particularly now that the Supreme Court has cast doubt on its willingness to intervene.311
A final proposal concerns the excise or severance taxes that states
such as Alaska, Montana, and Wyoming use in an apparent effort to
export tax burdens to out-of-state consumers. Such taxes could be
308. This has frequently been proposed. See id. at 825. The most prominent proposals exempt vendors with sales (overall or within the trucing state) below certain threshold amounts.
This creates a tax preference for small business and may inefficiently discourage businesses from
crossing the thresholds, but arguably is justified on the ground that small vendors' per-sale compliance costs would be disproportionately or even prohibitively high. Commentators mostly
agree that Congress has the power to reverse National Bellas Hess. See, e.g., Jerome R. Hellerstein, Significant Sales and Use Tax Developments During the Past Half Century, 39 VAND. L.
REV. 961, 982-92 (1986).
309. See, e.g., Mundstock, supra note 69.
310. Following practice in the personal income tax area, and in keeping with what seems to
be the dominant thrust of Professor Schoettle's analysis of tax discrimination, the jurisdiction
that should be required to allow a credit for the other jurisdiction's taxes probably should be the
one where the taxpayer resides or has its domicile.
311. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 111 S. Ct. 2049 (1991), where
an equally divided Court declined to strike down Florida's intangible property tax that applied
both to in-state domiciliaries and to items with an in-state business situs, despite the tax's evident
inconsistency with the recently promulgated "internal consistency" requirement. Even if the
Supreme Court were clearly willing to act, mandatory crediting would be preferable to its exercise of authority. Since internal consistency is satisfied where liability rests either on domicile or
on business situs, so long as it does not rest on both, problems would arise where states differed in
which of the two they employed. Thus, interstate commerce might remain disfavored in practice, subject to the Supreme Court's cumbersome searching for bias in particular cases.
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constrained, for example, by the requirement that their rates not exceed the taxing jurisdiction's generally applicable sales tax rates, except to the extent demonstrably justified as user fees that recover
direct costs to the taxing state specifically resulting from the extraction
activity, such as the construction of special roads for mining, or expenditures to repair environmental harm. Similar rules could apply to
other clear-cut instances of attempted tax exportation, such as hotel
taxes.
2. Requiring That Particular Tax Bases,
Forms

if Used,

Take Prescribed

a. State and local income taxes. A more ambitious set of proposals
- plainly desirable under the analysis in this article, but politically
less likely - would involve prescribing the content of entire tax bases.
States that levy income taxes could be required to use the federal income tax base, possibly with a small number of specified allowable
variations. 312 This would not only reduce opportunities for discrimination against outsiders or interstate commerce, but would significantly reduce compliance costs (especially for taxpayers that are
subject to income tax in a large number of jurisdictions). The proposal
would generalize a rule of conformity to the federal income tax that
many states already follow, at least in part. 313 Even to the extent that
the proposal would limit states' discretion, there seems little to regret,
for example, in ending California's use of its own depreciation system,
or the differences in carryover periods for capital losses and net operating losses.
One possible objection to the proposal is that it would complicate
state and local governments' fiscal planning. Changes to the federal
income tax base would affect state and local tax revenues, and while
this merely calls for rate adjustments (assuming a goal of keeping expected revenues constant), in some cases state and local governments
might be unable to respond in timely fashion. The Federal Tax Re312. Alternatively, conformity could be required solely for corporate income taxes, since
corporations are far more likely to have multijurisdictional presence. A further possible variation would be to condition the federal deductibility of personal state and local income taxes on
conformity to the federal base, thus merely encouraging rather than requiring conformity.
313. As an alternative to federal conformity, Charles McLure has suggested barring states
from taxing corporate income, while instead allowing them to tax corporate or all business instate sales and payrolls. He argued that this would not change the real economic incidence of
state corporate income taxes, would make such incidence more widely understood (since many
people erroneously regard such taxes as borne by shareholders), and would greatly simplify tax
administration. McLure, supra note 24, at 341-42. While this proposal may be meritorious, I
ignore it here because of its potentially distracting (even if misleading) appearance of reducing
progressivity.
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form Act of 1986, for example, which had dramatic revenue effects on
states that voluntarily conform to the federal base, 314 applied to the
1986 taxable year yet was not officially enacted until late October of
that year, by which time many state legislatures were no longer in
session. This problem has a simple solution, however. Either in general or under specified circumstances, states could be required or allowed to provide for a one-year lag in their conformity to the federal
income tax base. Given the recent rapidity of federal income tax revision, 315 the federal and state income tax bases might only rarely be
identical under this proposal, but at least the number of income tax
bases to which any taxpayer was subject would be capped at two. 316
Among its other appljcations, a requirement of general income tax
conformity would bar states from engaging in worldwide unitary taxation, since that method is not employed for federal income tax purposes. At present, political support for this particular application of
the conformity principle appears to be stronger than support for income tax conformity in general. Legislation has been introduced in
both houses of Congress under which the states would be barred from
engaging in worldwide unitary taxation. 317
Even without the enactment of a general income tax conformity
statute, the proposed legislation barring states from engaging in worldwide unitary taxation appears desirable, given the compliance burdens
that such taxation involves and the benefits of nationwide uniformity.
The proposed legislation is troubling in only one respect: as a possible
precedent for piecemeal intervention by Congress in the state and local
tax area. Conceivably, in the next case piecemeal intervention could
take the form of shrinking state and local tax bases in response to
lobbying pressure without regard to the principle of conformity between income tax systems. 318 While lobbying pressures to shrink the
314. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 937.
315. See Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913 (1987).
316. Requiring conformity to the federal income tax base, with or without a one-year lag,
would fail to prevent the states from diverging in their practices of administrative enforcement or
in their judicial interpretations of the federal income tax statute (although the latter would be
subject to review by the U.S. Supreme Court, given the assumed federal statute requiring conformity). Yet substantial or predominant conformity clearly seems attainable.
317. On recent legislative consideration of the issue, see HELLERSTEJN & HELLERSTEIN,
supra note 1, at 608-09.
318. Prior isolated interventions by Congress in the state and local tax area have not led to
this sort of degradation of the process, however. An example of such intervention is the Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 306, 90 Stat. 31, 54
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1988)) (barring state and local taxation of railroad property at a
higher rate than that generally applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same
jurisdiction).
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tax base may come to bear whenever Congress legislates about taxes,
at least for provisions that apply to both federal and state or local
taxes there is a countervailing cost: reducing federal tax revenues
leaves Congress with less money to spend unless it incurs the political
cost of raising someone else's taxes (assuming some constraint on deficit spending).
If the dangers of undesirable piecemeal intervention by Congress in
state and local taxation do not appear too great, several other specific
proposals for increasing income tax uniformity might be worth considering, assuming that Congress declines to take the better course of requiring income tax conformity in general. The steps that could be
taken - or urged of state legislatures, if congressional action is
thought too risky - to reduce the compliance burdens resulting from
diversity, include the following:
• Require the allowance of S corporation elections for state and
local income tax purposes whenever they are allowed for federal income tax purposes.
• Eliminate state-level alternative minimum taxes. By its nature,
an alternative minimum tax is a separate tax system, applied in parallel to the regular tax system, and thus in many instances doubles taxpayers' recordkeeping and computational burdens. For example,
depreciable assets generally have separate bases for regular tax and
alternative minimum tax purposes, given the use of separate depreciation systems. Whatever the merits of the federal alternative minimum
tax, 319 imposing such burdens in numerous state jurisdictions clearly is
undesirable. States that wished to parallel the reduction in the value
of tax preferences that the federal income tax system accomplishes
through the alternative minimum tax could rely instead, at a lower
compliance cost to taxpayers, on a rule adding back to regular taxable
income (subject to apportionment among the states) a percentage of
the difference between federal regular and alternative minimum taxable income.
• For similar reasons, bar states from applying their own depreciation systems. States could be permitted to require that a portion of
federally allowable depreciation deductions be first added back to taxable income and then treated as a separate tax account to be deducted
over a longer period. This would simplify recordkeeping, in comparison to the use of a separate depreciation system, by eliminating the
319. See Daniel Shaviro, Perception, Reality and Strategy: The New Alternative Minimum
Tax, 66 TAXES 91 (1988).
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need for taxpayers to keep track of more than one tax basis for each
separate asset.
• Require the states to adopt the federal income tax carryover periods for tax attributes such as capital losses and net operating losses.
• Require states to grant income tax filing extensions automatically when extensions are allowed for federal income tax purposes.
• Require all states to apply a uniform deadline for reporting adjustments to one's federal income tax return.
b. Other state and local taxes. Arguments also could be made for
standardizing tax bases other than the income tax. The problem is
that Congress may be less trustworthy when it is specifying tax bases
that. are not being used by the national government. Thus, barring the
enactment, say, of a national sales or value-added tax, greater uniformity may best be pursued at the state and local levels - despite its
being impeded there by the forces favoring the separate exercise of
discretion, either to serve particular political objectives or as an end in
itself.
As to the sales tax, however, requiring or encouraging greater uniformity within the states might be useful. Arguably, 7000 separate
sales tax jurisdictions simply is too many. The excess would be particularly objectionable if out-of-state vendors were required to collect use
taxes under a congressional or judicial reversal of National Bellas
Hess. Thus, either in general or as a precondition to compelling outof-state vendors to remit use taxes, states could be required to cap the
number of their separate sales tax jurisdictions. For example, a cap of
ten such jurisdictions per state - applied uniformly to all states or on
average, with variations in proportion to state population - would
reduce more than tenfold the current number of jurisdictions. 320 In
this connection, it is worth noting that at present twenty states have
only one sales tax jurisdiction, and another six have fewer than twenty
separate jurisdictions. 321
Other steps also could be taken to reduce administrative and compliance burdens, whether or not it is desirable to have Congress enter
the field by taking action to require them. In particular, property
taxes would be less burdensome - as well as less subject to discriminatory application - if, instead of being based in many instances on
subjective assessments of value, they followed simply from numerical
320. Restricting the number of sales tax jurisdictions would require states to revise their
methods for dividing revenue among local governments, but this is not necessarily regrettable.
Given the arguments for locational neutrality made in this article, I see no reason to believe that
the current regime ranks high in terms of either equity or efficiency.
321. See Advisory Commission, supra note 104.
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calculations such as historical cost plus a reasonable annual growth
factor. 322 Similarly, excise and severance taxes would be less burdensome if they always were volumetric, instead of sometimes employing
the netback method based ultimately on contract price. Admittedly,
for both of these types of taxes state and local reliance on value or
contract price has an advantage: it causes tax liability to vary automatically with what might loosely be deemed the taxpayer's ability to
pay, whereas the historical cost-based and volumetric methods would
require legislative action to adjust for shifts in value. Arguably, however, legislatures that regard this advantage as more significant than
the increased burdensomeness of value-based taxes, even if they duly
consider questions of administrative cost to the state government, are
failing to give sufficient weight to the compliance costs taxpayers incur, as well as the danger of discriminatory application in the audit
process. 323
3. Limiting State and Local Tax Discretion in Choosing the
Relative Tax Rates Applicable to Different Tax Bases
Even if the states retained the power only to decide what tax rates
to apply to federally constrained or prescribed tax bases, locational
distortion would persist. By moving in the direction of tax base uniformity, one would hope merely to reduce such distortion, while stopping short of the point where the costs of uniformity due to reduced
state and local autonomy begin to outweigh its benefits. One could
322. The Supreme Court briefly accepted for review a case (subsequently settled) that concerned a property tax valuation formula based on historical cost. R.H. Macy & Co. v. Contra
Costa County, 276 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2256, cert. dismissed, 111 S.
Ct. 2923 (1991). The case concerned the so-called "Welcome, Stranger'' rule under California's
property tax, whereby a property's valuation cannot increase by more than two percent per year
while it is under the same ownership, but properties are reassessed at the purchase price upon
sale to a third party. The problem was the unrealistically low annual inflation factor. The petitioner asserted that this rule violated the Equal Protection Clause and discriminated against
interstate commerce (by requiring new entrants from out-of-state to pay higher property taxes
than their established in-state competitors). It then dropped the suit in the face of a threatened
consumer boycott. One problem with the petitioner's argument, even assuming the tax was
aimed sufficiently at out-of-staters, not just all purchasers, was that the tax could be described
neutrally as a combination property tax and sales tax, with the latter being levied in the form of a
stream of increased property tax payments. Thus, however unwise or inefficient the tax, it is
difficult to see a constitutional violation. Cf. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County,
488 U.S. 336 (1989) (striking down a local "Welcome, Stranger" enforcement policy where it
caused eight- to thirty-five-fold disparities in the tax valuations of properties that were worth the
same amount).
323. Under ideal conditions, legislatures would take into account taxpayers' compliance
costs, because these could be converted dollar for dollar into higher tax liability without prompting additional exit. One reason this tradeoff does not always occur may be that the tradeoff
might not be possible without either overtly discriminating against interstate commerce or raising in-state voters' taxes along with those paid by outsiders.
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argue, however, that the proposals I have advanced so far do not go
far enough in the direction of limiting discretion.
In particular, if states retain total discretion regarding which of the
allowable tax bases they use and what rates to apply to these bases, not
only would great variation continue to exist, but some problems of
discrimination would be replicated. Consider, for example, Iowa,
which, being primarily a market rather than a business state, employs
a corporate income tax allocation formula based solely on in-state
sales rather than on the standard three factors. Even if that opportunity were eliminated by the imposition of uniform rules governing
both allocation and measurement of corporate income, Iowa arguably
could still accomplish a measure of perceived or actual tax exportation
simply by continuing to rely heavily on the corporate income tax,
rather than, say, on property, sales, and personal income taxes that are
paid to a greater extent by in-staters.
If state corporate income taxes present the principal remaining tax
exportation problem, because out-of-state companies are the most natural deep-pocket targets, a simple solution would be to constrain the
rates of such taxes, either absolutely or in relation to the rates of other
taxes levied by the same jurisdiction. In favor of such a limitation, one
could argue, as Charles McLure does, that state corporate income
taxes are unusually unmeritorious. In addition to imposing large compliance burdens, they are perhaps the greatest existing state-level tool
of fiscal illusion, largely failing not only to shift costs out-of-state but
even to allocate real tax burdens progressively (presumably one of
their principal aims). 324 The main problem with such a proposal is
simply that, given the widespread belief that corporate income taxes
are progressive in incidence, a proposal to limit them at the state level
might create political confusion between the issue of federalism in taxation and the separate issue of tax progressivity.
If state corporate income taxes are merely one example of a serious
broader problem, or if the problem is best stated in broader terms to
avoid political confusion between the issues of federalism and progressivity, it might be thought desirable to constrain state discretion more
broadly by prescribing outer bounds to the disparities between the tax
rates applied to different tax bases. For example, among a set of tax
bases, such as personal income, corporate income, sales, and property,
states could be barred from taxing any one base at a rate more than
324. McLure argues that the real economic incidence of state corporate income taxes resembles that of two tax bases that generally are agreed to be regressive: payroll and sales. McLure,
supra note 24, at 341-42.
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three times as high, or five percentage points higher, than the rate applied to any other of the bases.
Yet such a proposal, while not affirmatively objectionable under
the analysis in this article, does not appear necessary. Consider what
are probably the three most critical locational distortion problems
posed by federalism in taxation: administrative and compliance costs,
discrimination against outside business, and perceived or actual tax
exportation. The first of these is not addressed by constraining tax
rate variations. As for the second, so long as all businesses within the
taxing state's market pay tax at the same rate, insiders are not advantaged relative to outsiders. Thus, a state that applies extremely
uneven rates to different types of taxes does not create competitive
distortions like those resulting, for example, from Iowa's income allocation rule, which favors wholly in-state firms by increasing the relative taxes paid by outsiders. Finally, tax exportation, while perhaps
not negligible, is ameliorated by limiting discretion over tax bases even
if we do not limit discretion over tax rates. A state that charges a high
rate on a broad-based levy such as a corporate income tax cannot
avoid directly taxing some in-staters as well as outsiders. This may
provide some political protection for outsiders.
In addition to being relatively unnecessary, constraining tax rate
variations plainly would move closer to the point where the costs of
increased uniformity begin to exceed the benefits. As discussed previously, the more visible and salient an issue, the more plausible it is that
local control enhances real voter satisfaction, even if that satisfaction
is based on illusions about a tax's effect or incidence. Issues of what
type of tax to use - for example, whether to rely on income taxes or
sales taxes for revenue - tend to be more visible and salient than the
details of particular tax bases - for example, the system for income
tax depreciation. 325 Requiring uniformity only for the latter type of
issue, and thus not limiting state and local voter sovereignty on issues
large numbers of voters may actually care about, helps to eliminate
any serious doubt that more is being gained than lost by moving in the
direction of national uniformity.
4. Relevance of Constitutional Limitations to Congress' Power
over the States
The proposals discussed in this section might, in varying degrees,
reduce the autonomy of state and local governments in taxation below
what has been practiced for the past two centuries and what the Fram325. See supra section 111.C.3.
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ers expected and assumed. 326 This naturally raises the constitutional
question of whether Congress is empowered to impose such significant
limitations on the states. The central issue is whether Congress' power
to restrict state and local taxation, arising under the Commerce flnd
Supremacy Clauses, is in any relevant respect limited.
The answer here initially appears quite clear. Numerous Supreme
Court cases interpreting the Commerce Clause, including a handful
that specifically concern congressional restrictions on state and local
taxation, establish that Congress' power to restrict state and local taxation of interstate commerce is "plenary and all-pervasive, and unrestricted by competing State interests."327 The only question,
therefore, is whether a particular. restriction impermissibly reaches
purely intrastate activity that is not within the reach of the power over
interstate commerce.
Given this question, one might still argue, for example, that, despite the breadth of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, a rule requiring conformity between state and federal income taxes is
unconstitutional as applied to taxpayers not engaged in interstate commerce. In practice, however, the intrastate limitation appears to have
little or no significance. Not only is the currently prevailing definition
of what constitutes interstate commerce extremely broad, 328 but taxing
purely intrastate taxpayers or activities differently from those subject
to the congressional power would raise discrimination issues and thus
support requiring uniformity between the two. In other areas, Congress' power to regulate purely intrastate activities due to their indirect
effects on interstate commerce has long been settled. 32 9
One potential complication should be noted, however. Given the
longstanding assumption that in our federal system state and local
governments will remain active and important within their sphere, an
overly sweeping set of federal restrictions might make the Supreme
Court sufficiently uneasy to invite the creation of new constitutional
326. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison).
327. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 329. Cf. HARTMAN, supra note 111,
§ 13:7, at 703 ("[T]he power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce seems so complete and
paramount in character that Congress may supersede state action even in areas which admittedly
are local or intrastate."); Paul F. Mickey & George B. Mickum, Ill, Congressional Regulation of
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 38 N.C. L. REv. 119, 122 (1960) (noting Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause to regulate state taxation in interstate commerce).
328. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that the Commerce Clause
power supports federal regulation of wheat grown and consumed on the farm of the grower).
329. See, e.g., Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (upholding
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate rates of interstate railways);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause to set minimum wages and maximum hours for employees engaged in the production of
goods for interstate commerce).
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principles limiting Congress' preemptive power. In this regard, the
short-lived reign of National League of Cities v. Usery, 330 decided by
the Supreme Court in 1976 and overruled in 1985,331 is instructive. In
National League of Cities, the Supreme Court struck down Congress'
extension to state employees of minimum wage and maximum hour
requirements under the Fair Labor Standard Act. In a plurality opinion, Justice Rehnquist, straining desperately to make something of the
rather vague and exhortatory Tenth Amendment, 332 claimed that it
" 'expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not
exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their
ability to function effectively in a federal system.' "333
As a matter of textual interpretation, Chief Justice Rehnquist's account of what the Amendment "expressly declares" is extremely weak.
The Amendment, in its own words, applies only to "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution" - to wit, powers other
than the Commerce Clause power at issue in the case. As the expression of a historically rooted constitutional instinct, however, the Chief
Justice's position arguably has more force. Surely one might pause
before concluding that, simply because the Commerce Clause power
has been interpreted as virtually universal, Congress has the power to
eliminate essentially all state and local government authority. The
question, then, is where and on what constitutional ground to draw
the line, assuming that such a line should be drawn judicially rather
than by the political process.
In this regard, National League of Cities provided little but what
one commentator has termed "a variety of inexact and overstated expressions,"334 principally relying on the notion that Congress may not
interfere with states' "integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions" 335 which are not easily defined. In large part, it
was the unworkability of this standard that led to National League of
Cities' reversal in 1985, and to the Supreme Court's conclusion that
the states must instead look to the national political process for
protection. 336
330. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
331. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
332. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." U.S. CoNST. amend. X.
333. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 843 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542,
547 n.7 (1975)). Justice Blackmun, concurring and providing the crucial fifth vote for the holding, appeared to suggest balancing federal and state interests case by case. See 426 U.S. at 856.
334. HARTMAN, supra note 111, § 13:2, at 679.
335. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
336. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47, 556.
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Yet National League of Cities may not be irreversibly repudiated.
Among current members of the Supreme Court, Justices Rehnquist
and O'Connor are explicitly committed to the revival of National
League of Cities. 337 Since the case seems generally to appeal more to
conservatives (perhaps because they are more hostile to economically
activist national legislation), it is conceivable that Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas would consider voting to revive it, particularly if Congress acts so aggressively as to reduce their confidence in
the political check. 338 As a practical matter, then, there may be
outside limits, perhaps more aesthetic than logical, on how far Congress can go in the state and local tax area. Still, the proposals that I
endorse, which are limited to addressing coordination problems between states' tax systems and conforming tax bases to reduce burdens
on interstate commerce, should be well within any such limits.
B.

The Federal Courts

If Congress took sufficient steps to regulate state and local taxation, the main federal judicial role would change from one of interpreting the Constitution against a background of congressional silence to
one of interpreting federal laws. Thus, even if the courts remained
active in reviewing state and local taxes, their views concerning the
negative Commerce Clause would lose significance, given the statutory
grounds on which discriminatory taxes presumably would be subject
to challenge in most cases. Absent substantial congressional action,
however, the choice of judicial standard under the negative Commerce
Clause is consequential. I have already suggested that current negative Commerce Clause doctrine is seriously deficient, in large part due .
to the Supreme Court's effort to balance concern about discrimination
against the value attributed to state and local government autonomy.
Moreover, I have suggested that such doctrine should single-mindedly
focus on harm to outsiders and interstate commerce, instead of attempting to balance it against the value of state and local government
autonomy. The principal remaining question is how to conceptualize
this change - that is, what the revised judicial standard should look
like.
Unfortunately, no one concise test can capture what the courts
should do. The problems that may arise - ranging from hostility to
outside business competition to attempted tax exportation to correcta337. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
338. for Justice Scalia, however, the lack of textual support from the Tenth Amendment and
the difficulty of drawing a simple line between permissible and impermissible national legislation
might militate against reviving National League of Cities.
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ble but unmalicious disregard for the creation of undue compliance
costs - are simply too various. Moreover, the courts' institutional
competence to detect these problems and design workable solutions
varies significantly with the context. I therefore suggest that the
courts invalidate state and local taxes under the negative Commerce
Clause when these taxes violate any of the following tests:
(1) Comparative marginal cost test. As discussed previously, this
test has certain shortcomings. 339 Its distinction between fixed and variable costs may be unclear in practice, and perhaps is even more unclear in theory. In the long run, all tax costs are variable and tend to
influence the structure of interstate markets. Nonetheless, the test is
useful, given that not all locational disparities can be struck down consistently with retaining a federal system, because it identifies a class of
undesirable tax disparities that state and local political processes may
tend systematically to produce. As noted earlier, outsiders are relatively likely to be disfavored by state and local political processes, even
where they have potential in-state allies such as consumers. 340 Moreover, Schoettle's distinction between fixed and variable costs is roughly
compatible with the insight that basic locational decisions, such as
where to reside or locate one's business, tend to be less elastic than
decisions to enter a jurisdiction for limited purposes such as the sale of
goods, 341 making the latter - the realm of his variable costs - more
subject to inefficient distortion. The comparative marginal cost test
therefore is a major advance over current legal doctrine, giving more
coherent and concrete economic content to the murky concept of discrimination against interstate commerce.
(2) The Supreme Court's internal consistency test. Under this test,
a state or local tax is struck down if its adoption by all jurisdictions
would lead to relative overtaxation of interstate commerce. The value
of this test lies in its requiring states to make reasonable efforts at equitable tax base apportionment when more than one state has a potential
claim. 342 Concededly, merely requiring some reasonable effort at apportionment is inferior in principle to mandating consistent apportionment rules that all states will follow. For the courts, however, the
internal consistency test's simplicity of application is in some situations a decisive advantage. It can eliminate the need for a court either
339. See supra section 11.C.1.
340. See supra section II.A.
341. See supra section 11.C.1.
342. The internal consistency test does not always succeed in requiring a reasonable effort at
apportionment, as Moorman Mfg. Corp. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978), makes clear. Iowa's salesonly apportionment rule was consistent with internal consistency.
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to act like a legislature by mandating specific apportionment rules or
to engage in a detailed examination of how different states' apportionment rules interact.
(3) Require adherence to "rules of the road," or apportionment rules
that have attracted widespread consensus among the states. The judicial agnosticism or timidity about prescribing particular allocation
rules that underlies the internal consistency test need not always be
decisive. When particular allocation rules have attracted widespread
consensus among the states, the courts can go beyond internal consistency and require that holdout states accept those rules, in effect as
"rules of the road." 343 Possible applications include requiring (1) adherence to consensus rules regarding which state must be the one to
provide a tax credit when states' tax bases overlap, 344 and (2) the use
of a three-factor allocation formula for multistate business income perhaps (depending on one's tolerance for specific judicial prescription) even adding specificity to the rule of the road by requiring that
the three factors be weighted equally.
This test, along with the internal consistency test, could be generalized as an application of a broader principle that states must make
some good faith effort at tax base apportionment for multistate activities. A test more generally requiring good faith efforts at apportionment, while worth considering, might create too much uncertainty
about judicial outcomes. For example, assuming that Iowa's singlefactor unitary business income apportionment rule is struck down but
that no one variant of the three-factor test is mandated, what about
the Minnesota rule, which applies to the standard three factors but
assigns seventy percent of the weight to sales and only fifteen percent
each to profits and payroll? If that rule is struck down, what about
states that double-weight the sales factor? Perhaps it is best not to give

343. Past Supreme Court Commerce Clause cases regarding regulation by state and local
governments have treated uniformity as an important value, and imposed what were literally
rules of the road. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981}
(striking down an Iowa law barring certain large trucks that were allowed on the roads of nil
neighboring states, partly on the ground that Iowa's divergence from the norm burdened interstate commerce).
344. Under state and local personal income taxes, for example, if a resident of one state earns
income in another state and both states include such income in their tax bases, the state of
residence generally is the one that provides a tax credit for income taxes paid to the other state.
See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 968-69. This happens to be the correct
place for the credit under the Schoettle test, but it might be worth following as a "rule of the
road" even if neither state, more than the other, was the right one to provide n credit. Under
another "rule of the road," in the case of an interstate sale that both the seller's and the buyer's
jurisdictions subject to sales tax, priority generally goes to the state of destination, and the seller's
jurisdiction provides a tax credit. See id. at 781-82.
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much content to the good faith principle beyond requiring internal
consistency and mandating adherence to consensus rules of the road.
(4) Bar significant attempted tax exportation. To the extent feasible, significant tax exportation, whether perceived or actual, should be
barred. To detect instances of significant attempted tax exportation,
the courts generally should look for two critical identifying features:
(i) the use of a tax base that disproportionately reaches outsiders, at
least as to direct incidence or in the short run; and (ii) the application
to that base of a tax rate that is higher than the rates applied within
the jurisdiction to other fiscally significant tax bases. Under a test barring taxes with these two indicia, numerous states' excise and severance taxes would probably be struck down (subject to reinstatement at
lower rates), as might certain corporate income or other business
taxes.

***

Judicial review based on the above tests admittedly might be inferior, in both effectiveness and predictability, to a well-designed legislative solution. The well-known institutional disadvantages of using
courts to implement broad rules and policies345 are hard to overcome.
Yet the tests should at least make possible the achievement of an ordinary and acceptable level of judicial failure, as compared with the extraordinary level that has characterized negative Commerce Clause
doctrine from its earliest days until the present. Moreover, in comparison to the alternative of no significant judicial review of state and
local taxes, the tests should improve at the margin the functioning of
our integrated national markets.

345. See, e.g., id. at 324-25.

